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The FTC is a "passel of ideologues who are hostile to the
business system, to the free enterprise system, and who sit
down there and invent theories that justify more meddling
and interference in the economy."'
-David Stockman, Director,
Office of Management and
Budget

I.

INTRODUCTION

For the second time in three years, Congress is contemplating serious changes in the law enforcement role of the Federal Trade Commis-

sion (FTC). Following months of intense, widely-publicized debate,
Congress in 1980 curtailed the agency's statutory authority, restricted
several ongoing programs, and authorized the agency's operations
through September 30, 1982, with promises of unrelenting scrutiny.2

Within the past year, several members of Congress have introduced
bills to limit further the Commission's powers. 3 As the agency's appropriations and authorization measures come before the Congress, these

proposals are likely to receive serious attention.4
An important articulated basis for the 1980 legislation and current
limiting measures is the congressional perception that the Commission
has contradicted the legislature's policy preferences in selecting its law

enforcement programs. Congressman William Frenzel pungently cap1. Chicago Tribune, Feb. 23, 1981, at A-I, col. 2-3. Budget Director Stockman's remark
came soon after the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) had recommended budget reductions that would eliminate the FTC's Bureau of Competition, the agency's antitrust enforcement
division. See FTC Commissioners Foresee Budget Cuts 4s Instant Doom for Competition Programs, [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1002, at A-1 (Feb. 19, 1981). The
OMB withdrew this proposal in the following month. See Budget Cuts Won't ScrapFTC's Competition Mission, Jan.-June] ANTTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1004, at A-4 (Mar. 5,
1981). See generally Impact of OMB-ProposedBudget Cuts For the Federal Trade Commission "
HearingsBefore a Subcomna ofthe House Comm on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981) [hereinafter cited as House 1981 Government OperationsHearings].

2. Federal Trade Comm'n Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the origins and
content of the 1980 statute, see infra text accompanying notes 429-43.
3. See, eg., S.1984, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc.,S15,685 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981).
Senators McClure and Melcher introduced S.1984 which would (1) bar the FTC from intervening in the affairs of any state-regulated profession; (2) require the FTC to bring all of its cases in
federal district court; (3) direct the Commission to reimburse private parties for the cost of responding to its subpoenas and other information requests; and (4) limit substantially the scope of
the agency's mandate to address "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices" under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Id; see also H.R. 3722, 97th Cong.,
Ist
Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H2489 (daily ed. May 28, 1981) (bill with over 130 co-sponsors placing
moratorium on FTC actions affecting the professions).
4. See Senate Unit Votes Strict FTC Curbs, Wash. Post, May 12, 1982, at Al, col. 1; Congress
threatens to extract some of the FTC's sharpestfangs, 14 NAT'L J. 535 (1982).
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tured this view in 1979 as Congress debated bills to restrict the agency's
activities:
[T]he FTC is. . .a king-sized cancer on our economy.
It has undoubtably added more unnecessary costs on American consumers who it is charged with protecting, than any
other half dozen agencies combined.
It is bad enough to be counterproductive and therefore
highly inflationary, but the FTC compounds its sins by generally ignoring the intent of the laws, and writing its own laws
whenever the whimsey strikes it.
Ignoring Congress can be a virtue, but the FTC's excessive nose-thumbing at the legislative branch has become legend. In short, the FTC has made itself into virulent political
and economic pestilence, insulated from the people and their
representatives, and accountable to no influence except its
own caprice.
On my most charitable days, I think repealing the FTC
would be a good idea. Whenever I pick up the paper and
read of another atrocity wrought by it, I think more hideous
thoughts about making the punishment fit the crime. For instance, every staff member and every Commission member
should spend 20 years at hard labor filling in their own asinine forms. And then they should spend the rest of their lives
resubmitting the same material upside down and backward. 5
The Commission, Representative Frenzel concluded, was "a rogue
agency gone insane."6
Congress' acute interest in the FTC's policies comes roughly a decade after the last comparable congressional assessment of the FTC's
performance. In the late 1960's and early 1970's several committees
with appropriations or oversight responsibilities extensively analyzed
the Commission's work and recommended a fundamental reorientation
5. 125 CONG. REc. HI0,757-58 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1979) (statement of Rep. Frenzel). Dur-

ing debate over the 1980 Improvements Act, supra note 2, the principal Senate sponsors of the Act
also expressed the view that the FTC had neglected to heed congressional policy guidance. See

126 CONG. REc. S5676 (daily ed. May 21, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Ford); id at S5681 (remarks of
Sen. Cannon).
6. Id at H10,758. See also, e.g., 121 CONG. REc. S15,687 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981) (Sen.

McClure: "In recent years, we have seen unprecedented efforts by the Commission to expand its
activities into areas well beyond those charted by Congress. It is time for Congress to curb these
actions."); House 1981 Government OperationsHearings, supra note 1, at 168 (OMB Director

Stockman: "[I]n
recent years the FTC has served the public interest very poorly, in major part
because it has sought to expand its power and influence beyond that envisioned by Congress.")
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of its efforts.7 The committees concluded that the FTC, in its first halfcentury, had spent its resources on largely insignificant matters and had

fallen unacceptably short of the goals set for it by Congress in 1914.
They generally prescribed a shift toward more innovative, aggressive

enforcement strategies and singled out a number of problems to which
the agency should give careful attention. On some occasions, the committees cautioned that failure to carry out these reforms would warrant

the Commission's abolition.'
This Article discusses the FTC's response to congressional over-

sight of its antitrust activities since 1969. 9 It begins by reviewing the
1969 Report of the American BarAssociation Commission to Study the
FederalTrade Commission. 1° This document focused congressional at-

tention upon the FTC's antitrust role and deeply influenced the legislature's thinking in the early 1970's about the appropriate course of the

agency's competition work. The ABA Report proposed that the Commission devote its antitrust resources to economically significant
problems in complex, unsettled areas of law and economics, stressing
that the agency's ability to perform this role depended heavily on the

actions of institutions outside the agency-principally the Congress
and the President. This Article analyzes the ABA's findings and, from
a historical perspective, examines the significance of external forces on

the Commission's ability to pursue the bar committee's competition
proposals. The historical review helps to explain the course of the
7. See infra text accompanying notes 216-25.

8.Id
9. This Article does not discuss congressional oversight of the Commission's consumer protection programs. For two recent studies that treat the relation of the Commission's consumer
protection programs to congressional guidance in this period, see M. Pertschuk, The Rise and
Pause of the Consumer Movement: Political Strategies of Regulation and Deregulation (lectures
presented at the School of Business Administration, University of California, Berkeley, 1981)
(forthcoming as Revolt Against Regulation: The Rise and Pause of the Consumer Movement)
(hereinafter cited as Pertschuk); B. Weingast & M. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control: Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, Working Paper No.
72 (Jan. 1982) (available through the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington
University, St. Louis, Mo.) (hereinafter cited as Weingast & Moran) The Article also does not
attempt to evaluate the legal or economic merits of the agency's antitrust activities. For recent,
largely critical reviews of the substance of the FTC's antitrust programs since 1970, see THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970, 307-315 (K. Clarkson & T. Muris eds. 1981); Gelhorn,
Two's A Crowd, The FTC's Redundant Antitrust Powers, AEI J. GOV'T & Soc'Y, Nov./Dec. 1981,
at 32. For a more positive assessment, see Fox, FTC. Sound, Coherent Approach to Monopoly
Issues, Legal Times of Wash., June 23, 1980, at 22, col. 1; House 1981 Government Operations
Hearings,supra note 1, at 237-68 (remarks of H. Goldschmid, C. Havighurst, and J. Shenefield)..
10. COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FTC, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, (Sept. 15, 1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA
REPORT]. This Article will refer to the ABA Commission as the ABA Committee to avoid confusion with the Federal Trade Commission.
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FTC's antitrust work in the 1970's and, most important, its dependency
on congressional support.
The second half of the Article describes how Congress endorsed
the ABA's recommendations, directing the FTC toward more ambitious antitrust initiatives. It will be shown, however, that the initially
strong congressional support for expansive, innovative enforcement endeavors peaked in 1976, after which congressional enthusiasm for some
programs declined. To illustrate this decline, this Article discusses
some of the measures by which the 96th Congress proposed to limit the
FTC's antitrust authority.'I Through its analysis of the ABA Report,
the historical influence of external institutions upon FTC competition
activities, and the substance of legislative oversight since 1969, the Article demonstrates that the Commission's antitrust programs of the
1970's were consistent with, and responsive to, congressional policy
preferences.

ii.

THE 1969 REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

On September 26, 1914, Woodrow Wilson concluded the chief antitrust legislative initiative of his presidency by signing into law the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 12 With its elastic substantive mandate
and broad grant of investigatory powers, the statute embodied the high
expectations of Congress that the new commission would be a singularly effective tool for maintaining competition. Three weeks before
the bill's enactment, Senator Albert Cummins addressed the Senate in
words that expressed the hopes of many of the legislation's supporters:
I predict that in the days to come the Federal [T]rade
[Commission and its enforcement of the section with regard
to unfair competition. .. will be found to be the most efficient protection to the people of the United States that Congress has ever given the people by way of a regulation of
commerce. . . . I look forward to its enforcement with a high
degree of confidence. 3
11.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

12. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as FTC Act]. At
the time of its enactment, Wilson regarded the Trade Commission Act as the centerpiece of his
antitrust program. For discussions of the evolution of Wilson's antitrust thinking as it affected the
formation of the FTC, see infra text accompanying notes 70-81; J. BLUM, WOODROW WILSON AND
THE POLrrics OF MORALITY 75-79 (1956); A. LINK, WILSON: THE NEW FREEDOM 417-44 [hereinafter cited as A. LINK, FREEDOM] (1956); A. LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA 1910-1917, at 66-74 (1954) [hereinafter cited as A. LINK, 1910-1917].

13. 51 CONG. REc. 14,770 (1914). On Cummins' central role in the passage of the FTC Act,

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol17/iss4/1
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In the Commission's first half-century, a host of commentators and

special committees appraised the agency's effectiveness as an antitrust
enforcement body.14 Their collective view was that the FTC had accomplished little of what the 63d Congress envisioned. Virtually every
study stimulated attempts at reform. Few, however, were so influential-and none as significant in its effects upon modem Commission
activities-as the ABA Report.
The American Bar Association (ABA) began its study in 1969, at
President Richard Nixon's request, 15 several months after a Ralph Nader-sponsored critique of the Commission drew widespread attention
to the agency.1 6 To conduct the inquiry, ABA President William Gossett selected a committee of sixteen individuals with differing viewpoints and broad familiarity with the FTC. 7 Although severely critical
of the agency's antitrust achievements, the Committee still perceived a
uniquely useful antitrust role for the FTC. Anchoring this view was
the belief that the Commission possessed a special capacity for resolving economically complex and unsettled competition policy issues.
A. Findings andRecommendations
The ABA Report analyzed the agency as a whole and examined
each operating bureau. This section reviews criticism relevant to antitrust enforcement, beginning with agency-wide functions that significantly affected the FTC's competition work.
see Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of the FederalTrade
CommissionAct, 21 B.C.L. REv. 227, 231-38 (1980).
14. See infra notes 59, 61, 69, 113, 127 & 136.
15. ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 86.
16. See The Consumer and the FederalTrade Commission-A Critique of the Consumer Protection Record ofthe FTC, 115 CONG. REc. 1539 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Nelson). The Nader
Report was later expanded and published in E. Cox, R FELLmErH, & J. SCHULZ, "THE NADER
REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969) [hereinafter cited as NADER REPORT].
See ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 88.
17. ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 88 (press release of William Gossett). The committee
consisted of five law professors, two economists, seven attorneys in private practice, a counsel to a
major labor union, and a counsel to a major civil rights organizatiop. The Committee's Chairman, Miles Kirkpatricic, later chaired the FTC from 1970-1973. Robert Pitofsky, the Committee's
counsel and principal author of the Committee's Report, headed the agency's Bureau of Consumer Protection in the early 1970's and served as a commissioner from 1978-1981.
18. Of all the committee members, only Richard Posner opposed the Report's recommendations. ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 92-119. Posner believed the underlying premises upon
which Congress founded the agency-the ability to address anticompetitive practices beyond the
reach of prevailing interpretations of the Sherman Act; and the desirability of developing antitrust
policy through a specialized body with flexible substantive authority and political independencewere no longer valid. Id at 115. For an elaboration of these views, see Posner, The FederalTrade
Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 47 (1969).
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1. General Criticism

The Committee's overall evaluation of the agency was unfavorable. By any of several tests, the Report found the FTC wanting: "[The
Commission's] performance when measured against a reasonable standard of acceptable government operation has been disappointing.
When actual performance is measured against the potential which the
FTC continues to possess, the agency's performance must be regarded
as a failure on many counts.""9
The agency's poor performance, the Committee concluded, was
due mainly to its failure to establish goals and priorities.2 0 The FTC's
review of its goals and priorities took place on an ad hoc basis only,2 '
and reliance upon passive case selection tools such as the "mailbag"
channel led FTC resources toward economically insignificant pursuits. 22 Even where the FTC had systematically established priorities,
it rarely translated these objectives into guidelines for its staff.23
To cure these flaws, the ABA Report recommended that the FTC
promptly "embark on a program to establish goals, priorities, and effective planning controls."'24 An attractive approach, the Report concluded, would be an "immediate expansion and reinvigoration of the
Office of Program Review," the FTC's existing planning apparatus. 2 19. ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 35.
20. The Committee observed:
Many of the present problems of the FTC-including allocation of resources, commitment of time and effort to relatively trivial matters, and extensive delay in the investigational stage of agency action-are traceable to a considerable extent to the
fundamental failure to establish goals and priorities and to implement effective planning
controls consistent with those goals and priorities.
Id at 77.
21. Id at 12. This criticism did not apply to the FTC's merger program, whose management
and operation the ABA praised. Id at 13 n.33.
22. Faulty planning, the Committee stressed, "has caused a misallocation of funds and personnel to trivial matters rather than to matters of pressing public concern." Id at 1. To the
Committee, the preoccupation with trivia manifested itself in excessive fur and textile statute enforcement and inadequate spending on the merger program. Id at 45, 69.
23. In the Committee's view, the typical FTC staff member had "no institutional devices or
agency-wide standards. . . for comparing the relative merits of allocating FTC resources to proceedings against possible violations of law. .. . ." Id at 13. This weakness frustrated the implementation of coherent policies for opening and closing investigations, selecting remedies, and
filing complaints.
24. Id at 3. The ABA Report considered this to be the agency's top reform priority: "The
first and most pressing order of business in revitalizing the FTC must be to replace present caseby-case techniques for opening and closing investigations, filing complaints, and settling cases
with comprehensive planning controls." Id at 77.
25. Id at 78. Established in the early 1960's, the Program Review Office had consisted of one
attorney, one economist, and a secretary. The position of Program Review Officer had been vacant for over a year when the ABA did its study. Id at 12-13.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol17/iss4/1
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This office would review long-range

goals, 2 6

measure anticipated re-

turns from enforcement initiatives against their cost, 27 and prepare "an
agenda of projects that ought to be undertaken by each bureau and

division . . . and indicate priorities with respect to each."' 28 By curtailing the use of "passive" case selection devices,29 the project agenda
would help correct the agency's "unfortunate tendency to involve itself

in investigations and projects of marginal importance."3 To give practical effect to this process, the planning office would devise enforcement

guidelines for the FTC's staff.'
A second basic cause of the Commission's poor performance was
its inability "to manage the flow of its work in an efficient and expeditious manner."' 32 The FTC's worse management shortcoming was its
haphazard system for monitoring the progress of cases and investigations. 33 This weakness severely hampered attempts to bring enforcement efforts to a timely conclusion.

4

Moreover, the agency's

procedures were afflicted by a "crippling delay" which the ABA Comto be "about as serious. . . as at any time in the agency's
mittee found
35

history."
The ABA Report proposed several management reforms to reduce
delay. A vital first step was to establish a system for supervising the

progress of cases and investigations, 36 a second was to review the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure "to modernize and maximize
the efficiency of the Commission's operations, 3 7 and a third was to
26. Id at 78.
27. Id
28. Id at 80.
29. Id
30. Id The Committee said the "failure of the FTC to initiate projects relevant to pressing
contemporary needs" had resulted "[i]n important part. . . from the agency's traditional reliance on the mailbag to generate most investigations and projects in the absence of comprehensive
planning and priorities." Id
31. The guidelines would explain the Commission's priorities, delineate its powers to address
them, and supply criteria for opening and closing investigations and cases. Id at 79.
32. Id at I.
33. TheA.4BA Report observed: "It. . . appears that there is no effective procedure within
the FTC to keep track of progress on matters formally initiated, to establish realistic deadlines, or
to terminate investigations once it becomes apparent that anticipated returns do not justify continued investment of time and effort." Id at 15.
34. Because the FTC lacked an effective tracking system, the ABA Report stated, "projects of
various kinds often disappear into the lower reaches of the agency and then resurface after many
years." Id at 81.
35. Id at 34.
36. Id at 81.
37. Id at 84.
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delegate more authority to the agency's staff. 38 Beyond reducing delay,
delegation would diminish the potential conflict that the ABA perceived to exist when commissioners sat as judges in matters that required their approval for commencement.39
A third important source of the Commission's ineffectiveness lay
in its choice of enforcement tactics. From recent enforcement statistics,
the ABA Committee discerned that "the FTC has resorted less frequently to formal proceedings, and has increased its reliance upon an
'informal' or 'voluntary compliance' approach to bring about industrywide compliance." 40 The Committee said the de-emphasis of formal
enforcement had "gone too far," damaging the agency's enforcement
credibility.4 The Committee added that "[v]oluntary compliance" was
especially suspect without an effective program to ensure compliance.42
Accordingly, the Committee recommended that the FTC resort more to
compulsory enforcement proceedings and expand its efforts to check
compliance with its outstanding orders.4 3
2. Antitrust
In general, the ABA Committee considered the FTC's antitrust
performance "less than satisfactory." 44 The agency's disappointing record resulted largely from its failure "to take advantage of the unique
strengths conferred upon it by Congress. . .in 1914."4- With its inves38. Id at 3, 81-83. The ABA recommended that bureau directors be authorized, among
other things, to issue complaints and close investigations.
39. Id at 82-83. The ABA Committee predicated its delegation recommendations on the
completion of its suggested planning reforms.
40. Id at 8.The informal devices included industry guides, advisory opinions, trade regulation rules, and assurances of voluntary compliance and informal corrective actions. Id at 8-9.
41. Id at 25. The panel observed: "With such an obvious disinclination by the FTC to
proceed formally, we fear that the business community may cease to take seriously the guides,
rules, and other administrative pronouncements by the FTC, and also may cease to take seriously
the statutes the FTC is empowered to enforce." Id at 26.
42. The ABA stated:
[W]e question the operation of a voluntary compliance program for which no effective
compliance checks have been devised. Many companies that voluntarily agree to change
their business practices undoubtedly will do so, but others will not. Absent a program of
careful compliance surveillance, coupled with strong sanctions when necessary, the voluntary compliance program cannot be regarded as effective law enforcement.
Id at 26.
43. Id at 79.
44. Id at 64.
45. Id The Report identified the "unique strengths" as (I) broad investigatory powers;
(2) the centralization in one agency of Commissioners, administrative law judges, attorneys, and
economists who could develop special competence in the antitrust field; (3) the ability to decide
questions without necessarily relying on case-by-case precedent; and (4) the power to issue studies
to the President, Congress, and the public on antitrust issues. Id at 64-65.
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tigatory powers, institutional expertise, jurisdictional flexibility, and equitable remedies, the FTC appeared ideally suited to address the mixed
economic and legal issues that dominate antitrust.46
Since 1914, however, this potential seldom had transcended the
level of mere possibility. Merger enforcement aside, the Committee
could find few FTC accomplishments on the frontiers of antitrust law:
If the measure of the quality of FTC performance in the
antitrust area is whether the agency has broken new ground
and made new law by resort to its unique administrative resources, it seems clear that the record is largely one of missed
opportunity. However, the FTC did lead the way in implementation and interpretation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
Moreover, that program has been carried out not simply by
the institution of formal proceedings, but by the publication
of economic reports and the promulgation of guides, le., by
use of the full panoply of administrative resources available
to the FTC.47
Although seemingly speaking hypothetically, the Committee's next remark revealed that it believed "ground breaking" to be an appropriate
performance standard: "In the expectation that these kinds of successes
can be repeated and extended by the revitalized FTC we envisage, we
decline to propose the elimination of antitrust enforcement authority in
the FTC."4 8 Thus, in weighing the desirability of antitrust enforcement
by administrative means, the Committee recommended that the FTC
retain its antitrust authority: "However well the federal judiciary may
now be thought to be functioning in this area, there is an important role
for the administrative process in solving difficult and complex antitrust
questions."4 9
Because it expected the FTC to apply the "full panoply" of its resources to break new ground and make new law in the many "difficult
and complex" areas of antitrust policy, the Committee endorsed continued antitrust responsibility for the agency.5" The significance of this
view is evident in the ABA's recommendations about the future divi46. Id
47. Id at 65. Shortly before discussing the Commission's limited accomplishments as an
antitrust pathfinder, the Committee noted, without comment, that "[u]nder the Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1964), the FTC has power (never used) to cancel trademarks where
used for anticompetitive purposes." _d at 64 n.98.
48. ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 65.
49. Id at 64. Earlier, the Report had concluded that the FTC could "perform valuable service in bringing the administrative process to bear on difficult and complex problems." Id at 2.

50. Id at 2, 65. If well-established, per se violations were antitrust policy's exclusive concern,
one presumes the ABA might have suggested a different course.
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sion of labor between the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FTC:
We recommend that the FTC concentrate on antitrust
enforcement that would make best use of the unique advantages of its administrative process. This would mean, for example, that the FTC should take no action in situations in
which the conduct at issue, if challenged by the Department
of Justice, would be likely to be challenged in a criminal proceeding. Cases ofper se illegality, such as price-fixing, market
allocation, and boycotts designed to enforce price-fixing cartels should thus be left to the Department of Justice. For the
trial of these cases which usually involve nothing more than
controversies over whether alleged conduct in fact occurred,
the criminal sanctions, where appropriate, and litigation procedures of the district courts are better suited than the FTC's
administrative approach.
On the other hand, where issues of anticompetitive effects
turn essentially on complicated economic analysis, and where
decided cases have not yet succeeded in fashioning a clear line
such
marking the boundary between legal and illegal conduct,
51
matters should generally be assigned to the FTC.
The ABA proceeded to suggest three specific changes in the FTC's
antitrust programs. First, it singled out vertical restraints as one "complicated and economically significant" area in which the FTC had
"foregone opportunities to participate in the constructive development
of law that might contribute to the attainment of antitrust objectives." 52
Second, the Committee proposed that the FTC expand its merger enforcement efforts.53 Finally, the ABA recommended that the agency
"initiate*a study and appraisal of the compatibility of the RobinsonPatman Act and its current interpretations to the attainment of antiof
trust objectives," 54 and during this appraisal, limit its enforcement
55
the Act to "instances in which injury to competition is clear."
51. Id at 66.
52. Id at 68. In another passage, the ABA stated that the FTC had "virtually abandoned"
efforts to address vertical distribution problems. Id The Committee identified several
problems--dual distribution, territorial confinement and other limitations on franchises, and price

squeezes-for which "the expertise of the FTC could be employed to enlighten the business community and the courts." Id

53. The ABA generally praised the FTC's merger work. Id at 69. "In this area.., the FTC
has contributed to the adoption of original and important theories of antitrust enforcement." Id
(footnote omitted). The Committee added that the agency had not "committed enough of its
resources to the divisions charged with responsibilities in the merger area." Id
54. Id at 67; 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976).
55. Id at 68.
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3. Conclusion
The success of the ABA's recommended program depended upon
the quality of the FTC's leadership and staff, both of which the ABA
found deficient. 6 The Committee acknowledged, however, that
whether and how far the FTC would press its renewal were questions
that only Congress and the President could answer. The Report stated:
If the proposals in this report are ever to be implemented,
and if the FTC is to fulfill the role we believe it can play, it
must have the continuous vigorous support of the President
and Congress. The first important manifestation of that support should be the appointment of a Commission Chairman
with executive ability, knowledge of the tasks Congress has
entrusted to the agency, and sufficient strength and independence to resist pressures from Congress, the Executive
Branch, or the business community that tend to cripple effective performance by the FTC.57
If Congress, the President, and the agency's own leaders did not pursue
a comprehensive reform program, the Committee flatly favored the
FTC's abolition:
In conclusion, this Commission believes it should be the
last of the long series of committees and groups which have
earnestly insisted that drastic changes were essential to recreate the FTC in its intended image. The case for change is
plain. What is required is that the changes now be made, and
in depth. Further temporizing is indefensible. Notwithstanding the great potential of the FTC in the field of antitrust and
consumer protection, if change does not occur, there will be
no substantial purpose to be served by its continued existence;
the essential work to be done must then be carried on by other
governmental institutions. 8
As its dramatic insistence upon immediate reform shows, the ABA
was impressed by how similar its findings were to earlier evaluations of
56. The Committee concluded that there were "too many instances of incompetence in the

agency, particularly in senior staff positions." Id at 34. The panel believed that the uneven
quality of staff, like other FTC shortcomings, reflected badly on the Commission's leadership. See
id "The primary responsibility for these failures must rest with the leadership of the Commis-

sion. In recent years, bitter public displays of dissension among Commissioners have confused
and demoralized the FTC staff, and the failure to provide leadership has left enforcement activity

largely aimless." Id at I.
57. Id at 35.
58. Id at 3. The Report did not specify which "other governmental institutions" would carry

on the agency's work, though presumably the Justice Department would assume the FTC's antitrust duties.
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the FTC's antitrust performance.5 9 The Committee's review of previ-

ous critiques suggested steadfast resistance by the FTC to needed
changes:

Since its establishment in 1914, a succession of independent
scholars and groups have sounded much the same themes in
their criticisms of the FTC, including the absence of effective

planning and failure to establish workable priorities, the consequent tendency to become involved in too many trivial
cases, the delay and unnecessary secrecy in FTC operations,

and the uneven quality of staff. It is worthy of note that each
successive study made it clear that the older criticism was still
applicable and that previously proposed solutions generally
had been ignored.60

At first glance, experience with the critical historical commentary suggested the futility of still another report that recited the same basic
flaws and, yet, like most of its predecessors, said the FTC should retain
its antitrust authority. The crucial question was why the FTC had not
heeded previous reform proposals. To be convincing, the ABA had to
show why its recommendations might take hold where other critiques
apparently had failed.6 1
59. TheABA Report cites eight previous studies of the FTC: BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STUDY (1960); COMMITTEE ON INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS, TASK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (Jan. 1949) (submitted separately by

The Hoover Commission as Appendix N to COMMISSION ON ORO. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
OF THE GOV'T, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (Mar. 1949)) [hereinafter cited as
HOOVER COMM'N TASK FORCE REPORT]; T. BLAISDELL, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(1932); G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PROCEDURE (1924); L. KOHLMEIER, THE REGULATORS (1969); C. Auerbach, Report on the
Internal Organization and Procedure of the Federal Trade Commission (Dec. 1962), reprintedIn
48 MINN. L. REV. 393 (1964); J. Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies To The President-Elect
(Dec. 1960); NADER REPORT, supra, note 16 at 5 n.3, 10 nn.22-23, 11 n.29.

. 60. ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 9. One should be wary of the notion advanced in this
passage that the earlier commentary was so completely homogenous as the ABA suggests. These
critiques make many of the same points but they contain important differences as well. Significant
points of disagreement or variations in emphasis emerge in discussions of the nature and causes of
the agency's weaknesses, the appropriate standards for measuring performance, and the correct
path for reform. To say that earlier critics shared common assumptions and spoke with one voice
in evaluating the FTC's performance imparts a misleading simplicity to the problems and policy
choices facing the Commission throughout its history. For an insightful review of the literature
assessing the work of the FTC and other regulatory agencies, see McCraw, Regulation in America:
A Review Article, 49 Bus. HIST. REV. 159 (1975).
61. Most earlier evaluations of the FTC and antitrust enforcement had recommended that
the agency continue to exercise antitrust authority. Some studies explicitly endorsed dual antitrust
enforcement. G. HENDERSON, supra note 59, at 327; HOOVER COMM'N TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 59, at 120, 125; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 375-77 (1955).
Several other major critiques did not address the issue directly but made proposals that assumed
the retention of concurrent jurisdiction. See BUDGET 1960 STUDY, supra note 59; C. AUERBACH,
supra note 59; WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY (NEAL REPORT) (presented to
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The ABA Committee suggested two reasons for the minimal effect

of earlier commentaries. The first was the tepid quality of previous
FTC reform efforts. While noting exceptions, the Committee perceived
a near contentment by the FTC with unobtrusive law enforcement, in-

terrupted only by infrequent attempts to test the full potential inherent
in its charter.6 2 The Committee recognized that some often-mentioned

reform goals, such as effective planning, were intrinsically elusive, and
in discussing the Commission's enforcement attitudes, the ABA did not

claim to have exhausted all possible organizational or institutional explanations, short of outright neglect, for the agency's seeming disinclination to pursue significant antitrust matters.63 Nevertheless, the
Committee concluded that the FTC, to an inexcusable degree, had

merely shrugged off previous reform proposals. To prevent the agency
from ignoring its recommendations, the ABA warned that the appropriate alternative to serious reform was the Commission's abolition.
Although it questioned the Commission's fortitude, the ABA was

not satisfied that frail institutional will was the only, or even dispositive, reason for the scant discernable impact of earlier studies. In one
salient passage, the Committee intimated that forces outside the agency
had deadened the FTC's reform impulses. "If the proposals in this
report are ever to be implemented, and if the FTC is to fulfill the role
we believe it can play, it must have the continuous vigorous support of
President Johnson on July 5, 1968 and released on May 21, 1969), reprintedinEconomic Concentration: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoiy of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,91st Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 8,at 5054-82 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Economic Concentration
Hearings: Pt. 8]. On the other hand, James Landis' 1960 commentary proposed that the FTC's
antitrust authority be transferred to the Justice Department. Landis, supra note 59, at 29-30, 5152; see also PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION (StiglerReport) (released June 16, 1969), reprintedin Economic ConcentrationHearings: Pt. 8, at 5034-52.
The Stigler Report stated that "substantial retrenchment by the Commission in the antitrust fields
is highly desirable," but stopped short of recommending the total elimination of the agency's
antitrustpowers. Id at 5039.
62. The ABA Report referred to the following passage from the HOOVER COMMISSION TASK
FORCE REPORT.

As the years have progressed, the Commission has become immersed in a multitude of
petty problems; it has not probed into new areas of anticompetitive practices; it has become increasingly bogged down with cumbersome procedures and inordinate delays in
disposition of cases. Its economic work-instead of being the backbone of its activitieshas been allowed to dwindle almost to none. The Commission has largely become a
passive judicial agency, waiting for cases to come up on the docket, under routinized
procedures, without active responsibility for achieving the statutory objectives.
ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 10 (quoting HOOVER COMM'N TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at
125).
63. See ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 15; see also R. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND ANTITRUST POLICY

76-85, 180-89 (1980) (ob-

serving that the opening of some small, easily prosecuted cases may be important to recruiting and
retaining a capable litigation stafi).
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the President and Congress."' The Report called for the appointment
of a chairman with "sufficient strength and independence to resist pressures from Congress, the Executive Branch, or the business community
that tend to cripple effective performance by the FTC."6 Surprisingly,
the ABA Report contained little mention of the environment surrounding the FTC in 1969, but the ABA Committee seems to have contemplated the willingness of actors outside the agency, particularly the
President and the Congress, to support the agency's rejuvenation.
B. ExternalInfluences on FTCAntitrust Performance
The history of the FTC's competition programs suggests that the
attitudes and behavior of institutions outside the agency were indeed
important to the ABA's reform proposals. The agency's historical relationships with the President, the Congress, the judiciary, and the business community all had influenced the scope and quality of the FTC's
antitrust endeavors. Drawing upon major events in the agency's history, the balance of this section addresses several important events and
trends that help explain the ABA's implicit view in 1969 that external
circumstances favored the agency's antitrust transformation. 66
1. Stature of Competition Policy
Since 1914, the scope and substance of FTC antitrust enforcement
have depended fundamentally on how dearly the country has valued
competition over rival systems for organizing the nation's economy. 67
The antitrust laws embody, among other things, a social preference for
the primacy of market forces and limited government supervision of
the economy.68 These measures, however, are neither the sole nor final
expressions of national policy toward economic organization. For
64. Id at 35.
65. Id

66. This review focuses mainly on the actions of governmental bodies toward the FTC. It
therefore treats the influence of businessmen and the public on FTC activities indirectly as it
emerges through the actions of the President, Congress, and the judiciary.
67. For an especially illuminating historical analysis of antitrust enforcement as a function of
changing social attitudes toward competition and the market system, see R. HOFSTADTER, What
Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND
OTHER ESSAYS 188 (1965). For two important, recent contributions to the literature on the history
of competition policy, regulation, and business-government cooperation, see REGULATION IN PERsPECTrvE (T. McCraw ed. 1981); OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS-BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY: HISTOIANS' PERSPECTIVES ON
ANTITRUST AND GOvERNMENT-BUSINEss RELATIONSHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES (1981).
68. On the public mood that precipitated congressional moves in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries-to redress monopoly, see generally R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 213-69
(1955); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 54-163, 235-368 (1955); S. HAYS, THE
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much of this century, they have coexisted with many other statutes and
policies that either stress a greater government role in guiding economic activity or exempt various industries from the competition rules
applying to business generally. As political scientist Pendleton Herring
observed in 1936, the country's refusal to give competition policy a

more certain endorsement hindered the FTC's antitrust work: "An
agreed-upon policy concerning government regulation of industry has

not yet been developed with the clarity or objectivity essential in establishing a basis for the free exercise of discretion by an independent
commission. Vacillations as to fundamental69 policy have disrupted the
career of the Federal Trade Commission.
The question of what role competition should play in governing

economic activity dates back to the FTC's very creation. The problem
of monopoly occupied a prominent place in the presidential election
campaign of 1912.70 All three candidates-Taft, Wilson, and Theodore
Roosevelt-addressed the issue, but attention focused mainly on Wilson's and Roosevelt's antitrust enforcement views.7 1 Wilson proposed
supplementing the Sherman Act with legislation banning the specific,
illicit devices that enabled firms to achieve market power. "Our pur-

pose is the restoration of freedom. We propose to prevent private monopoly by law, to see to it that the methods by which monopolies have

been built up are legally made impossible."7"
Roosevelt, the independent, Progressive Party candidate, took a
1885-1914, at 4-93 (1957); P- WEIBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER
1877-1920, at 1-163 (1967).
69. P. HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 110 (1936). Twenty
years later, Marver Bernstein, another scholar in the field of public administration, appraised the
agency's antitrust record in terms very similar to Herring's:
The most critical problem of the FTC enforcement program stems from national
inability to fix a course of antimonopoly action. The FTC has inherited the national
ambivalence toward antimonopoly and competition. Moreover, it must operate in an
environment marked by notable legislative deviations from antimonopoly objectives.... Its programs are complicated by the American habit of both respecting the
accomplishments of bigness and fearing the political and economic consequences of increasing concentration of economic power. Its burden of enforcement is increased immeasurably by the lack of a clear commitment to antimonopoly policy throughout the
government and the country generally.
M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 222 (1955).
70. See G. HENDERSON, supra note 59, at 16-19, 22-24; R. HOFSTADTER, suPra note 68, at
246-50; A. LINK, 1910-1917, supra note 12, at 18-21.
71. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 68, at 247-49; A. LINK, 1910-1917, supra note 12, at 18-21.
72. W. WILSON, THE NEw FREEDOM 222 (1913). "Everybody who has even read the newspapers knows the means by which these men built up their power and created these monopolies.
Any decently equipped lawyer can suggest to you statutes by which the whole business can be
stopped." Id at 172. The architect of Wilson's position on antitrust during the campaign was
Louis Brandeis. A. LINK, 1910-1917, supra note 12, at 20-21.
RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM
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different tack. Viewing substantial industrial concentration as inevitable, he recommended that the federal government guide the great accumulations of private economic power toward public ends.73 Roosevelt
envisioned a federal commission with authority to regulate the issuance
of securities; compel publication of company accounts; investigate any
business activity; control hours, wages, and other conditions of labor;
and set maximum prices for goods produced by monopolists who had
attained their positions by honest means. 74

Wilson denounced Roosevelt's industrial commission as an
"avowed partnership between the government and the trusts" in which
business interests would dictate national policy, 75 but his spirited objections placed him further away from Roosevelt than their views actually
warranted.7 6 To most observers in 1912, however, their ideas mirrored

a deep ideological division among progressives over the correct ap73. Two major works of progressive thought helped move Roosevelt to this position: H.
CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (1909); C. VAN HIsE, CONCENTRATION AND CONTROL:

A SOLUTION OF THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1912). Croly attacked the historical perception that equated a Hamiltonian policy of government intervention with aristocracy and
special privilege-an attitude that inhibited the creation of national policies to achieve Jefferso-

nian, or democratic ends. To Croly, the country needed a "new nationalism" in which the federal
government would work actively to change economic and social conditions. Van Hise saw economic concentration as predetermined by the evolution of modern business, but believed administrative control of the products of this evolutionary trend was essential. On Croly's significance to
Roosevelt's thought, see E. GOLDMAN, RENDEVOUS WITH DESTINY 146-65 (Vintage ed. 1955).
On Van Hise's significance to Roosevelt's thoughts, see A. SCHLESINGER, THE CRISIS OF THE OLD

ORDER 1919-1933, at 22 (1957).
74. Roosevelt described the main elements of his program in Roosevelt, The Trusts, the Peopile, andthe SquareDeal, 99 OUTLOOK 649 (November 18, 1911); see also J. BLUM, THE REPUBLICAN ROOSEVELT 116-123 (1977).

75. W. WILSON, supra, note 72, at 202. "If the government is to tell big business men how to
run their business," Wilson asked, "then don't you see that big business men have to get closer to
the government even than they are now? Don't you see that they must capture the government, in
order not to be restrained too much by it?" Id at 201-02.
76. See R. HOFSTADTER, supra,note 68, at 247-48. Wilson feared size wrought by consolidation or illicit practices; he disclaimed any desire to disturb firms that achieved dominance through
"fair competition" alone. Wilson appeared to assume that those who pursued monopoly profit by
exclusively benign means were doomed to Sisyphean frustration. Nonetheless, he seemed willing
to let such ambition have its day. See generally, W. WILSON, supra note 72, at 163-91. Wilson's
implicit faith that purely innocent behavior could virtually never yield a monopoly was probably
the major respect in which his views differed from Roosevelt's.
It is wrong to attribute to Roosevelt in 1912 the total contempt for the Sherman Act that
possessed some progressives who scorned the statute as a foolish bar to beneficial national planning. H. CROLY, supra note 73, at 274; W. LiPPMANN, DRIFT AND MASTERY 124-46 (1914).
Roosevelt in 1913 saw a continuing usefulness for the Sherman Act as a means for dissolving firms
that had acquired monopoly power through sharp practices. See T. RoOSEvELT, AUTOBIOORAPHY 423-50 (1913). Nonetheless, by the end of the decade, Roosevelt did turn against the measure
whose application once stamped him as a "trustbuster." Approving the suspension of antitrust
enforcement during World War I, Roosevelt wrote, "If the Sherman Law hurts our production
and business efficiency in war time, it hurts it also in peace time, for the problems. . . are no
different ..
" T. ROOSEVELT, THE FOES OF OUR OwN HOUSEHOLD 122 (1917).
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proach to economic organization. Historian George Mowry defined
the difference in these terms: "The one school cherished the competitive system with its individual values and feared the powerful state; the
other welcomed concentrated power whether in industry or politics,
looked to a paternalistic state staffed by an educated elite for leadership, and depreciated individualism."77
After defeating Roosevelt and Taft to gain the Presidency, Wilson,
in his original antitrust package, asked Congress to augment the Sherman Act with a roster of specific illegal practices; and to create a new
trade commission with advisory and investigatory powers-a concept
that, at least in organizational form, resembled the Rooseveltian
agency he had earlier derided.7" Upon the advice of Louis Brandeis
and George Rublee, Wilson also gradually came to support a commission with adjudicatory authority to apply a broad standard proscribing
unfair competitive practices.7 9
At Wilson's urging, Congress put the expanded trade commission
proposal atop its antitrust agenda. The legislators soon directly addressed the Commission's role: Should it promote competition policy
or exercise public-utility regulation functions, including ratemaking? °
Congress firmly endorsed the former in passing the FTC Act.8 ' The
77. G. MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 57 (1958); see also, J. BLUM, supra note
12, at 59-62; A. LINK, 1910-1917, supra note 12, at 18-21.
78. Wilson presented his original antitrust plan in a message to Congress in January 1914.
See H.R. Doc. No. 625, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), reprintedin 51 CONG. REC. 1962-64 (1914).
Henderson in 1924 observed that "the Rooseveltian conception of an administrative agency to
license and supervise the 'trusts' had been the target of some of Mr. Wilson's most effective eloquence." G. HENDERSON, supra note 59, at 24.
79. Rublee's and Brandeis' roles in moving Wilson to support a trade commission with adjudicatory powers and a flexible mandate are discussed in A. LINK, FREEDOM, supra note 12, at 436442; see also A. MASON, BRANDEIS-A FREE MAN'S LIFE 402-04 (1946); Rublee, The Original
Plan and Early History of the FederalTrade Commission, 11 PRoc. ACAD. POL. Sc,. 666 (1926).
80. The Senate Interstate Commerce Committee explicitly defined the policy choice as it
reported the trade commission bill to the full Senate:
With the development of public sentiment on the subject of a trade commission, points
of view have naturally changed with respect to particular provisions, and differences
have also appeared with respect to the extent of the power to be lodged with such a
commission. Some would found such a commission upon the theory that monopolistic
industry is the ultimate result of economic evolution and that it should be so recognized
and declared to be vested with a public interest and as such regulated by a commission.
This contemplates even the regulation of prices. Others hold that private monopoly is
intolerable, unscientific, and abnormal, but recognize that a commission is a necessary
adjunct to the preservation of competition and to the practical enforcement of the law.
The functions of such commissions would be as distinct and different as the ideas upon
which they are founded.
S. REP.No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1914); see also H. SEAGER & C. GULICK, TRUST AND
CORPORATION PROBLEMS 415 (1929).
81. S.REP.No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1914); see also BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 2.
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new agency's founders believed it would remove impediments to competition, but would not plan or coordinate the affairs of business.
To its creators, the FTC Act reaffirmed the competition goals Congress had enshrined as national policy in 1890. Nonetheless, the Commission's establishment did not entirely dismay disciples of Roosevelt
who preferred pervasive business-government cooperation and central
planning. Congress mainly had intended to promote more effective antitrust enforcement, but the new agency conceivably had other uses as
well.82 Since the statute did not expressly limit the agency to antitrust
enforcement, the FTC, if properly directed, could supply a flexible instrument for joining government and business in a cooperative venture
to direct the economy.83
The struggle between the competition and cooperation models
most strongly affected the FTC's role from World War I through the
late 1930's.84 Central planning and cooperation made their first major
inroads into American economic policy during the First World War.8"
The war mobilization virtually suspended antitrust enforcement and
reoriented the FTC mainly toward information-gathering.8 6 Through
the War Industries Board (WIB), the federal government exercised
sweeping power over the country's
economic activities, controlling pri87
orities, allocation, and pricing.
The mobilization provided the country's first major experiment in
comprehensive economic planning, and created a new class of leaders
in government, business, and academia who felt the WIB model of government-business cooperation should be pursued in peacetime. 88 Fol82. Herbert Croly raised this point several months after the FTC Act became law: "In this
Trade Commission act is contained the possibility of a radical reversal ofmany American notions
about trusts, legislative power, and legal procedure. It may amount to historic political and constitutional reform. It seems to contradict every principle of the party which enacted it." THE NEw

REPUBLIC 8 (Jan. 9, 1915).
83. See generally Jaenicke, Herbert Croly, Progressive Ideology, and the FTCAct, 93 POL.
ScI. Q. 471 (1978).

84. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 67, at 193 (referred to this period as the "era of neglect" for
antitrust enforcement).
85. See Cuff, "Business, the State, and World War P The American Experience," in THE
ORDEAL OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA, INTERPRETATIVE READINGS 48 (J. Schwartz ed.

1974); Himmelberg, The War IndustriesBoard andtheAntitrust Question in November 1918, 52 J.
AM. HisT. 59 (1965).
86. See note 85 supra. During the war the Commission devoted most of its attention to
investigating the cost and supply of essential raw materials. H. MILLER, WORLD WAR ACTIVITIES
OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 1917-1918, at 2-15 (1940); FTC, ANN. REP. 10-43 (1920).
87. W. LEUCHTENBURG, THE PERILS OF PROSPERITY 1914-32, at 40-41 (1958); A. SCHLESINGER, THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER 1919-1933, at 37-38 (1957). See generally B. BARUCH,
AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN THE WAR (1941).

88. Leuchtenberg, The Impact ofthe War on theAmerican PoliticalEconomy, in THE IMPACT
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lowing several unsuccessful efforts at the war's end to obtain a
continuing formal relaxation of antitrust enforcement, this group of individuals focused their energies upon the development of systems for
industry self-regulation and business-government cooperation. 89 The
principal patron of this "associationalist" movement was Herbert Hoover, who, as Secretary of Commerce and President, encouraged the formation of trade associations and professional societies. 90 Hoover urged
these groups to prepare codes of ethical business behavior, collect and
disseminate data on production and inventories, and promote "product
simplification" by reducing the number of sizes and types of goods. 91
The FTC's activities in the 1920's strongly reflected the influence
of associationalism. 92 The most important manifestation was the development of the trade practice conference. 93 The Commission initiated the conferences by inviting all firms in an industry to meet with a
I, 57, 58-63 (A. Link ed. 1969); E. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 23738 (1955); B. BARUCH, supra note 87, at 104-07. Calling the antitrust laws "the simpler principles
sufficient for the conditions of a bygone day," Baruch, who headed the War Industries Board, said
the mobilization had enabled businessmen to enjoy "the tremendous advantages, both to themselves and to the general public, of combination, of cooperation and common action, with their
.natural competitors." Id at 105.
89. For an analysis of the failed movements during and after World War I to revise the
antitrust laws, see Cuff, supra note 85, at 55-63; Himmelberg, Business Antitrust Policy and the
IndustrialBoardof the Department of Commerce, 42 Bus. HIST. REV. 1 (1968); Himmelberg, The
War IndustriesBoardandtheAntitrust Question in November 1918, 52 J. AM. HIsT. 59 (1965). For
a discussion of postwar efforts by business and government to promote industry self-regulation
and cooperation between the public and private sectors, see R. HIMMELBERG, THE ORIGINS OF
THE NRA: BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND THE TRADE ASSOCIATION ISSUE, 1921-1933 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as R. HIMMELBERG, ORIGINS]; L. GALAMBOS, COMPETITION AND COOPERATION: THE EMERGENCE OF A NATIONAL TRADE ASSOCIATION (1966).
90. See, eg., A. BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION 69-75 (1936); Hawley, HerbertHoover, the Commerce Secretariat,and the Vision of an "AssociativeState,'1921-1928, 61 J. AM. HIST.
116, 139 (1974). Hoover's associationalism views should not be confused with the laissez-faire
OF WORLD WAR

economic proclivities of two of his prominent contemporaries, Warren Harding and Calvin Coo-

lidge. Their attitudes represent a distinct and independently important influence on the Commission's activities. See infra text accompanying notes 158-64.
91. A. BURNS, supra note 90, at 68-69; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 73, at 84-85; Hawley,
supra note 90, at 117-18.
92. The Commission's Annual Report for 1928 commented:
Never in the history of American business has there been a time when self-regulation has received more intensive consideration....
If an industry is capable of self-regulation, the trade practice conference procedure
of the Federal Trade Commission affords the most effective method yet devised to accomplish this end....
Trade associations, "institutes," the United States Chamber of Commerce, and business organizations in other forms have done, and are doing, excellent work in this
respect.
FTC, ANN. REP. 5 (1928). See T. COCHRAN & W. MILLER, THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE 345-46
(1961).
93. See NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, PUBLIC REGULATION OF COMPETIwE PRACTICES 224-41 (1929); Kittelle & Mostow, .4 Review of the Trade PracticeConferences of
the FederalTrade Commission, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 427 (1940).
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commissioner and members of the agency's staff to discuss practices
within the trade. 94 When a consensus of the conference participants
opposed some business tactic, the conferees drafted resolutions banning
the suspect practice. If the FTC approved the conferees' views, it classified the proposals as either "Group I" or "Group II" rules. The Commission treated violations of Group I rules as prima facie violations of
the FTC Act and sought cease and desist orders to halt them. For
Group II rules, the FTC based its decision to prosecute on the circumstances of each claimed infraction.
From several meetings per year in the early 1920's, the trade conference became the agency's dominant enforcement approach by the
end of the decade. 95 Many commentators found the device a constructive means to understand business and promote commercial ethics
without litigation. 96 For some, the FTC's reliance on the conferences
displayed a healthy inclination to replace competition-preserving enforcement with associationalist policies. 97 For competition policy advocates, the conferences' effect hinged mainly on whether the FTC, in
endorsing certain rules, was sanctioning collusion. Ultimately, the
agency proved inadequately circumspect in this regard.98
The war mobilization and the associationalism experiments of the
1920's gave the central planners important, limited tests of their theories. The economic collapse of 1929, however, provided a dramatic opportunity to sweep the competition model aside, perhaps permanently.
This movement reached its peak in the first administration of Franklin
Roosevelt, whose early New Deal drew mainly upon the country's war
94. For a discussion of the FTC's trade practice conference procedure in the 1920's, see FTC,
TRADE PRACTICE SUBMITrALs 1919 TO 1923 (1923); McCarty, Trade Practice Conferences, 2
CoP. PRAc. REv. 19 (1930).

95. T. BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 93-98. Blaisdell calculated that between 1919 and 1929
there were 83 trade practice conferences, including 60 between July 1927 and November 1929.
96. See, e.g, G. HENDERSON, supra note 59, at 82, 244; NationalIndustrialConference Board,
supra note 93, at 241.
97. In 1930, one former Commission official observed:

The trade practice conference marks the beginning of systematic cooperative effort
between various progressive industries and the government to establish and enforce intelligent rules of business conduct. It permits industries to become self-governing
through responsible trade organizations whose activities are supervised in the public interest by the Federal Trade Commission. . . . It creates among business men a more

enlightened sense of their responsibility to the public, and it creates..

. in

the public a

similar sense of its responsibility to permit business interests... to conduct business on
sound economic principles of cooperative effort as distinguished from destructive

competition.
McCarty, supra note 94, at 29.
98. See infra text accompanying notes 169-75.
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mobilization and associationalism experiences to stimulate recovery. 99
The country embarked upon an unprecedented program of peace-

time economic planning in 1933 with the National Industrial Recovery
Act (NIRA), 1°° the cornerstone of recovery efforts until 1935. The stat-

ute created the National Recovery Administration (NRA) which obtained codes of fair practice from each industry. Under the NRA's
often casual review, businessmen prepared and implemented codes

covering, among other things, pricing and output.101 By delegating
power over price and production to industry trade groups, "the NRA

created a series of private economic governments. . . The large corporations which dominated the code authorities used their powers to

stifle competition, cut back production, and reap profits from priceraising rather than business expansion."" °2
Following a brief surge of enthusiasm accompanying its creation,
the NRA swiftly fell into disfavor. Internal conflict among the cooperation advocates undercut NRA attempts to execute a coherent policy

and operate effectively.1"3 At the same time, supporters of antitrust enforcement relentlessly assailed the agency as a conduit for carteliza-

tion. 104 By the time the Supreme Court struck down the NIRA in
1935,105 the NRA seemed to be collapsing under its own weight. Until
its official demise, however, the NIRA significantly affected the FTC's

competition work. 06 Antitrust enforcement by the Commission and

99. See, ag., E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966); R.
HIMMELBERG, ORIGINS, supra note 89;

W.

LEUCHTENBURO, supra note 87, at 41-42.

100. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (declared unconstitutional in Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
101. C. PEARCE, NRA TRADE PRACTICE PROGRAMS (1939); A. SCHLESINGER, THE COMING
OF THE NEw DA. 119-35 (1958). Several industrialists, including Gerard Swope of General
Electric, Walter Teagle of Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Myron Taylor of United States Steel,
previously had urged the government to adjust production to demand. A. SCHLESINGER, supra
note 73, at 181-82. The National Recovery Administration appears to have modeled its industry
code program after the FTC's trade practice conference procedure. A. BURNS, supra note 90, at
463."
102. W. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 1932-1940, at 69
(1963).
103. The NIRA's passage masked formidable tensions among cooperation-oriented businessmen and public administrators who differed over the exact form such cooperation should take. E.
HAWLEY, supra note 99, at 135-42.
104. W. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 102, at 67-68; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 101, at 10001, 130-35, 167-69.
105. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
106. One 1964 commentary called the NIRA "the greatest threat to the Federal Trade Commission in the Commission's entire fifty-year history." Lamb, Counselforthe Defense, 24 FED. B.J.
431, 432 (1964).
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the Justice Department had virtually halted."7 By the mid-1930's, according to one observer, the FTC's chief function had become
"preventing false and misleading advertising in reference to hair restorremedies . . . a somewhat inglorious end to a noble
ers, anti-fat 08
experiment."'
The restoration of antitrust as an important national policy began
in the late 1930's. In his second term, Roosevelt gave greater credence
to the thinking of Felix Frankfurter, Benjamin Cohen, and Thomas
Corcoran who embraced the Brandeisian preference for active antitrust
enforcement. 0 9 His appointment, in 1938, of Thurman Arnold as Assistant Attorney General triggered an unparalleled period of activity in
the Antitrust Division. In five years, Arnold brought almost as many
antitrust suits as the Division had in the previous fifty." 0 The FTC
shared in this rejuvenation as well and began the most serious litigation
initiative up to that time-a comprehensive assault upon base-point
pricing., II
The antitrust revival in 1938 was a turning point for American
competition policy. Although the World War II mobilization blunted
many antitrust cases launched before 1942, the competition model
would not again face a challenger as formidable as the cooperation and
planning theories of the early New Deal. Competition policy emerged
from the Depression with a degree of social support that made possible
the comparatively stable, substantial government antitrust work of the
post-war era. 12 While not all peacetime economic policy since 1938
107. See STAFF OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL Bus., 84TH CONG., IST SEss., REPORT
ON STATISTICS ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST ACTIVITIES 3-4 (Comm. Print 1956).
108. P. HERRING, supra note 69, at 115 (quoting Abram Myers, a commissioner from 1926 to

1929). Although an accurate appraisal of the agency's litigation efforts, Myers' remark understated the Commission's work in those years as a competition advocate. The FTC, for example,
criticized the cartelizing proclivities of several NRA codes. E. HAWLEY, supra note 99, at 94-95,
108-09, 117; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 101, at 171.

109. W. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 102, at 148-49, 154-56, 163. Throughout the decade
Roosevelt had exasperated his advisors by entertaining a variety of views on an issue without
committing himself firmly to any one of them. Describing the President's ambivalence on economic policy, Leuchtenburg wrote "[hle preferred to let the rival theorists war around him. It was
almost as though he were watching himself, uncertain in his own mind and rather curious about
which faction would win him over." Id at 249. See B. MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER
CONNECTION 152-85 (1982).

110. See supra note 107, at 3. Ironically, in 1937, Arnold had argued that antitrust was a
charade that enabled the country to express harmlessly its indignation at the discomforting but
ultimately necessary process of industrial concentration. T. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 96, 207-29 (1937).

111. See infra text accompanying notes 198-208.
112. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 67, at 233; Lamb, supra note 106. "[Tihe passing of the
N.I.R.A. and the failure of Congress to enact any similar measure began a new era for the Federal
Trade Commission, and for antitrust enforcement in general." Id at 433.
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has conformed to the competition model, competition policy has enjoyed comparatively broader support since 1938 than it did in the century's first decades. Thus, a recommendation in 1969 that the FTC
strengthen its antitrust programs arguably had greater practical significance than one made forty years earlier.
2. Federal Judiciary
A second important external factor shaping FTC antitrust enforcement has been judicial review. 1 3 The judiciary's influence on the
Commission's choice of competition programs emerged vividly in the
courts' interpretation of the FTC's authority from 1914 to 1934. In creating an administrative agency to enforce the antitrust laws, Congress
was seeking to ensure greater fidelity to its own competition policy
goals.' 14 The main impetus for this choice came from the Supreme
Court's Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States"t5 and United
States v. American Tobacco Co. 11 decisions in 1911. The Court's

adoption of the "rule of reason" standard showed Congress that the
Sherman Act's effectiveness depended greatly upon how judges interpreted its general provisions. 17 Although some congressmen found the
rule of reason standard to be substantively deficient, Congress' main
concern in passing the FTC Act was with the process through which the
antitrust laws would be interpreted.' 18
Under Congress' plan, the judiciary's role was essentially to determine whether the FTC's conclusions about the propriety of various
113. See, e.g., T. BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 259-86; C. MCFARLAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 1920-1930

(1933); Decker, Unfair Competition and FederalTrade Commission, 24 FED. B.J. 513 (1964); HandIer, Unfair Competition andthe FederalTrade Commission, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399 (1940).
114. In this discussion of the institutional aims that moved Congress to create the FTC, the
author has relied frequently upon Robert Lande's analysis of the goals of the FTC Act, R. Lande,

The Goals of the Antitrust Laws (1981) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author); and
Neil Averitt's study of section 5 in Averitt, supra note 13. For a brief recent summary, see ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 5, THE FTC AS AN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGENCY:
THE ROLE OF SECTION 5 IN THE FTC ACT IN ANTITRUST VOL. I, at 20-25 (1981).

115. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
116. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
117. See G. HENDERSON, supra note 59, at 15; see also J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROcEss (1938):
In the field of unfair competition and monopoly... there was widespread distrust
of the courts' ability to evolve workable concepts to direct the economic forces which had
posed these problems.
...
Here distrust based itself upon the belief that the men who composed our
judiciary too often held economic and social opinions opposed to the ideals of their time.
The distrust was not without foundation.
Id at 32-34.
118. See Averitt, supra note 13, at 233-34.
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business practices had evidentiary support. Courts were not to probe
the wisdom of the Commission's choice among policy alternatives
where the agency's preference had sufficient evidentiary support.119 By
this design, Congress intended the Commission to account primarily to
it, not the courts, for its policy decisions. Senator Cummins described
how the proposed FTC statute would distribute authority among the
agency, the judiciary, and the legislature:
I realize that if these five men were either unfaithful to
the trust reposed in them or if their economic thought or trend
of thought was contrary to the best interests of the people, the
commission might do great harm. I realize that just as I realize that the trend of economic thought upon the part of some
judges has done and will continue to do great harm, or rather
will continue to render ineffective to a degree a statute that it
was believed by its authors would exterminate the monopolies
then in existence and prevent the establishment of others.
I would rather take my chance with a commission at all
times under the power of Congress, at all times under the eye
of the people, for the attention of the people is concentrated to
a far greater degree upon the commission which is organized
to assist in the regulation of commerce or to administer the
law regulating commerce than it has upon the abstract propositions, even though they be full of importance, argued in
the comparative seclusion of our courts.
If we find that the people are betrayed either through dishonesty or through mistaken opinion, the commission is always subordinate to Congress. . . . Congress can always
destro, the commission; it can repeal the law which creates it
120

In adopting a relatively narrow standard of judicial review, Congress also sought to supply the institutional means with which to enhance the stature of the FTC's work. In section 5 of the FTC Act,
Congress had given the Commission the interpretational and adjudicatory responsibilities that traditionally had been the province of the
courts. 12 1 Congress theorized that the Commission's principal tool for
119. See supra note 113.
120. 51 CONG. REc. 13,047-48 (1914). For a review of the legislative debates concerning the
scope of judicial review, see R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 201-04

(1941).
121. The Senate Interstate Commerce Committee Report on the FTC Act explained the logic

of this approach:
The committee gave careful consideration to the question as to whether it would
attempt to define the many and variable unfair practices which prevail in commerce and
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overcoming judicial opposition to this intrusion would be its competi-

tion policy expertise.

This expertise would have essentially three

122
sources: The Commission's repeated exposure to antitrust problems;

the Commission's authority to employ specialists of various backthe Commission's extraordinary investigative and regrounds;" and1 24
porting powers.

Congressional expectations received a serious blow in 1920 in the
first Commission case to come before the Supreme Court, FTC v.
Gratz "25
' . Although the Court decided the case on a procedural issue, it
proceeded to limit the Act's ban on "unfair method[s] of competition":
The words "unfair method of competition" are not delined by the statute and their exact meaning is in dispute. It is
for the courts, not the commission, ultimately to determine as
matter of law what they include. They are clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as opposed to good
morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud,
or oppression, or as against public policy because of their
dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or create
monopoly. The act was certainly not intended to fetter free
and fair competition as commonly26understood and practiced
by honorable opponents in trade.'

As subsequently applied by the courts in the 1920's, Gratz virtually
barred the Commission's development of antitrust principles not already established by judicial interpretation. Although the bare terms
of Gratz were potentially generous in their implication that the Cointo forbid [them] ... or whether it would, by a general declaration condemning unfair
practices, leave it to the commission to determine what practices were unfair. It concluded that the latter course would be better, for the reason, as stated by one of the
representatives of the Illinois Manufacturers' Association, that there were too many unfair practices to define, and after writing 20 of them into law it would be quite possible to
invent others.
S.REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914). Experience with the Interstate Commerce Commission had shown that federal judges generally begrudged bestowing traditionally 'Judicial"
functions upon an administrative body. C. McFARLAND, supra note 113, at 102-124.
122. G. HENDERSON, supra note 59, at 22. Senator Newlands expressed his expectation that:
[A]s a result of investigation and as the result of long experience [the FTC] will build up
a body of information and of administrative law that will be of service not only to fit] but
to the country itself, and that gradually standards will be established that will be accepted and will constitute our code of business morals.
51 CoNo. REc. 11,083 (1914).
123. Congress contemplated that the Commission and its staff would be made up of businessmen and economists, as well as lawyers. See 51 CONG. REc. 11083, 12216, 13005 (1914).
by §§
6 and
9 of59,
theat FTC
described
and Henderson
Both Blaisdell
46.
HENDERSON,
supra
note
supra
note 59, the
at powers
112; G. conferred
Act124.
as "sweeping."
T. BLAISDELL,
125. 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
126. Id at 427-28.
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mission could cover areas "heretofore regarded as opposed to good
morals... or as against public policy because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly,"' 127 its practical effect deflected the FTC away from the pathbreaking
initiatives
128
which were a major reason for the agency's creation.
The Supreme Court imposed a second damaging limitation on the
FTC's powers in 1927 in FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co. 29 One year
before Kodak, the Court had ruled section 7 of the Clayton Act inapplicable to asset acquisitions. 30 The Commission sued Kodak under
section 5 to require the film company to divest three recently acquired
processing plants. The Court ruled that the FTC lacked divestiture
power under section 5.131 By removing an essential remedy, the decision effectively prevented the Commission from plugging the Clayton
Act's assets loophole 132 and, more generally, from having an important
1 33
role in the areas of monopolization and attempted monopolization.
127. Id at 427. Some commentators regarded Gratz as excessively broad. See Montague,
Anti-trust Laws andthe FederalTrade Commission 1914-1927, 27 COLUM. L. REv. 650 (1927).
128. During the legislative debates in 1914, Sen. Newlands had predicted that § 5"will have
such an elastic character that it will meet every new condition and every new practice that may be
invented with a view to gradually bringing about monopoly through unfair competition." 51
CONG. REc. 12,024 (1914). Blaisdell summarized Gratz'r impact as follows:
In establishing its policies the Commission included in its definition the older ideas of
the common law. To these, as occasion demanded, it endeavored to add other criteria.
In connection with both criteria, the limiting hand of the law has been felt. But particularly in applying the latter group, based on other social and economic criteria, have the
courts been adamant. They have insisted on limiting the Commission to standards previously found in the law.
T. BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 21. Blaisdell supported his view by reviewing the outcome of
appeals of FTC cases through 1928. He divided the cases into two classes, one in which the
Commission had applied existing legal standards ("old criteria") and a second in which it had
attempted to develop new law beyond the boundaries of earlier doctrine ("new criteria"). Id at
40. He found that "[a] much higher percentage of those grouped under 'New Criteria' [had] been
reversed by the courts than of those grouped under 'Old Criteria'." Id at 41. He conclilded that
"[tihe Commission was apparently willing to broaden the scope of the law more rapidly than were
the courts. . . Concerning cases arising under the older standards. . .[t]he courts and the
Commission [had] not disagreed seriously in their interpretations." Id
129. 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
130. FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926). As drafted in the original Clayton Act,
§ 7 prohibited consolidations achieved by stock purchases. Businesses quickly realized that they
could escape the statute's reach by simply buying the target firm's assets. See G.HENDERSON,
supra note 59, at 40, 321. Experience with § 7 seemed to confirm congressional apprehension in
1914 about delineating every offensive practice in the statute for fear that businessmen would
merely circumvent the limitation with other devices.
131. 274 U.S. at 623, 625.
132. Following Kodak and Western Meat, the Commission continued to actively monitor major acquisitions and to investigate transactions that might fall within § 7's stock purchase prohibition. J. LANDIS, supra note 117, at 40-41.

133. The Commission promptly acknowledged that Kodak had removed its power to order
divestiture under § 5. See, e.g., FTC, ANN. REP. 67 (1927). Without this structural remedy, the
Commission's ability to deal effectively with firms that had achieved near or actual monopoly
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Early court decisions also narrowly interpreted the FTC's investigative and reporting powers. 134 One set of cases barred investigations
on the ground that the FTC had sought data on manufacturing production-two activities the courts of this era often treated as exclusively

"intrastate" commerce, and thus beyond the FTC's jurisdiction. 135 A
from gathsecond, more important line of rulings prohibited the FTC 36
ering information unrelated to alleged antitrust violations.

There are two principal explanations for the generally unsympathetic treatment the Commission received from the courts during its
first two decades. One is that the FTC failed to explain its decisions in
full, narrative opinions and thus left the courts with little basis for upholding the agency's judgment. 137

It is doubtful, however, that the

agency's cryptic opinions and other infirmities in its operations were
the dominant cause of its failures on appeal. The second and probably

dispositive factor was the judiciary's distaste for economic regulation
by legislative or administrative decree. 138 Any attempt to classify judicial attitudes for a given era is prone to oversimplification, but it is not
unreasonable to say that the Supreme Court viewed economic regulation more tolerantly after the 1930's and that this change led the courts
power was severely diminished. See A. STONE, ECONOMIC REGULATION AND THE PuBLIC INTEREST 121-22 (1977).
134. T, BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 172,258-62,271-73; G. HENDERSON, supra note 59, at 6770. In 1936, Arthur Burns observed that "judicial decision has whittled away [the Commission's]
investigatory power, its right arm, until as Professor [Myron W.] Watkins has expressed it, 'There
remains nothing but an impotent stump.'" A. BuP, s,supra note 90, at vi (footnote omitted).
135. See, e.g., Claire Furnace Co. v. FTC, 285 F. 936, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1923), criticized in T.
BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 266-70; Handler, The ConstitutionalityofInvestigationsby the Federal
Trade Commission, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 708, 71420 (1928). The ruling in ClaireFurnace rested
upon the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) that
manufacturing was not "commerce" for purposes of the Sherman Act.
136. See, e.g., FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924); United States v. Basic
Prods. Co., 260 F. 472 (W.D. Pa. 1919); see also MacChesney & Murphy, Znvestigatory andEnforcement Powers ofthe FederalTrade Commission, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 581, 588 (1940) ("Despite the language of the [FTC] Act, the courts have consistently refused to enforce the
Commission's demands for information in the course of a general fact-finding inquiry unrelated to
a specific breach of law"); Watkins,4n.4ppraisalofthe Work of the FederalTrade Commission, 32
COLUM. L. REv. 272, 278-80 (1932).
137. The early commissioners refrained from writing complete narrative opinions, largely because they found the endeavor too time-consuming. Thompson, Highlights in the Evolution of the
FederalTrade Commission, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 257, 267-68 (1940). Henderson was the main
exponent for this viewpoint. G. HENDERSON, supra note 59, at 117, 163, 334. Henderson suggested that the FTC's poor opinions were the major reason for its failings on appeal. Id at 334.
138. J. LANDIS, supra note 117, at 150. In Landis' words, the courts' willingness to defer to the
FTC's administrative judgments in the 1920's was more "a matter of attitude in a particular case
rather than of doctrine." Id See T. BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 289-90; C. McFARLAND, supra
note 113, at 92-99; Handier, UnfairCompetition andthe FederalTrade Commission, 8 GEo. WASH.
L. Rv. 399, 401-02 (1940).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981

29

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 17 [1981], Iss. 4, Art. 1
TULSA LAW JOURN-AL

[Vol. 17:587

to allow administrative tribunals greater latitude. 139

Whatever their exact origin, the Supreme Court's interpretations
of the Commission's substantive, remedial, and investigative authority
seriously retarded the agency's development of a distinctive antitrust
enforcement role. 140 The judicially imposed restrictions forced the
Commission "to concentrate its energies within the narrow confines of
the field of action set by the courts, and to refrain from a more experi-

mental and venturesome exercise of its powers." 14 1 In the antitrust
field, the FTC was left to work in terrain largely explored by the Justice
Department. 142
Since the 1920's, the courts have either reversed or substantially
modified the limitations imposed by Gratz, Kodak, and other early de-

cisions interpreting the agency's investigation and reporting powers. 143
By 1969, the agency had obtained Supreme Court rulings construing its
authority in a manner generally consistent with congressional expecta-

tions in 1914. The Court's affirmation in the mid-1960's of the FTC's

power to order divestiture under section 5, and its endorsement of a
flexible conception of "unfair methods of competition" were particularly significant developments. 144 This judicial trend provided the
ABA with reason to expect that its recommendations would receive
139. The first important interpretations of the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts took place in an era when the federal courts displayed a conservative attitude in reviewing congressional and state efforts to regulate business. See, e.g., R. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN
SuPREmE COURT 136-79 (1960); A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTi-

TUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1960); B. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1942).
140. These early rulings severely diminished the FTC's standing as a law enforcement agency,
and injured the agency's efforts to attract competent leadership and staff. Arthur Burns warned
that "An administrative body hampered as the Federal Trade Commission has been by the judiciary cannot attract able men." A. BURNS, supra note 90, at 574.
0
141. Handler, supra note 138, at 402; see also T. BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 36; C. KAYSEN
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 237 (1959); T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 139 n.20 (1969).
142. For example, the power to proscribe large asset acquisitions under § 5 of the FTC Act
would have afforded the FTC at least the opportunity to develop a unique and influential antitrust
enforcement role in the 1920's. See M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY, & H. GOLDSCHMID,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 431 (1975). The Commission's efforts to curtail
misleading advertising in the 1920's and early 1930's are partly attributable to its inability to gain
judicial acceptance for a broader-reading of its antitrust authority. See Handler, supra note 138,
at 405-06.
143. See, eg., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233, 241-43 (1972). Pan Am. World
Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 312 n.17 (1963); FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597,
606 n.4 (1966) (dictum) (rejecting Kodalk); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 641-42

(1950); 'Averitt, StructuralRemedies in Competition Cases Under the FederalTrade Commission
Act, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 781, 788-94 (1979).
144. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); FTC v. Dean Foods, 384 U.S. 597
(1966).
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consideration in an environment more favorable to ambitious FTC antitrust ventures than existed only a decade before.
3.

President

A more sympathetic judiciary in the 1920's alone would not have
guaranteed that the early FTC would have used its authority more effectively. Much depended on the agency's leadership. The President
and Congress share responsibility for selecting commissioners, but the
President historically has been the dominant force in choosing the
FTC's leadership.' 4 5 White House attitudes toward antitrust have
deeply affected the course of FTC competition programs. The Commission's first twenty years illustrate the importance of presidential antitrust preferences to FTC enforcement policy.
As a candidate and in the first two years of his presidency, Woodrow Wilson depicted himself as a foe of monopoly and special privilege. Soon after he signed the FTC Act, however, President Wilson's
position toward business and antitrust turned to the right. 146 As a consequence, Wilson's first appointments to the Commission "gave dominance to men who had an anxious regard for the traditional concerns of
business and finance."' 4 7 To chair the new agency, he selected John
Davies, a lawyer who had been Director of the Bureau of Corporations. 148 Wilson also chose George Rublee, an attorney and Wilson advisor, and three men with business backgrounds, Edward Hurley,
William Harris, and Will Parry. 149
The first Commission soon divided sharply over the direction it
should take. Rublee and Harris favored antitrust litigation, while Hurley, Davies, and Parry preferred programs limited to advising business145. See J. GRAHAM & V. KRAMER, SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss.,
APPOINTMENTS TO THE REGULATORY AGENCIES: THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1949-1974) (Comm. Print 1976).
146. See J. BLUM,supra note 12, at 79-80 (observing that the collapse of the Progressive Party
in the 1914 elections and the coming of war in Europe inclined Wilson "to reveal his basic faith in

the heartfire of the conscience of men of wealth.").
147. Id at 80.
148. Until 1950, the Commission chairmanship rotated annually among the commissioners.
Since 1950, the President has designated the chairmen for all independent regulatory agencies. In
1950, James Mead became the first presidentially designated FTC Chairman. J. GRAHAM & V.
KRAMER, supra note 145, at 10. For a discussion of the role of the chairman in directing the
affairs of independent regulatory agencies in the modem era, see D. WELBORN, GOVERNANCE OF
FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1977).

149. The tendency for lawyers to occupy all of the commissioner posts is a relatively recent
phenomenon. The FTC's current chairman, James C. Miller, III, is the first non-lawyer to serve
as a commissioner since James Mead, whose tenure ended in 1955. Id
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men of the legality of various anticipated acts. 150 The rift nearly
paralyzed the agency. Seeking to .establish a cordial relationship with
the business community, the FTC did not issue its first complaint until
February 1916, eleven months after it had officially opened its doors.' 1
Upon Rublee's departure and Hurley's elevation to chairman in 1916,
the agency acquired an even more conservative bent.1 2 Hurley "devoted his talents to making the Commission useful to businessmen and
to preaching the doctrine of co-operation between government and
business. . . . [U]nder his leadership, the Commission practically
abandoned its role as watchdog of business practices." 5 3 Although
many of the FTC Act's original supporters had regarded the giving of
guidance to business as worthwhile, 154 the degree to which Hurley
stressed the FTC's purely advisory functions chagrined many who believed the agency's effectiveness as a promoter of competition policy
rested heavily on the prosecution of antitrust suits. 55
Wilson's appointments to the Commission in his second term
150. Herring, The FederalTrade Commissioners, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 339, 344-45 (1940).
151. G. HENDERSON, supra note 59, at 87; Rublee, supra note 79, at 671.
152. Regarded as the most able of the early commissioners, Rublee served only an interim
appointment after the Senate refused to confirm him for a regular term. Rublee had aroused the
enmity of Senator Jacob Gallinger of New Hampshire by aiding Gallinger's opponent in the 1912
elections. Gallinger succeeded in blocking Rublee's confirmation for a full term. See Herring,
supra note 150, at 344.
153. A. LiNK, 1910-1917, supra note 12, at 75. See also R. WEIBE, supra note 68, at 298.
Hurley explained his enforcement approach in an address to the National Industrial Conference
Board in July, 1916:
I am glad to meet with a body of business men like you gentlemen, and I will plead
guilty on the start by saying that I do not know anything about the law, and that applies
to the Clayton act and to the Federal Trade Commission act. In my position on the"
Federal Trade Commission I am there as a business man. I do not mind telling you that
when I was offered the place I told the President that all I knew was business, that I knew
nothing about the new laws nor the old ones, and that I would apply the force that I
might have in the interest ofbusiness. I have been there since the sixteenth of March last
year, and I think that the businessmen of the country will bear me out when I say that I
try to work wholly in the interest of business.
G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HIsTORY,

1900-1916, at 274-75 (1963) (footnote omitted).
154. Many businessmen had supported the creation of a commission with specific statutory
authority to advise firms in advance of the legality of their actions. See R. WEIBE, BUSINESSMEN
AND REFORM 138-41 (1962).
155. Brandeis later referred to Wilson's early appointments to the Commission as "a stupid
administration." A. LINK, 1910-1917, supra note 12, at 74. Understandably, Wilson did not share
this view. In the fall of 1916, he told a grain dealer's trade association, "It is hard to describe the
functions of that Commission; all I can say is that it has transformed the Government of the
United States from being an antagonist of business into being a friend of business." P. HERRING,
supra note 69, at 112. These words may have been designed to convince businessmen that Wilson's tariff and antitrust legislation had not, as the Republicans claimed, been the source of the
economic depression of 1914. See A. LINK, 1910-1917, supra note 12, at 74-75. Link points out
that Wilson relaxed government antitrust enforcement efforts after 1914, initially to gain business
favor and later to spur war mobilization. Id at 74-76.
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aligned the agency more closely with the preferences of congressmen
who expected the FTC to be an effective antitrust enforcer.15 6 This
shift, however, only partly compensated for the policies that guided the
agency from 1915 to 1917. The first Commission's inability to pursue a
appear illsubstantial antitrust enforcement program made the FTC
157
suited to perform its assigned competition policy role.
The 1920 election of Warren Harding as President augured the
beginning of an unparalleled period of government solicitude for business interests.15 8 During the terms of Harding and his immediate successors, Calvin Coolidge and Herbert Hoover, two lines of thought
molded presidential antitrust policies. The first was the associational
view of business-government cooperation born in the War Industries
Board experience of World War 1. 59 Most closely identified with Hoover, associationalism promoted greater industry "self-regulation" under
the guidance of government which, with the advice of business, would
coordinate economic activity. A second, distinct strand of thought saw
government's proper role as serving the interests of business as businessmen defined them. Harding embraced this ideal, but it was Coolidge who became its foremost champion and "deliberately converted
his administration into a 'businessman's government.' "160
Harding and Coolidge initially considered limiting the government's regulatory agencies, including the FTC, by modifying their stat156. See Herring, supra note 150, at 346-49.
157. A. LINK, 1910-1917, supra note 12, at 75. See also Herring, supra note 150, at 345.
158. Blaisdell described the transition in these terms:
Near the end of President Wilson's term of office the attitude of the public towards government regulation of business underwent a change. The trend of opinion as expressed
by the shift in political control from Democratic to Republican forces was reflected in
the changed policies of the Commission. This changed attitude may be roughly expressed as a change from less governmental control of business to more business control
of government.
T. BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 75; see also P. HERRIN, supra note 69, at 125-38 (tracing the
liaison of business and politics in American history); J. HICKS, REPUBLICAN ASCENDANCY, 19211933, at 64-66 (1960) (appointments to federal agencies expressing conservative trend). Arthur
Link cautions that the Harding administration's regulatory policies constituted a change in degree
from Wilson's views rather than an abrupt break. Link, Whatever Happenedto the Progressive
Movement in the 1920's, 64 AM. HisT. REv. 833, 848-49 (1959). For a discussion of government
antitrust policy in the 1920's, see R. HIMMELBERG, ORIGINS, note 89 supra.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 85-98.
160. W. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 87, at 96. To Coolidge, business ideas formed a secular
creed that inspired the nation's greatest achievements. "The man who builds a factory builds a
temple," and "Itihe man who works there worships there.' A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 73, at 57.
William Leuchtenburg cautions that it would be incorrect to assume that the views of Coolidge
and his advisors did not have the backing of a large segment of the American public. "The
Coolidge era is usually viewed as a period of extreme conservatism, but it was thought of at the
time as representing a great stride forward in social policy, a New Era in American life." W.
LEUCHTENBURO, supra note 87, at 201. See also E. GOLDMAN, supra note 73, at 220-47.
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utory charters. Though no longer in control of the Congress,
progressives in both houses had sufficient strength to make this seem a
Pyrrhic route. 161 Consequently, Harding and Coolidge turned to devices more directly under presidential control, including their appointment power. 162 Early in the 1920's, the FTC was led by the last Wilson
appointees, who had begun several major initiatives, including the
agency's controversial study of the meatpacking industry in 1919.163
With William Humphrey's appointment to the FTC in 1925, however,
Coolidge achieved a working majority of commissioners who shared
his views on the correct relation of government to business.1' 4
As commissioner, Humphrey publicly denigrated the policies the
agency had followed from the end of World War I until his appointment and declared his intention to "help business help itself."' 165 Under
Humphrey's influence, the Commission imbued its enforcement programs with the values of Coolidge and the associationalists. One important step was the increased use of trade practice conferences. 166 In
theory, the trade practice device provided a useful tool for addressing
industry-wide abuses and learning about business first-hand.

67

Infor-

could also guide the FTC's selection and
mation from the conferences
8
prosecution of cases.16

From an antitrust perspective, however, the Commission's actual
use of the technique was less encouraging. Several observers, including
advocates of the conferences, urged the FTC to balance conferences
161. W. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 87, at 97.
162. J. IMcKs, supra note 158, at 64-66; A. SINCLAMR, THE AVAILABLE MAN 251-52 (1965).
163. See infra text accompanying notes 187-97.
164. See generally Davis, The Transformationofthe FederalTrade Commission,1914-1929, 49
MIss. VALLEY HIST. Rav. 437 (1962) (significance of Humphrey's appointment).
165. P. HIERRnqO, supra note 69, at 125. In a 1931 speech, Humphrey criticized the FTC's
prior litigation policy:
Under the old policy oflitigation it became an instrument of oppression and disturbance
and injury instead of a help to business. It harassed and annoyed business instead of
assisting it. Business soon regarded the commission with distrust and fear and suspidon-as an enemy. There was no cooperation between the commission and business.
Id
Analyzing Humphrey's public comments, Herring wrote in 1936:
It is not that these declarations are particularly cogent or marked by profundity of
thought; it is rather that they reflect in bald and obvious form the prevailing views of the
conservative leaders in his party and in business at the time. The shifting of political
fortunes had brought a combination of groups into control whose leaders expressed theories very different from the Wilsonian disciples of the New Freedom. Big business had
become more than respectable.
Id at 125-26.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 93-98.
167..Seesupra note 96; G. HENDERSON, supra note 59, at 82, 244; A. STONE) supra note 133, at
58-59.
168. See T. BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 46-55.
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with formal, binding litigation. 69 By the late 1920's, however, the

trade practice conference had become the agency's dominant antitrust
enforcement strategy, and the extreme retreat from formal litigation
had diminished the Commission's enforcement credibility. 170 A second, and more serious, problem was the content of the trade practice
codes. From their inception in 1919, the codes' potential for fostering

anticompetitive alliances was widely recognized. 7 ' Toward the end of
the 1920's, the Commission was routinely approving codes that effec72
tively sanctioned price fixing and other horizontal trade restraints.
Some codes so alarmed the Justice Department that in 1930 it called for
the FTC to rescind provisions that seemed to violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act.' 73 The Commission responded by reevaluating the
codes 174 and eventually deleting the suspect provisions. 75
Humphrey's influence also emerged in new FTC rules of procedure adopted soon after his appointment. 76 Among the most important were (1) a declaration that the agency would settle all cases
177
informally "except when the public interest demands otherwise;"'
and (2) a commitment that the FTC would neither announce the issuance of complaints "until after final determination of the case," nor
make public matters settled informally before a complaint was filed. 178
In Humphrey's tenure, the rules reduced the number of compulsory
169. G. HENDERSON, supra note 59, at 244. ("Experience has shown, however, that these informal proceedings cannot be relied upon exclusively.")
170. See T. BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 93-98; P. HERRING, supra note 69, at 129-31. Use of

the conferences reached its peak in the winter of 1929-30, when 57 were convened. Id at 130.
171. G. HENDERSON, supra 59, at 81 ("it is obvious that an embarrassing situation might arise
if a meeting should get out of bounds and discuss some forbidden topic.").
172. Arthur Schlesinger gives the following description of the codes' operation: "Though
dedicated to the elimination of "unfair" trade practices, the codes gradually began to spill over
into such questions as price-cutting and, in some cases, provided fronts behind which businessmen
fraternally conspired to evade the antitrust law." A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 73, at 65; see also J.
CLARK, THE FEDERAL TRUST POLICY 231-32 (1931) ("The industrialists persisted. . . in their
effort to exploit the opportunity they found in the trade practice conference to temper the warfare
of industrial competition and they were successful in devising euphemisms for trade-restraining
agreements which escaped the attention of the commission.. ."); T. BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at
95-96; T. COCHRAN & W. MILLER, supra note 92, at 346, 348; E. GOLDMAN, supra note 73, at 237;
P. HERRING, supra note 69, at 131-32; W. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 87, at 190 (1958); Kittelle
& Mostow, supra note 93, at 436-38.
173. See P. HERRING, supra note 69, at 132; see also J. CLARK, supra note 172, at 240-42; R.
HIMMELBERG, ORIGINS, supra note 89, at 93-98.
174. T. BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 95-96; P. HERRING, supra note 69, at 131; J. CLARK, supra
note 172, at 234; R. HIMMELBERG, ORIGINS, supra note 89, at 96-98.
L75. E. HAWLEY, supra note 99, at 39; P. HERRING, supra note 69, at 131-32.
176. T. BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 82-86.
177. FTC, ANN. REP. 111 (1925).
178. Id This rule applied even to cases involving fraud and misrepresentation. P. HERRING,
supra note 69, at 129.
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formal complaints and conenforcement proceedings and kept many
17 9
sent agreements out of the public eye.
For members of Congress who supported active FTC antitrust enforcement in the 1920's, the appointment and confirmation of commissioners with little sympathy for the statute's original aims was a searing
disappointment.180 Some found the Humphrey Commission so disturbing that they called for the agency's abolition.181 Humphrey's tenure, however, had graphically demonstrated how appointments could
set the tone and content of Commission policies. To many commentators, the FTC's ineffectiveness in its first two decades was caused by the
successful efforts of the President and, on occasion, of the Congress to
restrain the agency's pursuit of the competition policy goals of the 1914
statute.8 2 The Commission's experience in this era firmly supported
the ABAs conclusion in 1969 that the FTC's antitrust revitalization
would require the willingness of the White House to appoint, and of
the Senate to confirm, commissioners who preferred a forceful antitrust
role.
179. T. BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 85. "The coming of Humphrey to the commission meant
that private negotiation with concerns accused of unfair methods was substituted for the former
policy of prosecution." P. HERRING, supra note 69, at 129. Two commissioners, John Nugent and
Huston Thompson, dissented vehemently to the publicity limitations on the ground that they deprived the agency of an important means of deterring anticompetitive behavior. Davis supra note
164, at 448-49.
180. Reflecting on Humphrey's first year in office, Senator Norris lamented, "[i]t seems to me
that if the commission is to function, if it is to continue to perform the work that the law designed
it to perform, its personnel must be of men who believe in that kind of a law." 67 CONG. REc.
5962 (1926).
181. Senator King sponsored a bill to achieve this end, declaring that the FTC was "not only a
useless appendage, but ... a real menace." Davis, supra note 164, at 453-54. Senator Connally
said the agency had become "a city of refuge to which the guilty may flee, a sanctuary for those
who violate and defy the laws of the United States." Id at 453.
Humphrey remained a commissioner until 1933 when President Roosevelt removed him from
office. Humphrey's estate eventually persuaded the Supreme Court that Humphrey's dismissal
had been improper. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). Harold Ickes,
Roosevelt's Interior Secretary, later said that Roosevelt had claimed to have proof of actual misconduct by Humphrey, but had believed he could remove Humphrey without such disclosures. H.
ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THE FIRST THOUSAND DAYS 1933-36, at 374

(1953).
182. Blaisdell, for example, concluded:
[Tihe most important reason for the Commission's impotence lies in the drift of economic forces as they impinged on the political machinery. The struggle between "big
business" and those economic groups which desired the control of "big business" by
securing the control of the personnel and the policies of the Commission finally produced a governmental agency which would cooperate with business instead of regulate
business. At best the remodelled Commission would regulate business in accordance
with the ideals of business men.
T. BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 289-90. The other major obstacle, in Blaisdell's view, was "the
Commission's challenge to governmental control as administered by the courts." Id at 290.
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4. Congress
A fourth major external factor affecting the FTC's competition
programs is Congress.1 3 Through oversight, appropriations, and efforts to amend the agency's charter, Congress has significantly influenced the Commission's choice and execution of antitrust matters. As a
general rule, the FTC has successfully pursued few economically significant initiatives that lacked legislative approval. Fulfilling the active
antitrust role Congress envisioned in 1914 has always run the risk of
provoking business to seek legislative relief from the agency's actions.184 The FTC Act and its legislative history defined the nominal
deboundaries of the Commission's authority, but each new Congress
18 5
termines how far the agency may go in exercising its powers.
The political risk inherent in translating the broad mandate of
1914 into specific enforcement initiatives is evident in two past FTC
competition projects, each the most ambitious and visible Commission
initiative of its time: the meatpacking industry report of 1919, and the
Cement Institute base-point pricing case of the 1940's. The meatpacking report controversy involved the use of the agency's investigation
183. The preceding sections already have touched upon congressional influence upon FTC
antitrust activities. Significant examples include passage of the NIRA in 1933 and Humphrey's
confirmation in 1925. In their study of appointments to the FTC and Federal Communications
Commission, Graham and Kramer found that Congress historically has deferred to Executive
Branch judgment in reviewing appointments. See J. GRAHAM & V. KRAmER, supra note 145.
There have been notable exceptions to this proposition, however, such as the Senate's refusal to
confirm Rublee to a full term in 1915. See supra text accompanying note 152.
184. In 1936, Herring described this condition:
It seems apparent that from the beginning the commission was in a precarious position,
for not only were its legal powers vague and its resources inadequate, but its relations
with Congress were uncertain. The parties coming within its jurisdiction were often very
powerful. The more important the business, the wider its ramifications, and the more
numerous its allies and subsidiaries, the closer it came within the commission's responsibility. To review the firms with which this agency has had official contacts, especially in
its early years, is to go down the roster of business in this country. Making political
enemies was soon found to be an incident in the routine of administration. The discharging of official duties meant interfering with business and often "big business."
P. HERRING, supra note 69, at 115. See also R. CusHMAN, supra note 120, at 219 ("The authority
to investigate ...

mammoth business concerns.

. . is

a power loaded with political dynamite. It

is bound to arouse the bitter antagonism of those being investigated and to set in motion powerful
political pressures.").
185. "Only with strong political support can the Federal Trade Commission consistently administer its statutory responsibilities." P. HERMNO, supra note 69, at 116. Daniel Baum described
Congress' role since 1914 as one of continually restating and defining the FTC's mandate:
The question no longer is ... what the agency acting independently has the power to do
under statute, but rather, recognizing the sweep of its power, how far the agency can go
without incurring the wrath of Congress. . . . [T]he direction taken by the Commission
in the performance of its obligations must be done with an eye toward the Congress.
Baum, Antitrust Functions of the FederalTrade Commission: Area Discriminationand ProductDfferentiation, 24 FED. B.J. 579, 600 (1964).
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and reporting powers.' 8 6 In 1917, President Wilson requested the FTC

to investigate the food industry as part of a wartime price study. Despite vigorous lobbying by meatpacking firms to avoid the food in-

quiry, the Commission comprehensively examined the packing
business.' 8 7 The investigation yielded a six-volume report, 88 which
presented evidence of collusion among the nation's five largest packers

and numerous exclusionary tactics to thwart new competitors.' 8 9 The

Commission's recommendations included proposals for requiring the
packers to relinquish control of stockyards and restricting their activities in unrelated product lines.

The study quickly stimulated impassioned debate in Congress. 190
After months of hearings and discussion, Congress passed the Packers

and Stockyards Act of 1921 which gave the Agriculture Department
exclusive jurisdiction over the operation and practices of meatpackers,
stockyards, and livestock commission houses. 19 1 Congress' vesting of

authority over the packers in the Agriculture Department had an im186. 15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 49 (1976). Congress expected the Commission to use the information it
secured through these powers in two ways. The first was to provide advice to Congress and the
President on antitrust matters and to release data whose publication alone might correct market

imperfections. The House Report on the FTC Act, for example, anticipated that publication of
high business profits would attract entry into lucrative markets and depress prices. H.R. REP. No.
553, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1914). The second purpose was to improve the empirical basis upon
which the Commission selected its antitrust enforcement priorities and developed cases. The mere
fact that the agency exercised such powers might by itself deter violations. See T. BLAISDELL,
supra note 59, at 113-14.
187. P. HERRING, supra note 69, at 118; see also T. BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 188-91.

188. The report was submitted to President Wilson in summary form in 1918 and presented to
Congress in its entirety in 1919. P. HERRING, supra note 69, at 118.
189. See H.R. Doc. 1297, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918); Food Investigation: Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the MeatpackingIndustry, Summary and Part I (Extent and Growth of

the Five Packers In Meat and Other Industries) (1919). The five leading packers were Swift, Armour, Morris, Wilson, and Cudahy. P. HERRING, supra note 69, at 119.
190. Reaction to the report provided "a concrete illustration of the political and administrative
problems involved in attempting to regulate a powerful industry." P. HERRING, supra note 69, at
118. Herring explained: "The sweeping character of this investigation and the bold changes suggested caused a political backfire almost fatal to the Commission. Five federal officials aroused
the enmity of five great meat packers and the battle was on." Id at 119. Senator Watson, a
leading advocate of the packers, called for an investigation of the Commission employees who
conducted the study. Watson said that the FTC's Chicago headquarters were "centers of sedition
and anarchy. . . a nesting place for socialists, a spawning ground for sovietism." 58 CoNo. REc.
7169 (1919). The Commission investigated and exonerated the employees in question, but dismissed them nonetheless, a move widely seen as an effort to placate Watson. See T. BLAISDELL,
supra note 59, at 78-79; P. HERRING, supra note 69, at 119.
191. 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229 (1976). "The packers were desirous of getting from under the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission. They seemed to feel that they would receive more
sympathetic treatment from the officials in the Department of Agriculture." P. HERRING, supra
note 69, at 120. See also T. BLAISDELL, supra note 59, at 194; Davis, supra note 164, at 441; J.
LANDIS,supra note 117, at 112-13.
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mediate, demoralizing effect on the FTC.192 For the longer term, how-

ever, the meatpacking incident prompted Congress to keep the agency's
economic work on a shorter appropriations leash.' 9 3 This reduced the
number of economic investigations ordered by Congress, 194 and left the
FTC to initiate an increasing proportion of its own economic studies. 195
Decreasing congressional involvement in the initiation of the

FTC's economic work had important political implications. Historically, the least politically vulnerable FTC investigations and studies
had been those begun at the request of Congress. 196 On the other hand,
studies begun at the President's request or by the Commission itself

more often
provoked congressional efforts to limit the agency's
1
authority.

97

A second arena in which Congress has significantly affected the

Commission's choice of competition programs is litigation. An outstanding example is Congress' effort in the early 1950's to overturn the
192. Davis, supra note 164, at 441.
193. Formal congressional efforts to retrench the Commission's economic work began in the
middle and late 1920's with proposals to cease or sharply limit funding for the agency's economic
division. R. CUSHmAN, supra note 120, at 220. Spearheading this movement was Rep. Wood,
Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee for Independent Offices, who said that the
Commission's chief economist, Francis Walker, did little but "promulgate a lot of wild-eyed theories and idealism.' P. HERRING, supra note 69, at 128. In 1933, Congress barred the FTC from
beginning new investigations pursuant to legislative resolutions unless the requests were in the
form of concurrent resolutions. See Stevens, The FederalTrade Commission's Contributionto Industrialand Economic Analysis. The Work of the Economic Division, 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 545,
549-53 (1940). The restrictions did not stem entirely from the legislature's disapproval of the
FTC's work. In the 1920's, the Senate had ordered most of the FTC investigations begun by
congressional request. The Senate, however, had no authority to originate appropriations bills,
and the House was left in the disagreeable position of supplying funds for projects it had no hand
in devising. This situation irritated members of the House Appropriations Committee.
194. See MacIntyre & Volhard, The FederalTrade Commission, 11 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.
REV. 723, 755-56 (1970). Through 1933, Congress or the President had originated most of the
Commission's general studies. See FTC ANN. REP. 203-24 (1939).
195. Stevens, supra note 193, at 553. In 1970, Macntyre estimated that before 1933 some 43
investigations had been initiated by a resolution of the Senate and 5 by the House. Only 3 were
requested between 1933 and 1938, and none were sought from 1938 to 1970. MacIntyre &
Volhard, supra note 194, at 755.
196. The FTC's study of electric and gas utility holding companies, which followed a Senate
Resolution, is a noteworthy example. See FTC, SUMMARY REPORT ON HOLDING AND OPERATING COMPANIES OF ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES, S.Doc. No. 92, Pt. 73-A, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
59-76 (1935) (presenting a history of the FTC Study and its conclusions and recommendations).
197. The meatpacking study was performed at President Wilson's request. Two other examples also illustrate this trend. In 1952, President Truman asked the FTC for a comprehensive
study of consumer expenditures. Congress promptly barred the Commission from spending any
funds on such a study. See Boyle, Economic Reports andthe FederalTrade Commission: 50 Years'
Experience, 24 FED. B. J. 489, 501 (1964). Similarly, in 1963 the Commission's Bureau of Economics proposed a study of the nation's 1000 largest firms. Congress banned any expenditure of
the agency's funds on that venture as well. Id.; M. GREEN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 59,
369-70 (1972).
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result in FederalTrade Commission v. Cement Institute.19 ' During the
antitrust revival of the late 1930's, the Commission made base-point
pricing its principal antitrust litigation priority. 199 The main product of
this program was In re Cement Institute,2 °° in which the agency ordered
the members of the cement producers' national trade association to
abandon a multiple base-point pricing system. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the Commission, 20 1 but the Supreme Court
reinstated the agency's order.20 2
The Court's ruling triggered instant demands from cement industry officials that Congress declare base-point pricing legal.20 3 Congress
considered several bills designed to overturn Cement Institute 2° and
closely questioned the Commission about its future enforcement
plans.2 5 The climax came in June, 1950 when Congress passed the
198. 333 U.S. 683 (1948). See, e.g., C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAw 400-38
(1959); E. LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS (1952); Latham, The PoliticsofBasingPaint
Legislation, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 272 (1950); Wallace & Douglas,Antfltrust Policiesandthe
New.lttack on the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 684 (1952).
199. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON MONOPOLY OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 79TH
CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON UNITED STATES VERSUS ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION AND MONOPOLY 27 (Comm. Print 1946). The FTC's assault upon base-point pricing began in the early 1920's.

See, eg., In re United States Steel Corp., 8 F.T.C. 1 (1924).
200. 37 F.T.C. 87 (1943) (the Commission had filed the complaint in 1937).
201. Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. FTC, 157 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1946).
202. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948). Justice Black's majority opinion emphasized the Commission's extensive earlier work with the problem of base-point pricing. "We are
persuaded that the Commission's long and close examination of the questions it here decided has
provided it with precisely the experience that fits it for performance of its statutory duty." Id at
720. More than a purely mechanical deference to an abstract concept of administrative expertise,
this comment reflected an appreciation for the FTC's knowledge in this field. The remark underscored the "textbook quality" of the agency's base-point pricing program. As Congress, in 1914,
had expected it would, the Commission built the Cement Institute lawsuit upon careful economic
and legal analysis. Although the practice in question had many apologists, this seemed the type of
complex issue and enforcement approach for which Congress created the agency.
203. Wallace & Douglas, supra note 198, at 694-95; Latham, supra note 198, at 273-77. Joining ranks with the cement industry were the country's steelmakers, which also were losing an FTC
basing-point suit. See Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), aJ'dby
an equally divided Courtsub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949).
• 204. The bills are discussed in chapters 2-5 of E. LATHAM, supra note 198, at 54-208. For a
sympathetic treatment of these measures by the General Counsel of the Senate Special Subcommittee on Pricing, see Simon, The Casetlgainstthe FederalTrade Commssion, 19 U. CHI. L. REV.
297 (1952). For a rebuttal of Simon's views, see Wallace & Douglas, supra note 198.
205. S. 236: HearingsBe/ore the Subcomna on Pricinga/the Senate Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); INTERIM REPORT ON THE STUDY OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRICING POLICIES, S. Doc. No. 27, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. (1949). In his
1964 article, Baum described the purpose of the hearings as follows:
Here was no deliberate, careful study of Commission and court interpretation. Rather,
the hearings held were used to achieve two hurried ends; (1) the exertion of pressure to
force the Commission to back down, and not enforce the rulings of the Court, and
(2) the enactment of legislation which would soften existing antitrust laws.
Baum, supra note 185, at 597.
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O'Mahoney Freight Absorption Act which effectively overturned Cement Institute.2° 6 With the FTC's urging, President Truman vetoed the
bill, and later efforts to revive the measure failed.20 7
Although the O'Mahoney proposal failed, its narrow defeat exposed the precariousness of FTC lawsuits involving substantial economic stakes but lacking either the active support, or, at a minimum,
the tolerant acquiescence of Congress. Clair Wilcox, the economist and
business historian, summarized the lessons of the Cement Institute controversy for future economically significant FTC antitrust initiatives:
An administrative agency . .

is peculiarly vulnerable to

political attack. If inert, lenient, and ineffective, its placid
existence may be undisturbed. But if vigorous in the performance of its duties, it will be headed for trouble. Its powers
may be curtailed, its appropriation slashed, its administrators
refused confirmation, its personnel subjected to persecution,
its very existence jeopardized.
If the Federal Trade Commission comes to grief, it will
not be because it has been too lax, but because it has been too
tough. If it values survival, an agency thus attacked is likely
to draw in its horns.208
C. ImplicationsforFTC Competition Programs
Lassitude, as Wilcox suggested, may be the most reliable path to
long-run institutional survival for administrative agencies with politically sensitive law enforcement responsibilities. In 1969, however, the
pervasive perception of FTC "inertness, leniency, and ineffectiveness"
posed the greatest threat to its well-being. 20 9 The ABA Report pro206. S. 1008, 81st Cong. 2d Sss. (1950).
207. C. EDWARDS, supra note 198, at 430-32; Simon, supra note 204, at 323; Wallace & Douglas, supra note 198, at 693.
208. C. WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 259-60 (1955). John Blair, who directed the FTC's Bureau of Economics in the early 1950's, wrote in 1964 that "[tihe agonies that
the Commission went through in trying to justify its attack upon the basing-point system ... left
a sear which will long remain." Blair, Planningfor Competition, 64 COLuM. L. REv. 524, 525
(1964). Similarly, Baum noted:
The storm following the Cement case left destruction and with it a message ... : The
will of Congress cannot be ignored; statutory power must, at times, be exercised in a
political context. The question is not always what the Commission can in theory do, but,
rather what it can in reality accomplish. This calls for the agency to be aware of the
mood of Congress, and, more precisely the measure of opposition to proposed policy
decisions.
Baum, supra note 185, at 606 (footnotes omitted).
209. See NADER REPORT, supra note 16. The Report mainly discussed the Commission's consumer protection activities, but its criticisms frequently applied to the agency as a whole. Devot-
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posed that the FTC satisfy three broad criteria in choosing competition

initiatives: First, limit its resources to projects with genuine economic
significance; z 1° second, concentrate on matters involving unsettled legal
doctrine and requiring complicated economic analysis; third, resort
more to compulsory enforcement proceedings.
A central feature of the ABA criteria was their tendency, if closely
followed, to have the Commission draw increasingly from the riskladen end of the spectrum of all possible antitrust programs and enforcement methods. Each guideline advanced a change from "trivial"
to economically important programs, from per se offenses to complex,
unsettled areas of law and economics, from voluntary to compulsory
enforcement-that would replace a safer approach with a riskier
one.2 1 To succeed in a.comparatively higher risk role, the Commission needed to pursue the ABA's suggested internal reforms. The

agency's own substantive skills, and political acumen would be important in determining whether the agency developed meritorious programs and executed them without provoking serious collateral political
attack.21 z However, the success of the ABA's proposals also depended
as much on the attitudes of Congress, the President, the judiciary, and

the nation at large as it did on the FTC's skill in pursuing them. 21 3

ing "its dwindling energies to the prosecution of the most trivial cases," the FTC was "engaged in
active and continuing collusion with business interests-particularly big-business interests." Id. at
45, 121. The Nader Report added that "[m]isguided leadership is the malignant cancer that has
already assumed control of the Commission, that has been silently destroying it, and that has
spread its contagion on the growing crisis of the American consumer." Id. at 130. The agency's
work, it concluded, amounted to a "betrayal of the public interest." Id. at 59. In 1972, the Nader
organization published an equally unflattering analysis of federal antitrust enforcement and the
FTC's competition programs. See M. GREEN, supra note 197.
210. ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 37, 68.
211. The risk comes in mainly two forms. The first is that the Commission will win fewer
cases as it brings more lawsuits affecting high economic stakes and dealing with complex, unsettled areas of law and economics. Effective litigation strategy suggests that respondents will contest
economically significant suits vigorously and encourage judicial officers to shun applications of
"novel" economic theory and avoid apparent departures from existing legal doctrine. The second
risk consists of the possibility that enforcement programs affecting substantial economic interests
will spur affected firms to seek intervention by Congress or the President on their behalf, particularly where the Commission's action rests upon unsettled legal or economic theories.
212. As the modem political science literature indicates, political adroitness is as important to
the success of an administrative agency's programs as technical proficiency. F. ROURKE, BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN NATIONAL POLITICS 2 (1972). "[Elach agency must constantly create a climate
of acceptance for its activities and negotiate alliances with powerful legislative and community
groups to sustain its position. It must, in short, master the art of politics as well as the science of
administration." Id
213. Richard Posner's dissent to the ABA REPORT argued that the career interests of FTC
Commissioners alone made it extremely unlikely that the agency would begin or sustain politically risky programs.
It has been proposed as a reasonable hypothesis that regulators motivated by self-interest
act so as (a) to retain their jobs and (b) to obtain greater appropriations for their agency
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In recommending that the FTC retain its antitrust powers, the
ABA seems to have perceived that institutions outside the agency were
amenable to the risk-taking its guidelines implicitly required. The
ABA Committee appeared to believe that the President and Congress
would play the most important role in determining the form and content of the FTC's antitrust work. The preferences of the Executive
Branch would emerge through its selection of Commissioners, particularly the Agency's Chairman.214 Whether Congress wanted the FTC to
assume the ABA's suggested antitrust role would become apparent in
several ways: The demands Congress placed upon nominees to the
Commission; the types of competition programs the oversight and appropriations committees urged the FTC to pursue; the breadth and durability of congressional backing for specific initiatives to implement
Congress' broad preferences; and appropriations.2 15 The actual reas a way of augmenting personal power (and frequently remuneration as well). This
assumption seems reasonable as to those commissioners who seek reappointment and
those members of the staff who make a career of government service....
Not every commissioner or staff member makes a career of government service,
however.... A commissioner concerned with his future success at the bar will have no
greater incentive to promote the consumer interest fearlessly and impartially than one
whose guiding principles are job retention and agency aggrandizement . . . . Exceptional people may rise to the challenge but they are unlikely ever to constitute a sizeable
fraction of commissioners.
ABA REPORT, supra note 10, at 116-17 (footnotes omitted). The FTC's antitrust work since 1969
hardly supports Posner's thesis that managerial and career goals will deter a majority of commissioners from pursuing politically risky programs. See R. KATZMANN, supra note 63, at 183-85.
214. This Article does not analyze the appointment of commissioners by the Executive Branch
in the decade following the ABA Report. As a group, these appointments placed the agency's
leadership in the hands of individuals who shared many of the ABA's views and were committed
to revitalizing the agency. See J. GRAHAM & V. KRAMER, supra note 145, at 333-56, 369-70.
President Nixon's appointment of Miles Kirkpatrick, the head of the ABA Committee, to chair the
FTC in 1970 is an outstanding example of this trend.
In addition to the appointments process, the Executive Branch can seek to influence the Commission's activities through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). On at least two occasions, OMB has attempted to alter the FTC's enforcement functions through the President's
annual budget request to Congress. In 1937, the Bureau of the Budget, OMB's predecessor, tried
unsuccessfully to eliminate the Commission's Economic Division by refusing to seek appropriations for its operation. See Independent Offices AppropriationBillfor 1937" Hearing Before the
Subcomm of the House ComnL on Appropriations, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 218-60 (1936). More recently, in 1981, OMB asked that Congress gradually cease funding the FTC's Bureau of Competition. See note I supra.
215. The FTC's success would require legislative support for both antitrust generally and for
the agency's specific antitrust programs. As political scientist David Mayhew observes, the purposes which inspire congressmen to create regulatory bodies may differ from those which motivate
legislators' reactions to specific enforcement programs.
Position-taking politics may produce statutes that are long on goals but short on means
to achieve them ....
Probably the best examples of congressional symbolism are those
arising out of efforts to regulate business. Regulatory statutes are the by-products of
congressional position taking at times of public dissatisfaction. ...
What happens in
enforcement is largely a result of congressional credit-claiming activities on behalf of the
regulated; there is every reason to believe that the regulatory agencies do what Congress
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sponse of Congress and the Commission to the 1969 ABA Report is the
subject of the next section.
III.

THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION'S COMPETITION PROGRAMS:

1969-1980
From the date of its release, the ABA 'Report became a congressionally accepted standard for measuring the Commission's antitrust

performance. 16 Oversight and appropriations committees believed
that the study had diagnosed the agency's ills correctly and had
presented a sensible blueprint for reform.217 Congress endorsed the
Report's conclusion that the FTC had used its antitrust powers timidly
and unimaginatively, and insisted that future programs deal forthwants them to do. The ambitious "public interest" aims of the statutes are seldom
accomplished.
D. MAYHEW, CONrRFss: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 134-35 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
216. See, e.g., FederalTrade Commission Oversight: HearingsBe/ore the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Van Deerlin) [hereinafter cited as House 1976 FTC
Oversight Hearings];FederalTrade Commission Oversight: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 352 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Cook) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Commerce Committee 1974 Oversight Hearings];Agriculture-Enironmentaland Consumer Protection Appropriationsfor1973: HearingsBeore a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 511 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Evans) [hereinafter cited as House 1973
AppropriationsHearings];Agriculture-Enironmentaland Consumer ProtectionAppropriatlonsfor
1973" Hearings Beore a Subcomm, of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations,92d Cong., 2d Sess.
1483 (1972) (remarks of Sen. McGee) [hereinafter cited as Senate 1973 AppropriationsHearings];
Agriculture-Environmentaland ConsumerProtectionAppropriationsfor1972: HearingsBe/ore a
Subcomn
of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 65-66 (1971) (remarks of
Rep. Whitten) [hereinafter cited as House 1972AppropriationsHearings];Independent Offices and
Department of Housing and Urban Development Appropriations/orFiscal Year 1971: Hearings
Be/ore a Subcomm of the Senate Comin on Appropriations,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 487 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Pastore) [hereinafter cited as Senate 1971 AppropriationsHearings]; Independent
Offices and Department of Housing and Urban Development Appropriationsfor 1971: Hearings
Before the Subcomm on Independent Ofices and Departmentof Housing and UrbanDevelopment
of the House Comm. on Appropriations,91st Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1, 1281 (1970) (remarks of Rep.
Evins) [hereinafter cited as House 1971AppropriationsHearings];Independent Offices andDepartment ofHousing and Urban Development Appropriationsfor1970: HearingsBefore the Subcomm.
on Independent Offices andDepartment ofHousing and Urban Development fthe House Comm. on
Appropriations, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., Pt. 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as House 1970 Appropriations
Hearings];Nomination fMiles W Kirkpatriekto be Chairman of the FederalTrade Commisslon:
HearingsBeore the Senate Comm on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 174-79 (1970) (remarks of
Sens. Cook and Hart) [hereinafter cited as KirkpatrickConfirmationHearings];Nomination of Cspar W We'ibergerto be Chairmanof the FederalTrade Commission: HearingsBe/ore the Senate
Comm on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 12-15 (1970) (remarks of Sens. Magnuson and Moss)
[hereinafter cited as Weinberger Confirmation Hearings]; Federal Trade Commission Procedures:
HearingsBe/ore the Subcomm on AdministrativePracticeandProcedures0 /the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, 99-110 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) [hereinafter
cited as 1969 Admin, Practice& ProcedureHearings].
217. The one major ABA proposal that Congress did not approve was the suggestion that the
FTC limit its Robinson-Patman Act enforcement work. See infra text accompanying notes 23537.
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rightly with difficult, economically important antitrust problems. Congress also perceived a longstanding indifference by the FTC to the
weaknesses emphasized in the ABA Report. Congressional leaders underscored their demands for improvement by reiterating the ABA's
view that reform should be a basic condition for the agency's future
existence.218 Though perhaps overstated, such admonitions left little
doubt that Congress would no longer tolerate what it perceived to be
plodding, insignificant antitrust enforcement.
This section analyzes in two parts the development of the FTC's
competition programs since the ABA Report. The first covers the period from 1969 through the second session of the 94th Congress in
1976. The second section covers the period from 1977 through 1980.
Each section discusses the general antitrust role Congress wanted the
agency to perform, as well as the specific ways in which it preferred the
FTC to use its competition resources, and reviews the Commission's
response to this guidance.
A. 1969-1976

1. Congressional Guidance
The oversight and appropriations committees frequently articulated the general tone and character of antitrust enforcement they expected from the FTC's leadership. 219 They called for a fundamental
218. Senator Edward Kennedy, then Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedures, made this clear during an FTC oversight hearing on the day
the ABA Report appeared.
The subcommittee hopes. . . to see to it that the proposals we have received do not
merely become grist for the mill of future students of the FTC. . . . Surely, 45 years
after Henderson's landmark work on the FTC, first exposing many of the same problems
we see today, the time has come either to do something about them, or .... to consider
abolishing the agency and starting it from the ground again.
1969.4dministrativePractice& ProcedureHearings,supra note 216, at 110.
Two major recent studies of the FTC's relations with Congress in the 1960's and 1970's have
demonstrated the existence of a strong congressional sentiment favoring vigorous government antitrust and consumer protection initiatives dating back at least to the mid-1960's. See Pertschuk,
supra note 9; Weingast & Moran, supra note 9. The chief functions of the ABA Report and 1969
Nader Report appear to have been those of (I) sharply increasing public and congressional attention to the agency and its performance, and (2) catalyzing powerful, pre-existing congressional
reform impulses by supplying a concrete program for renewing the institution.
219. As mentioned above, several scholars have concluded that, since the founding of the
FTC, the Senate has cursorily reviewed most appointments to the Commission. See J. GRAHAM
& V. KRAMER, supra note 145, at 400; R. KATZMANN, supra note 63, at 140-42; see also supra note
183. This view accurately describes the level of Senate participation in the appointments process
for much of the FTC's history, but not for the early and middle 1970's. The Senate Commerce
Committee and its staff actively screened potential commissioner nominees before their appointments and used confirmation hearings to elicit pledges that the nominees would aggressively execute the agency's responsibilities. See J. GRAHAM & V. KRAMER, supra note 145, at 333-51, 370-

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1981

45

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 17 [1981], Iss. 4, Art. 1
TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:587

redirection of the agency's competition programs. Indeed, the hearings
of this period abound with instructions that the Commission's antitrust
programs place a premium on boldness, experimentation, and a willingness to tackle major sources of consumer injury.
The process of redirection began in earnest in November 1969
during hearings to confirm Caspar Weinberger as the agency's new
Chairman. Senator Warren Magnuson, Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, told the nominee to exert strong, independent leadership in renewing the agency:
This Commission is very important to this committee. I am
sure that you realize the task that confronts the new Chairman in light of so many recent criticisms of the operation of
the Federal Trade Commission ....
. . . I am hopeful that you will help maintain the right
kind of morale by recruiting strongly and expanding the existing Trade Commission programs in order to perform the
job well ....
The Trade Commission is an arm of Congress, and we
have entrusted to that agency numerous tasks that require a
great deal of attention and a great deal of fortitude not to respond to any pressures that come from any place.220
Miles Kirkpatrick, Weinberger's successor, received similar encouragement upon his first appearance before the Senate Appropriations Committee in 1971. Subcommittee Chairman Gale McGee told Kirkpatrick
that his Committee wanted the Commission to act aggressively and
take risks in applying its competition powers:
For a long time many of us have felt. . . that the FTC over a
long period of time. . . seemed to be either sitting on its posi-

tion rather than moving with the changing times or in many
71; Weingast & Moran, supra note 9, at 6; see also infra text accompanying notes 220-25. The
driving forces on the Commerce Committee were Senator Warren Magnuson, the Committee
Chairman, and Senators Frank Moss and Philip Hart, who were Chairman and Vice-Chairman,
respectively, of the Subcomm. for Consumers. All shared an abiding interest in the FTC's revitalization and used the Committee's power to promote that goal. See Pertschuk, supra note 9; Weingast & Moran, supra note 9, at 18-19. The Commerce Committee Staff (whose chief counsel was
Michael Pertschuk) and other staffs at the disposal of these senators were instrumental in seeing
that nominees were suitable to the Committee leadership. See J. GRAHAM & V. KRAMER, supra
note 145, at 350-51. The joint efforts of the senators and their staffs ensured the selection of

appointees-particularly nominees for the chairmanship-who shared the committee's enforcement goals and the abandonment of potential nominees who did not. See R. KATZMANN, supra
note 63, at 143-45.
220. Weinberger ConfirmationHearings,supra note 216, at 5. The appropriations committees
of the House and Senate conveyed the same message to Weinberger in his first appearances before
them. See, eg., House 1971 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 216, at 1289-90.
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instances actually retreating from what its original intent had
been ....
I think you would find a much friendlier Congress up
here than some of your [budget] requests might suggest...
that a great part of the Commission's duty is to strike blows in
behalf of the consumer ....
I think this is one of the Federal commissions that has a
much larger responsibility and capability than sometimes it
has been willing to live up to for reasons of congressional
sniping at it in some respects or pressures put on it through
the industry and the like.
Too often it has been either shy or bashful. . . .That is
why we were having a rather closer look at your requests just
in the hopes of encouraging you, if anything, to make mistakes, but I think the mistakes you are to make ought to be
mistakes in doing and trying rather than playing safe in not
doing.
I believe that is the most serious mistake of all. . . you
are not faulted for making mistakes. You may be for making
it twice in a row, for not learning properly but, we would
rather you make a mistake innovating, trying something new,
rather than playing so cautiously that you never make a mistake . 221
Similarly, when Lewis Engman appeared before the Senate Commerce Committee as Chairman-designate in 1973, the Committee's
members exhorted him to follow the path traveled by Weinberger and
Kirkpatrick during the preceding three years.222 During the same hear221. Agriculture-Environmentaland Consumer ProtectionAppropriationsforFiscal Year 1972:
Hearings Before a Subcomm of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2673
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate 1972 AppropriationsHearings]. Senator McGee concluded the
hearings by stating, "[w]e have considerable dependence on your initiative. . . to stay on top of
the great bulk of these bothersome areas that are easily forfeited through neglect and we would
like to encourage you to jump at rather than from." Id at 2699. The following year, Senator
McGee noted with approval that Chairman Kirkpatrick had "responded to the criticism. . . by
both Mr. Nader and the American Bar Association by moving aggressively against some of the
major industries in the United States.' Senate 1973 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 216, at
1483. As he had the year before, the Subcommittee Chairman urged Kirkpatrick to apply the
agency's antitrust powers vigorously. Id at 1490, 1507.
222. Nomination ofLewis4. Engman to be a Commissioner,FederalTrade Commission: Hearings Before the Senate Comm on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Engnhan ConfirmationHearings]. See also Agriculture-Environmentaland Consumer ProtectionAppropriationsfor 1974: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Agriculture-Environmentaland Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 6, 74 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as House 1974 AppropriationsHearings]("I personally feel that [Kirkpatrick] did
a real fine job, and we hate to see him go .... [Y]ou do follow in the footsteps of someone we
had a high regard for, and I think the country did.") (comments of Rep. Whitten to Chairman
Engman).
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ings, Senator Cotton complained that the FTC "has had a need for
2 23
some kind of injection to pep it up so it would fulfill its mission."
Senator Ted Stevens told Engman that he expected bold action from
the new Chairman: "I am really hopeful. . . that you will become a
real zealot in terms of consumer affairs and some of these big business
people will complain to us that you are going too far. That would be
the day, as far as I am concerned." 2 On these and other occasions,
the oversight committees left the Commission's leaders with little doubt
2 25
about the basic direction the Commission should pursue.
The confirmation and oversight process revealed the qualities
Congress wanted to see in the Commission's antitrust work. Beyond
fixing the broad objectives and tone they wanted to achieve, the committees actively suggested specific uses for the Commission's competition resources. As a first step, Congress urged the FTC to establish an
effective system for planning its affairs and choosing priorities.2 2 6 Various committees emphasized the need for a planning mechanism that
filtered out "trivial" matters and focused the FTC's resources on major
antitrust problems.2 27 In the committees' view, the Commission also
should translate the fruits of its improved planning efforts into guidelines by which staff attorneys and economists would organize their
223. Engman Confirmation Hearings, supra note 222, at 25.
224. Id at 31.

225. The committees routinely emphasized the importance of taking congressional views seriously. See, e.g., Weinberger ConDnation Hearings, SUpra note 216, at 31 (comments of Sen.
Hartke to Chairman-designate Weinberger); Federal Tade Commission Practicesand Procedures:
Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and

Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1974) (comments of Rep. Devine to Chairman
Engman) [hereinafter cited as House Special InvestigationsSubcomm. 1974 Hearings].
226. See, e.g., Senate Commerce Committee 1974 OversIght Hearings,supra note 216, at 352
(remarks of Sen. Cook); House 1972AppropriationsHearings,supra note 216, at 185, 211-12 (remarks of Reps. Whitten and Evans); 1969 Admin. Practice& ProcedureHearinfs,supra note 216,

at 8-14, 22-23, 25-26, 40-42 65-67, 101-02 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy on priorities of the Commission).
The committees were disturbed by the ABA's conclusion that the agency relied almost entirely on such passive devices as the "mailbag" to select enforcement targets. See, e.g., House 1972
AppropriationsHearings,supra note 216, at 94 (remarks of Rep. Whitten); Wenberger Confirma-

tion Hearings, supra note 216, at 24 (remarks of Sen. Moss).
227. See, e.g., House 1970 AppropriationsHearings, supra note 216, at 390 (Rep. Evins expressed to Chairman Dixon his concern over the FTC's exhausting resources on trivial matters),
As a guide to selecting projects, the new planning efforts should seek to measure the costs and
benefits of contemplated and completed cases. See, e.g., Agriculture-Environmentaland Con.

srumerProtectionAppropriationsfor1975." HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Agriculture-Environ
mentaland ConsumerProtectionofthe House Comm, on Appropriations,93d Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 6,
at 694 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Whitten) [hereinafter cited as House 1975 AppropriationsHearings;
Senate Commerce Committee 1974 Oversight Hearings,supra note 216, at 372-73 (remarks of Sen.
Moss).
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In addition to promoting the creation of a strong institutional
planning base, Congress singled out many specific, generic competition
problems and industry sectors for the FTC to scrutinize. They requested that the agency use a substantial portion of its antitrust resources to examine the consequences of industrial concentration and
the influence of market structure upon economic performanceproblems which Congress regarded as among the country's most urgent
competition priorities.229
Congress was especially concerned about business mergers, particularly conglomerate acquisitions contributing to industrial concentration.23 ° Congressional interest in this phenomenon took two forms.
First, it encouraged the Commission to refine its techniques for measuring the performance of diversified firms and their constituent
parts.231 For example, in 1973, Congress removed several obstacles to
the implementation of a line-of-business reporting program through
measures approved as part of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization
Act.232 Second, Congress enacted new legislation to increase the FTC's
228. House 1976FTC Oversight Hearings,supra note 216, at 7 (remarks of Rep. Van Deerlin);
Senate 1972 Appropi/ationsHearings,supra note 221, at 2683 (remarks of Sen. McGee).
229. See, e.g., S. 2387 and RelatedBills: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Mo.
nopoly of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, at 47-48 (1975) (Sen.
Packwood stated: "When we in Congress see this inevitable result of the concentration of power,
...the stifling of competition. . ., the answer is not to throw out the competitive system...
[but] to restore the competitive system. The answer is to require the breaking up and divestiture of
the giant business conglomerates into smaller parts so that the competitive system may flourish
and grow again."); Senate 1972AppropriationsHearings,supra note 221, at 2678-79 (Sen. McGee's
questions to Chairman Kirkpatrick); Letter from Sen. William Proximire to Chairman Weinberger (June 1, 1970), reprintedin Kirkpatrick Confirmation Hearings,supra note 216, at 136-38;
Role of Giant Corporations: Hearingson the Automobile Industry-1969Before the Subcomm. on
Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong. 1st Sess., Pt. 1, 1-3 (1969)
(remarks of Chairman Nelson) [hereinafter cited as Sen. 1969 Automobile Hearings].
230. See, eg., Weinberger ConfirmationHearings,supra note 216, at 25-26 (question addressed
by Sen. Moss to Chairman-designate Weinberger).
The Executive Branch also expressed concern over existing merger trends. Address by Attorney General John Mitchell, Georgia Bar Association (June 6, 1969), reprintedin Economic Concentration Reports: Pt. 8, supra note 61, at 5122-23 ("I believe that the future vitality of our free
economy may be in danger because of the increasing threat of economic concentration by corporate mergers.... The danger that. . . super-concentration poses to our economic, political and
social structure cannot be overestimated.").
231. In November 1969, Sen. Moss asked Chairman-designate Weinberger whether Weinberger favored divisional or line-of-business reporting for the top 400 companies. In reply Weinberger stated, "I know the Federal Trade Commission has very broad reporting authority to
require and discover the financial facts concerning corporations, and I think that this should be
used in the pursuance of authorized studies with respect to determining conglomerate policy.. . ." Weinberger ConfirmationHearings,supra note 216, at 26; see also House 1973Approprations Hearings,supra note 216, at 522.
232. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, § 409, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3502, 3512 (1976). The
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ability to identify and halt anticompetitive mergers. The 1973 Pipeline

Authorization Act gave the FTC power in certain circumstances, to
seek temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions in federal court to stop existing or impending antitrust violations, notably,
illegal mergers.233 In 1976 Congress amended the Clayton Act to require firms to notify the FTC and the Justice Department before making certain acquisitions.2 34

A second generic competition problem in which Congress took an
active interest was Robinson-Patman Act enforcement.235 Several
committees called on the Commission to explain a perceived agency
neglect of the statute.2 3 6 The discussions of Robinson-Patman enforce-

ment demonstrated that, while Congress agreed with the ABA's proposal that the FTC expand its antitrust efforts in other areas, it wanted the
agency to maintain other programs traditionally supported by
Congress.2 3 7

As it described the generic competition problems the Commission
amendments authorized the Commission to issue certain questionnaires without first obtaining
clearance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), as previously required. Id
§§ 3501-3511 (1970). In 1972 and 1973 the Commission had sought OMB approval for its line-ofbusiness questionnaires but was turned down each time. The 1973 legislation transferred this
authority to the General Accounting Office, a body more favorably disposed to the FTC proposal.
Id § 3512; see Senate Commerce Committee 1974 Oversight Hearings, sxqra note 216, at 133;
House 1973 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 216, at 522.
233. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, § 408, 15 U.S.C. § 53 (1976). This authority
would prove to be an important tool in the agency's merger program. See, infra note 408.
234. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b) (1976). The statute also established a mandatory waiting period for
firms attempting certain acquisitions and tender offers.
235. Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act §§ 2-4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976).
During Weinberger's confirmation hearings in 1969, for example, the Senate Commerce Committee questioned the nominee about his enforcement plans. Weinberger Con~frmnation Hearings,
supra note 216, at 28. Shortly before the hearings, Representative John Dingell, Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Small Business and the Robinson-Patman Act, had written to the Senate
Commerce Committee asking that it discourage the Commission from following the ABA Report's suggested reconsideration of the agency's existing Robinson-Patman policies. Id at 27.
236. House Special InvestigationsSubcommr 1974 Hearings,supra note 225, at 208. In 1974,
Representative Staggers, Chairman of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee,
provided this assessment of the FTC's Robinson-Patman enforcement trend:
In 1960, the Commission issued 130 Robinson-Patman complaints and 45 orders.
In 1963, it issued 219 complaints and 250 orders. In 1965, it issued 13 complaints and 21
orders. In 1969, it issued 8 complaints and 9 orders. . . . In 1973, it issued 3 complaints
and 4 orders. To me this dramatic decrease in the number of Robinson-Patman Act
cases between 1960 and 1973 raises questions about whether the Commission is enforcing the law. The subcommittee must be concerned about whether the decrease in Robinson-Patman Act enforcement by the FTC constitutes an administrative abolition of the
law.
Id. at 68.
237. See Recent Efforts to Amend orRepealthe Robinson-PatmanAct-Part I" HearingsBe/ore
the Ad Hoc Subcomn on Antitrust, the Robinson-PatmanAct, and Related Matters o the House
Comtm on Small Business, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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should address, Congress also earmarked specific industries and economic sectors it believed were fruitful subjects for antitrust inquiry. In
the early 1970's, Congress generally regarded the food industry as the
top priority for FTC competition analysis.238 Several committees asked
the agency to examine the effect of the food industry's structure on
prices,239 with special emphasis upon concentration in manufactur-

ing24° and retailing.241
With the sudden tightening of fuel supplies in the early 1970's,
however, energy soon displaced the food industry as Congress' preferred FTC antitrust priority. By 1972, the Commission had received a
growing number of congressional requests to begin or expand studies of
various aspects of the energy industry, including gasoline marketing,
natural gas supplies, the substitutability of oil, coal, natural gas, and
uranium as electric utility fuels, mergers in the petroleum industry, and
the effect of petroleum industry structure upon petroleum product
prices. 24 2 In 1973, gasoline and fuel oil shortages became especially

acute, and virtually every major congressional committee with responsibility for competition or energy policy directed the Commission to
make energy its chief antitrust priority.243
238. See, e g., Senate Commerce Committee 1974 Oversight Hearings,supra note 216, at 2, 109
(remarks of Sen. Moss); FoodPrice investigation: HearingsBefore the Subcomn. on Monopolies
and CommercialLaw of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong., Ist Sess. 35, 75-76 (1973).
Committee Chairman Rodino stated:
I think the Federal Trade Commission has tremendous areas of responsibility at a time
when prices are rising at such a rate, and the consumer is concerned whether or not the
government is living up to its responsibility.... [A]ntitrust enforcement in the food
Consumers are not being well served by the food
industry has lacked vigilance ....
industry.
Id.; see also id at 1-2, 35-48 (remarks of Reps. Rodino and McClory). H.R. REP. No. 1175, 92d

Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1972) (suggesting that the FTC "give increased attention to the problem(s) of

increased food costs").
239. Senate 1973 AppropriationsHearings, supra note 216, at 1494-95 (remarks of Sen. McGee); Senate 1972,4pprapriationsHearings,supra note 221, at 2684-86 (remarks of Sen. McGee).
240. Senate Commerce Committee1974 OversightHearings,supra note 216, at 111; Senate 1972
AppropriationsHearings,supra note 221, at 2685-86.
241. See, eg., Senate 1972 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 221, at 2685-86; House 1975
AppropriationsHearings,supra note 227, at 745.
242. Marketing Practicesin the GasoineIndustry: HearingsBefore the Subcomrz on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm; on the Judiciary,91st Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1, at 183-84 (1970)
(letter from Sen. Hart to A. Everette MacIntyre, Acting Chairman, Federal Trade Commission
(Aug. 14, 1970)); The NaturalGas Industry: HearingsBefore the Subcomnm on Antitrust and Monopoly ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, 197-208 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NaturalGas Industry 1973 Hearings]; These requests built upon the FTC's extensive
petroleum industry expertise, which dated back to the work of the Bureau of Corporations at the
turn of the century. See PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., INVESTIGATION OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, 3-4 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter cited as FTC PETROLEUM INDUSTRY INVESTIGATION].
243. See, eg., Competition in the Energy Industry: Gasoline andFuel Oi& HearingsBefore the
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In their discussions about fuel shortages, several committees displayed an urgent interest in having the FTC move promptly to address
perceived competitive dangers in the energy industry. During hearings
on the FTC's budget in April of 1973, Representative Mark Andrews
conveyed this message to Chariman Engman in comments that reflected the tone and substance of congressional guidance to the agency
in this period:
In the last 6 months in this country we have come smack
up against an energy crisis. We have specific knowledge that
small independent refineries in mid-America are unable to get
crude oil because the majors are cutting them off ....
Here right under your nose is something where obviously
you haven't been doing your job or you would have it resolved. .

.

. I might ask the question where were you then

and what are you doing now to force the majors, out of a
sense of Christian justice if not economic survival for midAmerica, to allow these small independent refineries to get a
supply of crude so they can serve their customers ....
As far as I can see, the Federal Trade Commission has
244
been sitting fat, dumb, and happy doing nothing about it.
Within months, various other committees of Congress called for the
Commission to investigate the shortages and move promptly to protect
independent refiners and marketers from a loss of petroleum supplies. 245 Committee members closely questioned Commission officials
about features of major oil company structure and behavior that might
warrant formal FTC intervention.246 Still other committees, without
specifically requesting FTC action, expressed serious concern with the
Subcomm. onAntitrutandMonopoly ofthe Senate Comm on the Judiciary,93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-

3, 235 (1973) (remarks of Subcomm. Chairman Hart and Sen. Kennedy) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Antitrust Subcomna 1973 Hearingson Gasolineand Fuel Oil]; FTC PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
INVESTIGATION, supra note 242, at v-vii (letter of May 31, 1973 from Sen. Jackson, Chairman of

the Senate Government Operations Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, to Lewis Engman);
House 1974.AppropriationsHearings,supra note 222, at 101, 103, 145 (remarks of Reps. Andrews
and Evans); FairMarketing of Petroleum ProductsAct: Hearings on S,.1599, S.1694, and S.723
Before the Consumer Subcomna of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 111-12
(1973) (remarks of Sen. Stevenson) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearingson 1973 FairMarketing
Acts]; see also Concentration by Competing Raw FuelIndustries in the Energy Market and Its Impact on Small Business: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Special Small BusinessProblems othe
House Select Comm on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-33 (1971) (remarks of Subcomm.

Chairman Smith and Rep. Conte).
244. House 1974 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 222, at 101. See also id at 103.
245. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on 1973 FairMarketingActs, supra note 243, at 111-12; Senate
AntitrustSubcomm. 1973 Hearingson Gasoline and Fuel Oil, supra note 243 at I.
246. See, e.g., FTC PETROLEUM INDUSTRY INVESTIGATION, supra note 242, at v, vii (letter of

May 31, 1973 from Sen. Jackson to Chairman Engman: "I am hereby requesting the Federal
Trade Commission to prepare a report within thirty days regarding the relationship between the
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viability of the petroleum industry's independent sector. 247

In July 1973, the Commission issued a complaint charging the
country's eight largest petroleum companies with maintaining a noncompetitive market structure in the Atlantic and Gulf Coast states.24 8
The filing of this complaint, however, did not diminish congressional
interest in having the Commission continue to monitor and address in-

dustry developments.2 49 Through legislation, Congress substantially
expanded the Commission's competition advocacy responsibilities in

the energy area. These included requirements that the FTC analyze
the effects of the mandatory petroleum allocation program pursuant to
the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973;250 comment on the

activities of American petroleum companies participating in programs
under the aegis of the International Energy Agency;2 5 1 and review

deepwater port applications filed with the Department of Transportation under the Deepwater Ports Act of 1974.252
Although food and energy were Congress' most important competition priorities in the early 1970's, they were not the only industries
arousing antitrust interest. Various committees earmarked several
structure of the petroleum industry and related industries and the current prospective shortages of
petroleum products."); Senate Hearingson 1973 FairMarketingActs, supra note 243, at 234-35.
247. See, e.g., MandatoryFuelsAl1ocation: HearingsBefore the House Comn on Interstateand
Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., IstSess. 1, 21-22 (1973) (remarks of Comm. Chairman Staggers
and Rep. MacDonald).
248. In re Exxon Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,388 at
20,269 (Dkt. No. 8934, July 17, 1973). One respondent to the Exxon suit later sought unsuccessfully to have the complaint dismissed on the ground that the Commission had no "reason to
believe" that the FTC Act had been violated, and had issued the complaint mainly in response to
congressional pressure. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. 232 (1980).
249. The committees and individual members expressed strong interest in FTC and other government actions that might protect the competitive vigor of independent refiners and marketers.
See, e.g., House 1975 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 227, at 751-53, 758-59, 803-04 (remarks
of Reps. Andrews and Robinson); The Consumer Energy Act of 1974: HearingsBefore the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., Pt. 3, at 999, 1009 (1973-1974) (remarks of Sen.
Mondale) [hereinafter cited as ConsumerEnergy Act: Pt. 3]; OiiPriceDecontrok HearingsBefore
the Senate Comm. on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, 6-7, 36, 181 (1975)
(remarks of Sens. Jackson, Haskell, Kennedy, and Bumpers); Crude Oil Cost and Suppiy Policy:
Effect on Independents: HearingsBefore the Subcommr on Budgeting, Management, andExpenditures ofthe Senate Comm on Government Operations,93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 6-7, 33-34, 52 (1974)
(remarks of Sens. Muskie, Huddleston, Brock and Rep. Melcher); The IndustrialReorganization
Act: Hearingson S.1167 Before the SubcomnL on Antitrust andMonopoly of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 8, at 6318-27 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Nelson and Reps.
Apsin, Brown, William Ford, Helstoski, and Roybal); 121 CONG. REc. 32,007-10 (1975) (remarks
of Sen. Gary Hart).
250. § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 756 (1976); see House 1975 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 249, at
647, 697. A major congressional purpose in ordering the FTC study was to measure the allocation
system's effects on independent refiners and marketers. Id at 697 (remarks of Rep. Whitten).
251. 42 U.S.C. § 6272(e) (1976); 50 U.S.C. § 2158 (1976).
252. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1976).
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other areas as particularly deserving of FTC competition analysis; most
frequently
mentioned were steel,25 3 automobiles, 254 and medical
2 55
care.
As the materials above suggest, Congress in the early and mid1970's often indicated that, while reports and studies were a useful part
of the FTC's work, the Commission should rely more heavily on compulsory enforcement procedures such as litigation.256 Congress was
also concerned that it had paid insufficient attention to ensuring compliance with existing orders.2 57 Consequently, the committees encouraged the Commission to bolster its compliance efforts, 258 and in
1973, Congress doubled the maximum civil penalty for each violation
of a Commission order to $10,000.259 Moreover, to increase flexibility
253. See, e.g., MarketPower, The FederalTrade Commission, andlnflation: HearingBefore lle
JointEconomic Comm. of Congress, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Joint Economic Comnz 1974 Hearings];Senate 1972 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 221, at 2686.
254. See, eg., Automotive Repair Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopol of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 4, at 1693-1722 (1970);
Senate 1972 AppropriationsHearings, supra note 221, at 2688; House 1973 AppropriationsHearings, supra note 216, at 499; ConsumerEnergy Act of1974: HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., Pt. 1, at 108 (1973) (Sen. Long to J. Halverson, Director of the
FTC's Bureau of Competition: "I would think you would have done yourself a study on competition for the FTC on the automobile industry because that is a good example of concentration. I
think I have an idea how they price those automobiles, do you?").
255. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1175, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1972) (recommendation by House
Appropriations Comm. that FTC give greater attention to the problem of "increased medical
costs"); House 1974 AppropriationsHearings, supra note 247, at 109-110, 119 (remarks of Rep.
Whitten).
256. This Congressional attitude was evident in the following dialogue between FTC Chairman Dixon and Rep. Evins, Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Independent Offices and Department of Housing and Urban Development:
MR. EviNS.. .. Mr. Chairman, you pointed out in your statement you have two
basic methods of approach at the Commission. One is voluntary compliance, which is
the soft touch approach, and the other is a crackdown and legal enforcement.
MR. DIXON. That is right.
MP. EvINs. I recognize you have to have a balance between the two. You cannot
prosecute every case that comes before the Commission. I think if you had a little more
emphasis on legal enforcement it would be better. You have been building up consent
agreements, stipulation letters, and settlements on a voluntary basis. This gets the job
done for the one industry but it does not set an example to others.
I think you should put more emphasis on your legal enforcement and crackdown in
some of your major cases.
House 1970AppropriationsHearings, supra note 216, at 363-64; see also House 1971 Appropriations
Hearings,supra note 216, at 1381-82 (remarks of Rep. Evins); Senate 1972 AppropriationsHearings, supra note 221, at 2684 (remarks of Sen. McGee).
257. See Weinberger ConfrmationHearings,supra note 216, at 16 (remarks of Sen. Moss).
258. See House 1974 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 222, at 171; House 1973,ApproprlationsHearings, supra note 216, at 425.
259. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, § 408, 15 U.S.C. § 45(e) (1976);
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, § 205, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(m)(1)(A) (1976). The Magnuson-Moss bill also expanded the Commission's jurisdiction
under section 5 to matters "in or affecting commerce". Id § 201, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52(b) (1976);
included "persons and partnerships" as entities subject to the agency's investigation powers under

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol17/iss4/1

54

Kovacic: The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of Antit
1982]

FTC 0 VERSIGHT/ANTITR UST ENFORCEMENT

641

in prosecution, Congress gave the FTC power to bring civil penalty
actions
in federal court where the Justice Department declined to do
0
SO.

26

Congress' exhortations about the appropriate style and content of
FTC antitrust programs had little chance alone of stimulating a major
FTC revitalization. An especially telling test of congressional commitment was appropriations.261 When asked in 1969 by Senator Mathias
what FTC renewal would require, Chairman Dixon responded, "[S]ee
to it that the agency has the money and the manpower." 262 In the
1970's, Congress took this advice; the agency's total budget'rose from
$20.9 million in fiscal year 1970 to over $70 million in fiscal year
1980.263

The question then arose of how to measure the FTC's effectiveness
in using the increased funds. Two different and, in some respects, conflicting, standards emerged from the oversight hearings. On one hand,
sections 6 and 9. Id § 203, 15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 49 (1976); and gave the FTC authority to seek
Supreme Court review of its rulings where the Solicitor General declined to do so. Id § 204, 15
U.S.C. § 49 (1976).
260. Id § 204, 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976).
261. Throughout its history, the Commission had received only modest financial support. Beginning with $200,000 in 1915, the FTC's budget grew by miniscule increments through the 1960's.
Its total outlays reached nearly $2 million in 1935, $3.5 million in 1949, $4.3 million in 1952, $5.5
million in 1957, $10.3 million in 1962, and just short of $17 million in 1969, the year of the ABA
REPoRT. Through fiscal year 1969, Congress had appropriated approximately $230 million for the
FTC, roughly $100 million of which had gone to support antitrust enforcement. See FEDERAL
ANTITRUST AcTrTIvsEs, supra note 107, at 2; Regulatory Agency Budgets: HearingsBe/ore the
Subcomm. on IntergovernmentalRelations ofthe Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 2, at 457-63 (1972) [hereinafter cited as RegulatoryAgency Budgets]. This slow
rate of growth took place at a time when Congress was adding substantially to the agency's antitrust and consumer protection responsibilities. These include the Robinson-Patman Act, §§ 2-4,
15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976); Wool Products Labeling Act, §§ 2-11, 14, 15 U.S;C. §§ 68-68j
(1976); Lanham Trademark Act, § 1-45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976); Textile Fiber Products
Identification Act, § 2-12, 14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 70-70k (1976), Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, §§ 2-10, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1339 (1976), and Fair Packaging and LabelingAct, §§ 2-12,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (1976).
262. 1969 Admin. Practice & Procedure Hearings,supra note 216, at 24. The oversight and
appropriations committees agreed that the agency's unsatisfactory performance in the past
stemmed in major respects from inadequate funding. See, e.g., DepartmentsofState, Justice,and
Commerce, the Judiciary,and RelatedAgencies AppropriationsFor Fiscal Year 1976: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. ofthe Senate Comm. on Appropriations,94th Cong., 1st Sess. 565-69 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Senate 1976 AppropriationsHearings];Antitrust Enforcement: Joint Hearings
Be/ore the Subcomm on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciaryand the
Subcomm, for Consumers ofthe Senate Comm on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1975)
(remarks of Sens. Philip Hart, Magnuson, Moss, and Tunney); Senate 1973 AppropriationsHearings, supra note 216, at 1490 (remarks of Sen. McGee).
263. See Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, The Judiciary, and RelatedAgencies
Appropriationsfor1981: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on the DepartmentsofState, Justice, and
Commerce, The Judiciary,andRelatedAgenciesofthe House Comm on Appropriations,96th Cong.
2d Sess. 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as House 1981 AppropriationHearings;Senate 1971 Appropriations Hearings,supra note 216, at 1281.
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the committees largely agreed with the ABA view that the Commission

should not inflate its enforcement statistics through trivial endeavors.
One implication of this guidance was that the Commission should pay
special attention to raising the overall significance and quality of its

caseload, even though the absolute number of matters on its docket
might fall below or not exceed pre-1970 levels.2 " On the other hand,
Congress sometimes attached great importance to FTC case and investigation statistics. Acknowledging that numbers alone were sometimes
a suspect criterion,265 the committees intimated that greater appropriations ought to yield a higher number of cases and investigations.266
Chairman Kirkpatrick and his successors sought, with some diffi-

culty, to convince the committees that the statistics did not reflect reduced FTC antitrust enforcement, but stemmed instead from basic
changes in the types of cases the FTC was pursuing. 6 7 The Commis-

sion explained that its more stringent preliminary screening procedures
also tended to reduce the number of matters certified as formal investigations.2 68 Nonetheless, FTC officials and Congress were unable to resolve what relative values qualitative and quantitative criteria should
receive in evaluating the FTC's caseload. The uneasy consensus
among the oversight bodies seemed to be that the numbers were neither
controlling nor insignificant.
264. The Commission's actual experience from 1965 to 1979 shows that the total number of
antitrust complaints ranged from 25 in 1965 to 37 in 1976 and again in 1979. The chief departures
from this pattern occurred in 1966 when the agency issued 95 complaints (including 73 RobinsonPatman cases), and in 1978 when it filed a low of 12.
265. See R. KATZMANN, supra note 213, at 146; see, e.g., House 1973 AppropriationsHearings,
supra note 216, at 407 (Rep. Whitten to Chairman Kirkpatrick: "I know that the number of cases
is not always a true test.")
266. See House 1973AppropriationsHearings,supra note 216 at 407, 427-28; Housn 1974 APPROPRIATIONS HEARINGS, supra note 222, at 120.

267. Chairman Kirkpatrick explained the reduction in these terms:
FTC activities in the past 2 years have put greater emphasis on industry structure,
and on seriously anticompetitive behavior. Merger investigations and cases have required increasing staff commitments. Some other examples of relatively more complex
antitrust work now in progress: (1) territorial restrictions in distribution of various products; (2) leverage exerted by "power buyers" on the conduct of dominant marketers; and
(3) an important monopoly case in the cereal industry.
FTC expects that its efforts to get effective relief in these more complicated antitrust
areas will mean that fewer cases will be settled. For this reason, and also because of an
increase in complaint recommendations, FTC's litigation burden is on the increase. It is
expected to expand significantly in fiscal 1973.
House 1973 4ppropriationsHearings,supra note 216, at 429.
268. House1974.AppropriationsHearings,supra note 222, at 124-25 (remarks of Rep, Whitten
and FTC Executive Director Mezines).
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Commission Response

During the late 1960's and early 1970's, the ferment within Con-

gress and among commentators about the FTC's antitrust role triggered an extensive process of reform within the FTC.z6 9

Agency

officials took seriously the congressional committees' view that the
agency should upgrade its antitrust programs substantially.270 The
Commission understood that the expected product of this overhaul

would be innovative, vigorous antitrust enforcement that came to grips
with vital competition issues.
FTC efforts to reorient competition programs had several dimensions. In line with congressional preferences, the first priority was to
build an effective system for choosing enforcement targets and communicating the agency's objectives to staff.271 The foundation for this effort was the creation of planning and evaluation offices.27 2

The

Commission also attempted to integrate its Bureau of Economics more
269. In September, 1969 Commissioner Philip Elman told the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on Administrative Practice and Procedures that the Nader report and the mere pendency of the
ABA investigation had stimulated a wide-ranging reexamination of the commission's work by its
staff:
I might also say that a great many of the changes that have taken place at the Commission have taken place in the last 2 or 3 months. And I think they have come under the
spur of this new awareness of how much the Commission could be doing and how it has
failed to fulfill its full potential. I think the healthiest thing that ever happened to the
Federal Trade Commission has been the avalanche of adverse criticism of the past year.
And it has been reflected internally.
See 19694dmin.Practice& ProcedureHearings,supra note 216, at 47; Senate Commerce Committee 1974 Oversight Hearings, supra note 216, at 134-37 (remarks of former Commissioner James
Nicholson).
270. Alan Ward, who directed the Commission's Bureau of Competition in the early 1970's,
made this point to the House Special Investigations Subcommittee in 1974:
Federal Trade Commission law enforcement policies did change in the late sixties ...
The agency's former enforcement policies, after all, had been severely criticized by almost everyone who knew anything about them-by the bar, respected academicians,
congressional committees and consumer groups, and this criticism lead to formation of a
Presidential Commission to study whether or not the agency should be abolished ...
Before I came to the Commission, the enforcement stance of the Commission was
beginning to change. It had already begun to respond to the report of the ABA Commission which urged a concentration "on difficult and complex problems," with which the
F.T.C. was uniquely equipped to deal.
House SpecialInvestigation Subcomn. 1974 Hearings,supra note 225, at 219-20.
271. House 1973 AppropriationsHearings, supra note 216, at 1059.
272. In 1970, the Commission created an Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation which,
through the mid-1970's, assumed increasing responsibility for reviewing competition programs
and coordinating FTC planning initiatives. See, e.g., Senate 1972.4ppropriationsHearings,supra
note 221, at 2692; House 1972-4ppropriationsHearings,supra note 216, at 94; House 1973Appropriations Hearings,supra note 216, at 611, 1062-66. In 1972 the Bureau of Competition created an
Evaluation Office to screen proposals for new investigations and to monitor the progress of ongoing projects. Id. at 1070. See also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH 5, THE FTC As AN
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGENCY: ITS STRUCTURE, POWERS AND PROCEDURES, VOL. II, at 5-8
(1981).
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closely into the antitrust program selection process. 2 73 As a further aid
to choosing future enforcement ventures, the Bureau of Economics and
the new planning and evaluation offices began devoting more resources
274
to assess the effects of proposed and completed Commission cases.
An important manifestation of the agency's new emphasis on central planning was greater use of the budget process to set priorities. In
1975, the FTC adopted its first program-based budget, which allocated
resources according to the types of violations or industry sectors to be
examined. 27 At the same time, Commissioners began formally reviewing resource commitments and expenditures twice annually in meetings
with bureau directors and staff.276 The budget review sessions were
part of a broader agency effort to translate the product of its planning
2 77
systems into guidelines for agency staff.
As it developed new planning tools, the Commission sought to improve the information sources it needed to decide which economic sectors and types of industry behavior most deserved antitrust analysis.
During his chairmanship, Caspar Weinberger said the Commission
wanted to enhance its "ability to monitor more precisely price and
profit trends within the array of industries in which it has regulatory
responsibility and to collect more detailed data on corporations. ' 27 In
273. The economists' principal planning role was to identify economic sectors worthy of careful antitrust scrutiny. See, e.g. Senate 1973 Appropriations Hearings, supra note 216, at 1433;
House 1974 AppropriationsHearing,supra note 222, at 989.
274. See, eg., S.J Res. 253 To CreatedA NationalCommission on RegulatoryReform: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 105-08 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Regulatory Reform Hearings];House 1972 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 216, at 133-37.
275. See, e.g., House 1976 FTC Oversight Hearings supra note 216, at 5, 7; see also R.
KATZMANN,supra note 63, at 122-25.

276. The Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation was instrumental in developing the program budget and the periodic review procedure. See, e.g., Senate Commerce Comm. 1974 Oversight Hearings,supra note 216, at 297; House 19744ppropriationsHearings,supra note 222, at 115.
277. An early step in the direction stemmed from Caspar Weinberger's desire to "probe the
frontiers" of the agency's statutes to devise new strategies for addressing competition and consumer protection problems. He notified the agency's staff that "[t]he Commission is receptive to
novel and imaginative provisions in orders seeking to remedy alleged unlawful practices." Letter
from Casper Weinberger to Senator Edward Kennedy, (July 22, 1970) reprintedin Kirkpatrick
ConfirmationHearings,supra note 216, at 133-36.
Chairman Kirkpatrick and Engman built upon this technique by developing guidelines and
using policy protocols to signal changes in priorities or suggest new enforcement strategies. See,
eg., Senate 1972 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 221, at 7.
278. Letter from Caspar Weinberger to Sen.William Proxmire (July 9, 1970), reprintedin Kirkpatrick Confirmation Hearings,supra note 216, at 138. In the letter, Weinberger specified the
FTC's needs for the Joint Economic Committee of Congress:
Access to adequate industry data has become increasingly difficult in recent years as
conglomerate firms have moved into a large number of industries. I have previously
recommended to Congressional committees that high priority should be given to modification of corporation reporting practices to provide better ability to assess current competitive trends on an industry by industry basis. This will enable the Commission to
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1971, FTC Chairman Miles Kirkpatrick reported to the Senate Appropriations Committee that the Commission had transformed Weinberger's suggestions into a concrete project to collect line-of-business
data.27 9 Majorities in both chambers supported the line-of-business initiative and approved the appropriations needed to carry out the
project. 280
Applying its new planning and priority-setting methods, the Commission earmarked several economic sectors and industries for careful
antitrust inquiry. A major criterion for selecting industries for study
was the importance of their goods and services to day to day consumer
28 2
energy, 28 3 and health
purchases. 28 1 The FTC established the food,
2 5 The decision
care 84 industries as its highest competition priorities.

to build comprehensive programs for these industries also reflected the
Commission's view that industry-wide analysis afforded the bet means
performance. 2 6
for dealing with the underlying causes of poor industry
evaluate the industry effects ofpast enforcement activities more effectively and to plan its
future programs more specifically.

Id; see also House 1975 4ppropriationsHearings, supra note 249, at 670 (remarks of Chairman

Engman).

279. Senate 1972-AppropriationsHearings, supra note 221, at 2643.
280. See, e.g., 'Senate 1976 Appropriations Hearings,supra note 262, at 707-08; S. REP. No.

1296, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1974). Congressional architects of the program encouraged the FTC

to pursue its line-of-business program vigorously. See, e.g., Senate Commerce Comma 1974 Over-

sight Hearings,supra note 216, at 299, 326 (remarks of Sens. Moss and Hart).
Not until 1978, however, after prolonged litigation with firms subject to the program's reporting requirements, did the FTC begin to collect the bulk of data it had sought to obtain. See In re
F.T.C. Line-of-Business Report Litigation, 1978-2 Trade Cas. %62,152 (D.C. Cir.), cert.deniedsub.
nom, American Air Filter Co. v. FTC, 439 U.S. 958 (1978).
281. See, e.g., House 1972,4ppropriationsHearings,supra note 216, at 14 (remarks of Chair-

man Kirkpatrick).

282. See, e.g., Senate Commerce Committee 1974 Oversight Hearings,supra note 216, at 29394; House 1972.4ppropriationsHearings,supra note 216, at 191-92.
283. See, eg., Senate Commerce Committee 1974 Oversight Hearings,supra note 216, at 293;
House 1972 4ppropriationsHearings,supra. note 216, at 194-95.
284. See, e.g., Senate Commerce Committee 1974 Oversight Hearings,supra note 216, at 294;
House 1972.4ppropriationsHearings, supra note 216, at 193.

285. Although it received somewhat less emphasis, the transportation industry constituted a

fourth prominent area of concern. See, eg., House 1973 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 216,
at 499; House 1972,4ppropriationsHearings,supra note 216, at 193.

286. In 1974, James Nicholson, who served as an FTC Commissioner from 1968 to 1969,
evaluated the FTC's industry-wide approach as follows:
Through in-depth investigations of certain industries by its staff and its issuance of complaints against prominent firms in the office copier, soft drink and lumber industries, the
Commission has announced its willingness to conduct its statutory responsibilities on an
aggressive and often industry-wide approach. Thus, the Bureau of Competition appears
to have broadened its enforcement perspective to get at the underlying causes of restraints upon competition in industry-wide situations .... Such an approach is a more
meaningful and efficient way to attempt to remedy the competitive problems in our
society.

Senate Commerce Committee 1974 Oversight Hearings,supra note 216, at 137 (footnotes omitted).
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To address competition problems in these and other economic sectors, the Commission used several enforcement strategies. The most
visible approach was litigation." 7 In the first half of the 1970's, the
agency initiated a number of significant suits,288 some of which involved new applications of section 5. The most prominent were the
FTC's monopolization and attempted monopolization suits, including
suits dealing with ready-to-eat breakfast cereals, 289 petroleum, 290 office
copiers,29 ' bread,292 coffee,293 car rentals,294 processed lemon juice,2 "
and airline schedule guides. 96 These monopolization suits presented
special opportunities and difficulties to the FTC in the 1970's. Even as
congressional sentiment supported Commission efforts to deal with
market structure and firm behavior in several concentrated industries, 2 97 the agency feared proceeding at a pace that outstripped its resources and its progress in* instituting planning, personnel, and
287. The Commission's litigation efforts corresponded with a de-emphasis of voluntary, nonbinding proceedings which had been criticized by the ABA and Congress. The FTC began limit-

ing the use of assurances of voluntary compliance to minor, inadvertent violations. See Senate
1972 AppropriationsHearings, supra note 221, at 2684.
288. One significant criterion for measuring the importance of the FTC's work is the size of
respondent firms mentioned in its suits. A recent, preliminary compilation of data suggests that
the absolute size of firms sued by the Commission from 1970 to 1979 substantially exceeded the
size of those prosecuted in the 1960's. See FTC Data IndicatesBureau of Competition, Not Anti.
trust Division, Sights BiggerTargets, [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 971,
at A-7 (July 3, 1980).
289. In re Kellogg Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 119,898 No.
8883, Apr. 26, 1972), complaint dismissed, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $ 21,864 (Sept. 10, 1981),
appeal denied, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 21,899 (Jan. 15, 1982).
290. In re Exxon Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) %20,388 (No.
8934, July 17, 1973), complaint dismissed, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 21,866 (Sept. 16, 1981).
291. In re Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364 (1975) (consent decree).
292. In re IT Continental Baking Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
1 20,784 (No. 9000, Dec. 10, 1974), orderto cease and desist issued, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,823 (May 12, 1981).
293. In re General Foods Corp., [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
1121,173 (No. 9085, July 14, 1976), complaint dismissed, 3 TRADE REQ. REP. (CCH) 21,902 (Feb.

3, 1982).

294. In re Hertz Corp., 88 F.T.C. 715 (1976) (consent decree).
295. In re Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978), ard, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) %64,558 (6th
Cir. 1982).
296. In re Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 95 F.T.C. 1 (1980) (complaint filed on Apr. 13, 1976),
enforcement denied sub. nom. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1362 (1981).
297. See supra text accompanying notes 229-47. As late as the fall of 1974, with the Kellogg,
Xerox, Exxon, and Borden cases underway, some committees were criticizing the Commission on
the ground that it had not been sufficiently vigorous in attacking monopoly. The following exchange between Senator Proxmire and Chairman Engman in November, 1974 is illustrative:
SENATOR PROXMIRE ....
the FTC, like a number of other regulatory agencies seems to
concern itself with minor infractions of the law, and to spend much of its time on cases of
small consequences. For example, have you used your powers to investigate the steel

industry... ?
MR. ENGMAN. We have a study of the steel industry now underway, Mr. Chairman.
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management reforms.298
A second, major litigation priority was the Commission's merger
work.299 The agency assigned substantial resources to conglomerate
mergers with possible horizontal consequences,"' and continued its
scrutiny of more traditional horizontal and vertical acquisitions. 0 ' A
third important category of cases dealt with vertical and horizontal restraints.30 2 The Commission challenged vertical territorial restrictions
in the soft-drink bottling industry30 3 and opposed resale price maintenance and distribution restraints in several consumer goods
industries."°
The Commission's major initiatives in the horizontal restraints
area included cases dealing with delivered pricing in the plywood inSENATOR PRoXMIRE. A study of the steel industry. ... why hasn't the FTC been more
aggressive in this area?
MR. ENGMAN. I think, Mr. Chairman, that the Federal Trade Commission today is very
We have seen a total turnaround in terms of the types of matters which
aggressive ....
. I must say that we cannot do
are being addressed by the Bureau of Competition ...
everything at one time.
1974 Hearings,supra note 253, at 58-59.
298. See Kirkpatrick Confirmation Hearings, supra note 216, at 140 (remarks of Chairman
Weinberger); House 1974.4ppropriationsHearings, supra note 222, at 144 (remarks of Chairman

Engman).
299. See, e.g., House 1973 Appropriations Hearings,supra note 216, at 472-73 (remarks of
Chairman Kirkpatrick).
300. See, e.g., In re Beatrice Foods Co., 86 F.T.C. 1 (1975), aj7d inpart,mod#Fed in part, 540
F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1976); In re BOC Int'l, Ltd., 86 F.T.C. 1241 (1975), rey'd inpart,remandedin
part 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Kennecott Copper Corp., 78 F.T.C. 744 (1971), af'd,467
F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974).
301. See, e.g., In re Warner-Lambert Co., 88 F.T.C. 503 (1976); In re Fruehauf Corp., 91
F.T.C. 132 (1978), enforcement denied, 603 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Ash Grove Cement Co.,
85 F.T.C. 1123 (1975), affd, 577 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978); In re
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 81 F.T.C. 984 (1972) (consent decree resulting in the creation of LouisianaPacific as a new lumber products firm).
302. See, e.g., Department ofState, Justice,and Commerce, The Judiciary,andRelatedAgencies
AppropriationsforFiscal Year 1977: Hearings &e/orethe Subcomm. on the Deprartmentof State,
Justice, and Commerce, The Judiciaryand RelatedAgencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 4, at 18-19 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate 1977Appropriations
Hearings].
303. In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978) (complaint issued July 15, 1971), remanded,
642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir.), complaint d'smissed, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,845 (July 28,
1981). See House 1972 4ppropriations Comm, Hearings, supra note 216, at 192; House Special
Investigations Subcomm. 1974 Hearings, supra note 225, at 26; Senate Commerce Comm. 1974
Oversight Hearings,supra note 216, at 293.
304. See, e.g., In re Levi Strauss Co., D. 9081 (May 5, 1976), 92 F.T.C. 171 (1978) (clothing)
(consent decree): In re Dahlberg Electronics, Inc., 84 F.T.C. 222 (1974) (hearing aids); In re
Radioear Corp., 82 F.T.C. 1830 (1973) (hearing aids) (consent decree); In re Sonotone Corp., 82
F.T.C. 1802 (1973) (hearing aids) (consent decree); In re Adolph Coors, 83 F.T.C. 32 (1973)
(beer), af'd, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); In re Sherwood
Elec. Laboratories, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 988 (1975) (audio equipment) (consent decree).
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dustry, 30 5 shopping center leases limiting the entry of discounters, 30 6
interlocking directorates, 3°7 and limitations on advertising, pricing of
services, and entry in the health care industry. 308 The FTC brought
substantially fewer Robinson-Patman cases than it had in the 1960's,309
and focused more attention on industry-wide investigations, including
substantial inquiries in the transportation 3 10. and health care fields.311
Coupled with these new litigation programs was an increased emphasis on monitoring compliance with orders obtained from previous
313
lawsuits.3 2 The FTC increased the size of its compliance program,
and initiated several important civil penalty actions, 314 many of which
applied the new powers Congress had given the agency in 1973.315
The second principal element of the Commission's competition
policy work was the preparation of reports. The main subjects of its
published studies were mergers and acquisitions,316 energy,317 and
food. 3 1 An increasing number of these reports responded to legislation
305. In re Boise Cascade, 91 F.T.C. 1 (1978) (complaint issued Apr. 18, 1974), enforcement
denied, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
306. In re Tyson's Comer Regional Shopping Center, 85 F.T.C. 970 (1975).
307. See, e.g., In re Perpetual Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 90 F.T.C. 608 (1977), order
withdrawn, 94 F.T.C. 401 (1979).
308. See, ag., In re American Medical Association, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979) (complaint issued
Dec. 19, 1975), afdinpart modofedinpart, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), ajd by an equal divided
court, 1982-I Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,616 (1982); In re American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 88 F.T.C. 955 (1976) (consent decree).
309. Except in 1966, the Commission brought about ten Robinson-Patman cases per year from
1965 to 1969. In 1966 the agency issued 73 Robinson-Patman complaints, most being consent
cases involving small clothing manufacturers. In the early 1970's the average number of Robinson-Patman suits fell to four per year, and dropped to two per year in the late 1970's.
310. On August 2, 1976, the Commission authorized an investigation to study the concentration, structure, and performance of the United States automobile industry.
311. On February 26, 1976, the Commission authorized the Bureau of Competition to investigate physician control of Blue Shield plans.
312. Senate 1973 Appropriation Hearings, supra note 216, at 1433, 1448 (1974); House 1973
AppropriationsHearings,supra note 216, at 426.
313. Id; see also House 1974.AppropriationsHearings,supra note 222, at 171.
314. See, eg, United States v. Papercraft Corp., 393 F. Supp. 408 (W.D. Pa. 1975); United
States v. Beatrice Foods Co., 351 F. Supp. 969 (D. Minn. 1972).
315. The Commission began using its authority to prosecute violations of outstanding orders
in federal court when the Justice Department declined to sue. See FTC v. Lukens teel Co., 454
F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C. 1978) (complaint filed on June 18, 1974); FTC v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1353 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
316. See, e.g., FTC, CONGLOMERATE MERGER PERFORMANCE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
NINE CORPORATIONS (1972); FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS (1969).

317. See ag., FTC,

EFFECTS OF FEDERAL PRICE AND ALLOCATION REGULATIONS ON THE

PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (1976); FTC, REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON THE
STRUCTURE, CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE OF THE WESTERN STATES PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
(1975) (joint report by the Bureaus of Competition and Economics); FTC, CONCENTRATION

LEVELS AND TRENDS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR OF THE U.S. ECONOMY (1974).
318. See e.g., FTC, PRICE AND PROFIT TRENDS IN FOUR FOOD MANUFACTURING INDUS-
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directing the FTC to analyze the competitive consequences of newly
established regulatory programs,3 19 or to examine certain important economic sectors.32 °

The Commission also expanded its competition advocacy efforts
before other agencies and branches of the government. The FTC appeared before other federal agencies to comment on the competitive
effects of several regulatory programs,321 often as part of new statutory
responsibilities Congress had conferred upon it. 322 The FTC also testi-

fied before congressional committees to propose new antitrust legislation or to offer its views on a variety of competition policy matters.323
As it upgraded the quality of its case and investigation workload,

the FTC also attempted to increase its institutional ability to execute
the new competition initiatives successfully. This process of reform

had several elements. Among the most fundamental was improving
the quality of the agency's staff. Congress generally gave Chairman
Weinberger broad latitude to make personnel changes 324 and actively
followed his progress in doing so. 325 The recruitment and retention of
capable attorneys and economists remained a high priority of Weinberger's successors.32 6
TRIES (1975); FTC, THE U.S. SUGAR INDUSTRY (1975); FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON THE DAIRY
INDUSTRY (1973).
319. Most of these statutes dealt with energy. For example, under the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act of 1973, Congress required the Commission to prepare a comprehensive evaluation
of the petroleum allocation program administered by the Federal Energy Office. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 751-756 (1976). See House 1975 4ppropriationsHearings,supra note 227, at 647, 688-89, 75859.
320. In October 1973, Congress authorized $1 million for an FTC study of energy supply
shortages. See House 1975.4ppropriationsHearings,supra note 227, at 646, 658, 717; S. REP. No.
253, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 62 (1973).
321. These agencies included the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, the Department of Transportation, the Federal Energy Administration, the Department of
the Treasury, the Department of Energy, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and
the International Trade Commission.
322. These statutes explicitly exhibited the congressional desire that the FTC encourage federal bodies to consider the competitive consequences of their regulations. See Regulatory Reform
Hearings,supra note 274, at 133, 148-49. Statutes requiring a greater FTC intervention role
before government agencies included the following: Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1506 (1976); Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §,6201 (1976); Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
323. Between 1970 and 1980, representatives of the Commission made over thirty appearances
annually before Congress to discuss competition matters. In most of those appearances, the Commission discussed proposed changes in the antitrust laws, amendments to regulatory statutes, or
competition policy generally.
324. Weinberger ConftnationHearings, supra note 216, at 19 (remarks of Sen. Moss).
325. Kirkcpatrick Confimation Hearings,supra note 216, at 1 (remarks of Sen. Magnuson).
326. See, eg., House 1973 Appropriations Hearings, supra note 216, at 1103; see also S.
BREYER, REGULATION AND rIs REFoRM 343 (1981); R. KATZMANN, supra note 63, at 117-18, 12729.
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The second major reform was a reorganization in 1970 that gave
the Commission the basic form it retains today. The move consolidated the existing bureaus of Textiles and Furs, Industry Guidance,
Deceptive Practices, and Restraint of Trade into two principal operating bureaus-Competition and Consumer Protection.327 The new bureaus, along with the Bureau of Economics, constituted the agency's
major divisions. This consolidation substantially reduced the number
of levels of review through which staff work had to pass before reaching the Commissioners.32
The third approach was to improve the Commission's system for
monitoring the status of competition programs and managing information. In 1973 the Commission began developing a comprehensive,
computer-based information management system.329
A fourth line of endeavor was the establishment of new internal
procedures for screening cases, setting deadlines, reviewing the progress of competition matters, and requiring staff members to account
for delays.330 As the cornerstone of these procedures, the Commission
expanded its existing ground-level evaluation tools and created new devices (such as the preliminary investigation) to establish, at an early
stage, a sufficient basis for deciding whether a matter warranted further
expenditure of FTC funds. 33 1 The improved operating procedures and

information management system were designed to reduce delay and to
support planning activities.332
327. Kirkpatrick ConfirmationHearings, supra note 216, at 133-34; House 1972 Appropriations
Hearings,supra note 216, at 67-73. For a description of these changes, see R. KATZMANN, supra
note 63, at 113-15, 118-25, 127-29. Of the reorganization and personnel changes Katzmann
observes:
The political climate was conducive to the making of sweeping changes. There existed a
consensus across the political spectrum (ranging from President Nixon to Ralph Nader)
that held that the commission was performing poorly and should be revitalized. The
new leadership was given a clear mandate to alter existing arrangements. It is unlikely
that the commission leadership would have been able to move so swiftly in reorganizing
and purging the agency of personnel without such widespread support.
Id. at 128. The reorganization plan also created the Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation,
discussed above.
328. House 1973 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 216, at 1103.
329. See, e.g., Senate 1973 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 216, at 1432, 1500-01; House
1973 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 216, at 457-62.
330. Agricuture-EnvironmentalandConsumerProtectionAppropriationsforFiscal Year 1975;
HearingsBe/ore a Subcomm. 0/the Senate Comm, on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 2, at
1222-23 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate 1975AppropriationsHearings];House SpecialInyestigations Subcommittee 1974 Hearings,supra note 225, at 44; Senate Commerce Committee 1974 Oversight Hearings,supra note 216, at 297.
331. See, e.g., House 1974 Appropriations Hearing, supra note 222, at 124-25; House 1973
AppropriationsHearings, supra note 216, at 1068-69.
332. Senate 1973 4ppropriationsHearings, supra note 216, at 1432.
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The Commission also considered revising its administrative procedures to expedite its cases.333 FTC officials informed the oversight
committees that the size, scope, and complexity of the agency's antitrust
cases made it difficult, within the bounds of due process, to save time
by altering the agency's litigation rules. 334 The Commission changed
some rules, but generally maintained that pre-trial preparation, cooperation between the parties, and judicial control of pre-trial proceedings
largely determined a case's duration.3 3 5
Despite the FTC's organizational, management, and procedural
reforms, Congress, in late 1975 and early 1976, began questioning the

Commission's ability to bring its largest litigation efforts to a timely
conclusion. Attention focused on the cereal and petroleum monopolization suits, filed in April 1972 and July 1973.336 Early in these proceedings Commission officials had informed Congress that cases such

as In re Exxon Corp.337 would necessarily be time-consuming and expensive. Some congressmen, who had supported the Commission's ac-

tions, regarded the prospect of protracted litigation as unacceptable.
Their concern was not that the cases lacked genuine substantive merit
but that the aims of these suits were sufficiently urgent to warrant direct

legislative action. It was in this spirit, for example, that Congress in
1975 and 1976 seriously considered several proposals to vertically
restructure the petroleum industry.33 8 However, congressional propo-

nents of legislative action suggested that the FTC discontinue the Exxon case only if Congress promptly accomplished by statute what the
FTC suit conceivably might attain at a later date.339
333. House 1973 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 216, at 512-13. Early in the 1970's Congress had pointed to procedural reform as a way to expedite FTC antitrust suits. Id at 512.
334. See id. at 512 (remarks of Rep. Evans and Chairman Kirkpatrick).
335. See id. at 512-13 (remarks of Chairman Kirkpatrick).
336. The Xerox suit ended in a consent decree in 1975. See supra note 291.
337. [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) T 20,338 (No. 8934, July 17, 1973),
complaint dismissed, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,866 (Sept. 16, 1981). In discussing Exxon in
1974 before the House Appropriations Committee, James Halverson, Director of the Bureau of

Competition, observed that "the prediction of a 10-year period before final disposition [on appeal]
. is not an unreasonable one." House 1975,4ppropriationsHearings,supra note 227, at 683.
338. On October 8, 1975, the Senate defeated by a vote of 45 to 54 a vertical divestiture measure offered as an amendment to a pending piece of energy legislation. See 121 CONG. REC.
32,289-96 (1975). Two weeks later, on October 22, a modified version of the vertical divestiture
propbsal was reintroduced as amendment to the same energy bill and was defeated by a vote of 40
to 49. See 121 CoNG. REc. 33,593-616 (1975). On June 15, 1976, the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary approved and reported to the full Senate a bill (S. 2387) requiring the vertical divestiture
of the nation's eighteen largest oil companies. See S. REP. No. 1005, 94th Cong., 2d Sess, Pt. 1
(1976). The Judiciary Committee bill did not reach the Senate floor.
339. For example, Senator Packwood, who co-sponsored a vertical divestiture bill in the 94th
Congress, argued that new legislation afforded a speedier, less costly alternative to litigation:
*

.
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1977-1980
By the fall of 1976, the FTC had attained perhaps its greatest level

of congressional respect. Congress seemed generally pleased with the
Commission's renewed antitrust enforcement approach. Certainly, the
objective measures of legislative feeling supported such a conclusion.
Since 1969, both the agency's total budget and competition expenditures had more than doubled, and Congress had significantly expanded

its statutory authority. Less tangible, but nonetheless important, indications of congressional opinion pointed in the same direction. In a
report on federal regulatory bodies issued in October of 1976, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce largely praised the FTC's competition work, stating that the FTC had become "one of the more effective
regulatory agencies."340 There was little question that Congress en34
dorsed the course which the FTC's competition programs had taken. 1
Over 2 years ago. . . the FTC charged eight majors with violating the Federal Trade
Commission Act ....
mhis case has not even reached the hearing stage, and is likely to drag on into the
1980's. The time and expense to the Nation can be avoided by congressional action
which will insure that competition is restored now.
19752etroleum VerticalIntegrationHearings,supra note 229, at 49. He went on to suggest that the
existing antitrust laws might be inadequate to deal with certain competition problems:
The present antitrust laws. . ., even if rigidly enforced, will not achieve what is necessary in this country: A breakup of the concentrations of power in the major industries in
this country, oil and otherwise, so that we might return to the numerous, small- and
medium-size competitive industries that made this country grow, and continue to be
needed to keep this country great.
Id. at 50; see also, e.g., Consumer Energy Act of 1974. Hearings Before the Senate Comm, on
Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 4, 1538, 1630 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Tunney).
340. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE
AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG. 2D Sass. REPORT ON FEDERAL REGULATION AND REOU-

LATORY REFORM 57 (Subcomm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 House Report]. Noting that
the FTC had been criticized previously for "excessive concentration upon matters of small cQnsequence," the House report applauded the Commission's efforts "to consider some major antitrust
and consumer protection problems." Id. -The report singled out the FTC's cereal and petroleum
monopolization suits, its challenge to advertising restrictions by the American Medical Association, and its investigation of the automobile industry as examples of a desirable trend in this
direction.
The following year the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee (successor to the Committee
on Government Operations) also praised the FTC's antitrust revitalization and used the agency's
competition performance since 1969 as one basis for recommending the maintenance of the dual
antitrust enforcement system. See STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION: REGULATORY ORGANIZATION. SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. v., at 246-54
(1977) [hereinafter cited as SENATE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 1977 REPORT]. Compared to other

committee studies of the FTC's work written earlier in the decade, these reports suggested a progressively greater level of congressional satisfaction with the Commission's performance from
1969 up to 1977. For one of the earlier, less flattering assessments, see Departments of State, Justice,and Commerce, theJudiciary,and JelatedAgenciesAppropriationsfor1976" Hearings 'efore a
Subcomm. of the House Comn on Appropriations,94th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 7, at 187-278 (1975).
341. For example, a business periodical article on the FTC noted that "[W]ith its turnabout to
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Although the Commission's antitrust work had enjoyed solid congressional backing through 1976, the durability of this support was
much less certain. Major segments of the business community viewed
the content and tone of the agency's new antitrust and consumer protection programs with alarm, and spoke increasingly of seeking substantial, legislatively-mandated retrenchment of the agency's litigation,
rulemaking, and information-gathering efforts. 42 When the first session of the 95th Congress convened in January 1977, the legislature's
membership had changed significantly. The roster no longer included
the names of Philip Hart, Vance Hartke, Mike Mansfield, Gale McGee,
Frank Moss, John Pastore, and John Tunney,343 senators who had been
strong advocates of the Commission's antitrust revitalization and influential in mustering congressional support for the agency's ambitious
programs and the enlargement of its budget and statutory powers. 3 "
As programs begun in the early and mid-1970's came to fruition in
the late 1970's, the Commission would be unable to rely on the support
of many key individuals who had championed its initiatives. Instead, it
would have to justify its competition projects before a Congress that
had significantly less stake in defending or maintaining FTC work begun through 1976 and possessed a stronger inclination to review new
proposals more critically. Moreover, it was a Congress more likely to
listen sympathetically to claims that the agency had erred in its choice
and execution of competition programs. 45
activism, the agenlcy has clearly won the approval of Congress." The EscalatingStruggle Between
the FTC andBusiness-Executives Openly ChallengetheActions andFolicies of the Newly Activist
.4gency, Bus. WK. 53 (Dec. 13, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Business Week 1976]. Some observers
at this time also believed the agency's status in Congress would likely improve in the future with
the appiontment of Michael Pertschuk, an influential Senate staff member, to chair the FTC. See
Caught in a CrossFire of Fraiseat the FTC, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 20, 1977, § 3, at 3, col. 1.
342. For a perceptive discussion of the business mood at the time, see Bus. WK. 1976, supra
note 341, at 52.
343. Senators Hart, Mansfield, and Pastore retired and did not seek re-election in 1976, and
Senators Hartke, McGee, Moss, and Tunney were defeated in the general election. The departure
of these Senators marked the beginning of a process of erosion in the ranks of congressmen who
had urged the commission to occupy ever larger territory in the antitrust and consumer protection
field. This process continued in 1978 with the deaths of Lee Metcalf and Hubert Humphrey; the
retirement of James Abourezk; and the election defeat of Dick Clark, Floyd Haskell, and Thomas
McIntyre.
344. As a group, these senators had held a disproportionate number of important positions in
the Senate hierarchy generally and occupied pivotal seats on committees with appropriations and
oversight responsibility for the FTC's work.
345. Through a review of voting records, Weingast and Moran document a major shift in
Congressional preferences for FTC policy. "The oversight committee," they write, "experienced a
nearly complete turnover in 1977 that brought to power members opposing the polices of their
predecessors." Weingast & Moran, supra note 9, at 46.
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1. Congressional Guidance
From 1977 through 1980, the oversight and appropriations process

did not constitute a complete departure from earlier legislative scrutiny
of the agency's competition programs. The Congress continued to develop many themes that had emerged at the decade's beginning.

Like their predecessors in the early 1970's, the committees encouraged the Commission to refine its system for selecting priorities
and choosing enforcement programs.346 Both chambers placed greater
emphasis on the use of cost-benefit studies by the agency in choosing
future cases and investigations.347 In another area, closely related to
planning and case selection, Congress sustained its support for the
agency's line-of-business program. 348 The oversight committees expressed concern about the delays occasioned by lawsuits challenging
the program and considered (but did not enact) legislation to expedite
the data collection. 4 9 The appropriations committees continued to

fund the program, but also urged the Commission to reduce as much as
346. See Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, 7he Judiciary,and RelatedAgencies
AppropriationsforFiscalYear 1980: HearingsBefore a Subcomm of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations,96th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2, at 2156-57, 2162-63 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Senate 1980
AppropriationsHearings];Departmentsof State,Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, andRelated
Agencies AppropriationsforFiscal Year 1979: HearingsBefore a Subcommn
of the Senate Comm
on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 5, at 1707-08 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Senate 1979
AppropriationsHearings].
347. See, ag., Huse 1981AppropriationHearings,supra note 263, at 201; Departmentsof State,
Justice,and Commerce, the Judiciary,and RelatedAgencies Appropriationsfor FiscalYear 1981:
HearingsBefore a Subcomm of the Senate Comm on Appropriations,96th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 2, at
408 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Senate 1981 AppropriationsHearings];Departmentsof State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary,andRelatedAgenciesAppropriationsfor1980: HearingsBefore
the Subcomm on the Departmentsof State,Justice,andCommerce,the Judiciary,andRelatedAgen.
dies of the House Comm, on Appropriations,96th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2, at 804 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as House 1980 AppropriationsHearings];Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the
Judiciary, and RelatedAgencies Appropriationsfor 1979: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on the
Departmentsof State, Justice,and Commerce, the Judiciary,and Related Agencies of the House
Comm on Appropriations,95th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 3, at 1013 (1978) [hereinafter cited as House
1979 Appropriations Hearings];Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciaryand
RelatedAgencies AppropriationsforFiscalYear 1978 HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on the DepartmentsofState, Justice,and Commerce,the Judiciary,andRelatedAgenclesof the Senate Comm.
on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 5, at 546 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate 1978
AppropriationsHearings].
348. For example, in 1977, Representative Moss told the House Subcommittee on Consumer
Protection and Finance that the successful completion of the line-of-business program was essential to the continuing revitalization of the FTC's competition programs. FederalTrade Commisslon Amendments of 1977 and Oversight: HearingsBefore the Subcomrtn on Consumer Protcetlon
andFinanceofthe House Comm on InterstateandForeign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 101-02
(1977) [hereinafter cited as House 1977 FTC Oversight Hearings].
349. In 1977, Representative Eckhardt, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance, proposed giving the FTC increased statutory power to overcome procedural
obstacles to collecting the line-of-business data. Id at 1-2.
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possible its reporting requirements.3 5 0

Congressional interest in planning and priorities was part of a
broader concern with the FTC's ability to manage its programs capably. As they had done earlier in the decade, the committees pressed the
Commission to closely monitor its use of resources and to expedite
ongoing cases and investigations. 35 ' The committees also questioned
the FTC's care in using compulsory process in its investigations.3 52
Beyond analyzing the Commission's planning and management
systems, Congress specified several types of competition problems and
particular industries the FTC should scrutinize. Though less forcefully
than it once had, Congress continued to regard economic concentration
as meriting serious antitrust attention. During antitrust enforcement
oversight hearings in 1977, Senator Paul Laxalt commented: "To me,
the undue concentration of economic power in this country is troublesome. I think that undue concentration constitutes as big a threat to the
353
individual liberties of Americans as anything that I can perceive."
Similarly, in March 1980, Representative Neal Smith of the House Appropriations Committee advocated a continuing concern with certain
oligopoly industries during hearings on the FTC's 1980 budget request:
I happen to be one who thinks that you ought to be spending
a lot of time on some major problems, such as oligopolies
which have a direct impact and effect upon inflation in this
country. This is especially true in food processing and some
350. See Senate 1978 4ppropHationsHearings,supra note 347,at 548-55.
351. See Senate 1979 4ppropriationsHearings,supra note 346, at 1708; House 1981Appropriations Hearings,supra note 347, at 207-09. The FTC's Exxon and Kellogg monopolization suits
most often provided the point of departure for discussing the agency's management skills. See,
e.g., House 1979 Appropriations Hearings,supra note 347, at 1077; Senate 19784ppropriations
Hearings,supra note 347, at 505-06. For example, committee members questioned the turnover
rate for attorneys assigned to these cases. See Senate 1980.4ppropriationsHearings,supra note
346, at 2086. The FTC's ability to retain new attorneys beyond a period of several years had
concerned Congress earlier in the decade as well. See Senate 1975AppropriationsHearings,supra
note 330, at 1204-05; Interfuel Competition Hearings on S.489 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust
andMonopoly ofthe Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 313-15, 522-23 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Intefel Competition Hearings]. Some members suggested that the agency
consider contracting for the services of outside, experienced lawyers. House 1974 Appropriations
Hearings,supra note 222, at 144-45. The Committees also raised the possibility of narrowing the
issues in the Exxon case. See House 1980AppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at 823.
352. See House 1980 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at 875. On occasion, the committees seemed surprised at the suggestion that the FTC had the power or the inclination to conduct an investigation solely for the purpose of gathering information about an industry. See
Senate 1981 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at 380.
353. Oversight of AntitrustEnforcement: HearingsBefore the Subcoma on Antitrust andMonopoly of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., IstSss. 5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Judiciary 1977 Oversight Hearings]; see also id at 2-3 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy, Subcomm. Chairman).
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areas where imports do not keep a cap on domestic prices 354
or
have an impact as they do in some areas of manufacturing.
Merger enforcement also remained an area of antitrust concern
that Congress believed the FTC should assign a high priority. In 1979,
the Senate Appropriations Committee asked the Commission what action it had taken "in response to the current conglomerate merger
wave?" 355 Later that year, Senator Kennedy introduced two merger
bills, one limiting large conglomerate acquisitions 356 and the other
prohibiting the nation's sixteen largest oil companies from purchasing
any firm with $100 million or more in assets.357 As it considered these
proposals, the Senate Judiciary Committee also encouraged the FTC to
use its statutory power to block anticompetitive acquisitions. 8
In enumerating specific economic sectors for scrutiny, Congress reaffirmed its interest in energy, food, medical care, and transportation.
Congress occasionally singled out other areas of economic activity for
FTC attention, including concentration in the ownership of the news
media. 59 Of the industries already receiving FTC attention, Congress
stressed energy. The appropriations committees directed the FTC to
expedite the energy industry studies which had been funded by a special congressional appropriation in the early 1970's.360 Congress also
substantially expanded the Commission's competition advocacy re354. House 1981 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 263, at 143. See also Senate Government
Affairs 1977 Report, supra note 340, at 246.
355. Senate 1980 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 346, at 2145. One year earlier Senators
Kennedy and Metzenbaum had urged the antitrust enforcement agencies to devise new strategies

for dealing with large conglomerate acquisitions. See MergersandIndustrialConcentration:Hearings Before the Subcomna on Antitrust andMonopol, of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3, 143-44, 185-86 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Senate 1978 Merger Hearings].
356. See Mergers and Economic Concentratiorn Hearingson S. 600 Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Monopoly, and Business Rights of the Senate Comn. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as . 600 Hearings].
357. See Energy andAntimonopooy Act of 1979, S.1246: Hearingson . 1246 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly, andBusiness Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th

Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as S. 1246 Hearings]. Similar legislation received
the support of President Carter. Id. at 370-74.
358. See Senate Judiciary1977 Oversight Hearings,supra note 353, at 6-8 (remarks of Sen.

Metzenbaum).
359. In 1978, the Senate Appropriations Committee submitted the following written question

concerning media ownership to the Commission:
Last year Arthur Sulzberger, publisher of the New York Times, noted that the American
newspaper industry is probably the one unregulated business left in the world. In terms
of employment the newspaper industry is the third largest in America, and only behind
automobiles and steel. What interest does the FTC have in this area?.. .Can you bust
the media trusts with current statutes?. . .What causes your inability to challenge media acquisitions and the concentration of press power in the hands of a few giant
companies?
Senate 1979 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at 1729.
360. House 1979 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at 1076-77.
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sponsibilities under several new energy statutes, including the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act of 1978,361 the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act Amendments of 1978,362 the National Energy Conservation
Policy Act of 1978,363 and the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act
of 1978.16 Each of these measures required the agency to assess the
competitive consequences of various government regulatory programs.
The food industry also remained a high antitrust priority for Congress, but different areas of interest were suggested. 36 - The House Apmore
propriations Committee suggested that the Commission pay
367
attention to food retailing366 and the beef processing industry.
Congress gave close, and often critical, scrutiny to three other major FTC competition initiatives during this period: The automobile investigation, the Formica trademark cancellation suit, and cases
affecting the professions. The House and Senate Appropriations Committees were especially apprehensive about the automobile inquiry's
purpose and scope. 368 They were concerned that the Commission had
slighted the role of foreign automobile makers and had imposed excessive document demands upon American firms.369
The committees also expressed reservations over the agency's effort to cancel the Formica trademark on the ground that the name had
become generic. 370 In 1979, the House Appropriations panel intensively questioned the Commission about its Formica investigation,37 '
and whether the case foreshadowed far-reaching efforts to cancel other
well-known trademarks. 372 Early in the same year, several bills were
introduced in the House to bar the FTC from exercising its powers to
cancel a trademark on the ground that the mark has become a com361. §§ 101-106, 201-205, 301, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841 (Supp. IV 1980).
362. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
363. §§ 101-691, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8201-8278 (Supp. III 1979).
364. §§ 101-902, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8483 (Supp. III 1979).
365. See House 1979 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at 987-90; House 1980.Appropriations Hearings,supra note 347, at 771-73.
366. House 1980.4ppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at 771-73.
367. Id at 771-72 (remarks of Rep. Andrews).
368. See H.R. REP. No. 1253, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1978).
369. See, ag., Senate 1980 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 346, at 2030-31, 2081; House
1979.4ppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at 1001, 1056-57. The Committees proposed that
the FTC expand its analysis of foreign car manufacturers and curtail the breadth of its requests to
domestic companies.
370. FTC v. Formica Corp., 5 TRADE REo. REP. (CCH) 50,372 (1978).
371. House 1980.4ppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at 817 (Rep. Early to Chairman
Pertschuk: "On what grounds did the FTC bring this action, a fishing expedition?").
372. Id at 816, 817, 821.
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mon, descriptive name.3 73
The third troublesome FTC initiative was the agency's competition work involving the professions, particularly its programs affecting
lawyers and physicians.37 The Senate Antitrust Subcommittee in
1977, and the Senate Appropriations Committee in 1977 and 1979
questioned the Commission about its interest in professional associations. 375 Although the appropriations and oversight panels did not explicitly oppose the program or suggest its modification, the tone of their
inquiries conveyed a sense of discomfort with this initiative.
2. Commission Response
The oversight and appropriations hearings from 1977 to 1980 revealed a perceptible change in congressional attitudes toward the
FTC's competition programs. Until late 1979, this adjustment was a
relatively quiet one. Congress continued to endorse many of the same
initiatives it had promoted earlier in the decade, including the FTC's
line-of-business, energy, and food programs. Moreover, it had sustained the pattern of budget increases set in the early 1970's, raising the
Commission's total appropriation from about $47 million in 1976 to
nearly $70 million in 1980. Mixed with these threads of continuity,
373. See, eg., Remarks of Rep. Andrew Maguire in introducing H.R. 3865, reprintedin [Jan.June] A=TrrRusT & TRADE REo. REP. (BNA) No. 911, at A-19 (Apr. 26, 1979).
374. In his economic message to Congress on October 8, 1974, President Ford had urged careful antitrust scrutiny of horizontal agreements concerning professional services. The President
said:
I am determined to return to the vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws.
The Administration will zero in on more effective enforcement of laws against price.
fixing and bid-rigging. For instance, noncompetitive professional fee schedules and real
estate settlement fees must be eliminated. Such violations will be prosecuted by the Department of Justice to the full extent of the law.
H.R. Doc. No. 366, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 120 CONG. REc. 34,421, at 34,422 (1974).
375. Senator Laxalt and Chairman Pertschuk discussed the basis for the agency's interest in
this field:
SENATOR LAXALT. Explain to me the concern in connection with the various professional groups on this levelas opposed to inquiring into the problem on a state level.
MR. PERTscHu
The Commission, beginning 2 to 3 years ago, as part ofits policy
planning process, had identified these areas as ones in which the competition was simply
not working in which price fixing, barriers to entry, restrictions against advertising, or
other restraints were causing excessively high prices to consumers, and excluding competitors. These were identified as areas in which a high potential payoff in terms of
cosumer benefit and restoring competition could lie. There are clearly very serious
questions about Federal-State relations in the Commission's entering this area. And
there are questions about the extent of the Commission's authority in this area.
The Commission is proceeding in a careful and gingerly way to identify those areas
in which the restraints on competition are most egregious with justification least strong
and least evident for state action.
Senate Judiciary1977 Oversight Hearings,supra note 353, at 13. See Senate 1978 4pproprations
Hearings,supra note 347, at 546; Senate1980 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 346, at 2159-61.
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however, were important differences in tone and emphasis. Before

1976, majorities in both chambers of Congress encouraged the FTC to
test the boundaries of its authority. After 1976, Congress was less amenable to further expansion and considerably more disposed to scrutiny
of ambitious FTC antitrust ventures already underway.
In fulfilling its antitrust role from 1977 to 1980, the Commission
was responsive to these changes in congressional attitude. This was
particularly evident in the agency's efforts to strengthen its processes
for selecting priorities and managing its work. The enhancement of the
FTC's priority and program selection techniques proceeded along four
lines. The first was the establishment in 1977 of an Office of Special
Projects and a Planning Office within the Bureau of Competition.376
The Office of Special Projects was given responsibility for identifying
and examining long-range economic factors, such as technological
change, which influence the competitive process.3 77 The Planning Of-

fice focused upon developing legal and economic analysis for use in
selecting new cases and refining the theoretical underpinnings of ongoing suits and investigations3 7 8 This office also directed most of the
Commission's efforts to measure the effects of its completed antitrust
3 79

cases.

The second major refinement of the agency's planning mechanism
was the improvement of priority selection tools that enabled the Commission to periodically examine the FTC's workload and evaluate proposals for new projects. In 1977, the Commission commenced a series
of monthly meetings to review the agency's activities in a given subject
area and explore future strategies. 380 From 1977 through 1980, the
FTC conducted "policy review sessions" for the automobile industry,
376. See New Beginningsfor Antitrust Enforcement at the FederalTrade Commission, Address

by Alfred Dougherty, Jr., Ohio State Bar Ass'n Annual Antitrust Law Inst. (Oct. 28, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Dougherty 1977 Speech]; Senate 1980 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 412, at
2162-6.3. The two new offices were created as part of a reorganization that realigned the Bureau's

litigation offices along programmatic lines. The move was designed to enable the agency's litigators to build expertise in certain industry sectors (e.g., food).
377. See, ag., Antitrust, Competition Policy, and the Emerging Industry, Address by Albert
Foer, Roundtable on Antitrust and Technology of the New York State Bar Ass'n (Jan. 23, 1980).

The Special Projects staff also served as the FTC's liaison for a variety of interagency task forces
and carried out competition advocacy duties under new statutes requiring the FTC to monitor the
competitive consequences of new technologies.
378. One major area of Planning Office work has consisted of analysis of the agency's substantive and remedial authority. See, ag., Averitt, supra note 13; Averitt, supra note 143.

379. For a discussion of these efforts, see Senate 1981 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 347,
at 408; House 1981 4ppropriationsHearings,supra note 263, at 202.
380. See New Directionsfor the FTC, address by Michael Pertschuk, New England Antitrust
Conference (Nov. 18, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Pertschuk 1977 Speech].
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compliance activities, mergers, health services, media ownership, and
the Commission's industry-wide enforcement programs. 381 During the
same period, the Commission expanded its budget review process, a
planning mechanism whose potential the agency began to tap in the
first half of the decade.
The third major change in the agency's planning system was increased effort to more fully integrate its economists into both the selection of competition programs and the generation of cases and
investigations.3"2 In an attempt to accomplish this, agency-wide task
forces of lawyers and economists were created to examine existing areas of antitrust concern,38 3 and assess possible new areas of inquiry. 8 4
The fourth key area of planning and priority selection work was
the enlargement and improved use of the agency's information sources.
The Commission published its first analysis of data obtained through
its line-of-business program, 385 and extensively used information received through its pre-merger notification program under the HartScott-Rodino Act of 1976.386 As it employed these new data sources in
planning and evaluating enforcement programs, the agency made its
38 7
internal data sources more accessible to staff.
Consistent with the interest of the oversight and appropriations
committees, the Commission placed greater emphasis on managing its
workload effectively. This manifested itself in several areas of the
agency's competition work. First, the FTC finished installing the chief
elements of the management information system begun in the early
381. The Commission's Office of Policy Planning coordinated the policy review meetings and

prepared briefing books for the sessions. The briefing books were subsequently edited and made
public. See 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 111,000 (1980).
382. Chairmen Collier and Pertschuk identified this as a major Commission objective in their

appearances before the appropriations committees. See Departmentsa/State,Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary,andRegulatoryAgenciesAppropriations.forFiscal Year 1978. HearingsBefore

a Subcomn of the House Comm. on Appropriations,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as House 1978 AppropriationsHearings];House 1979 AppropriationsHearings,supra note
347, at 814.

383. House 1979 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at 813-14.
384. Id Subjects explored in this manner include energy, food, health care, transportation,

mergers, joint ventures, and remedies. See Dougherty 1977 Speech, supra note 376.
385. See BUREAU OF EcONOMICS, STATISTICAL REPORT: ANNUAL LINE OF BUSINESS REPORT

1973 (March 1979).
386. See Malcolm Pfunder, Remarks on Premerger Notification Before the American Law
Institute-American Bar Association (Nov. 20, 1980), reportedin [July-Dec] ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 991, at A-6 to A-7 (Nov. 27, .1980).

387. See note 388 infra. In addition, the Bureau of Competition also began to catalogue the
products of past and ongoing Commission research and to see that staff benefited from the fruits
of this body of work. Id
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1970's.388 Second, the agency exerted more stringent early review of

case and investigation proposals. The planning and priority selection
reforms outlined above were one step in this direction. Another ingre-

dient was the expanded role of the Bureau of Competition's Evaluation
Office and Evaluation Committee in examining recommendations for
complaints and investigations.3 89
The Commission and the Bureau of Competition applied a more

rigorous analysis to the agency's existing information-gathering programs, investigations, and lawsuits. In 1979, the FTC substantially reduced the number of stock and asset acquisitions that must be reported

under the agency's pre-merger notification provisions.3 9 0 The following year, the Commission narrowed the scope of both its automobile
industry investigation 3 9 ' and its Exxon monopolization suit, 392 measures which the Congress had urged the agency to consider.3 93
In selecting industries for competition study, the Commission
mainly examined industries providing consumer goods and services.3 9 4
395
The FTC devoted over half of its antitrust resources to the energy,
food,3 96 health care,39 7 and transportation3 9 8 industries. The agency
388. The system afforded FTC commissioners and other supervisory officials the first truly
effective means for obtaining reliable, timely information on the status of ongoing investigations
and cases, as well as the disposition and content of closed matters. See House 1981 Appropriations
Hearings,supra note 263, at 207-10; Senate 1979AppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at 1708;
House 1978.AppropriationsHearings,supra note 382, at 97, 104. The Agency also strengthened its
computer systems for collecting and organizing data used in major litigation projects. Id. at 104.
389. House 1978AppropriationsHearings,supra note 382, at 4. This type of preliminary analysis, coupled with efforts to evaluate and learn from the agency's previous lawsuits, helped the
Bureau of Competition to limit the scope of its investigations and narrow the issues raised in its
complaints. For a discussion of the effects of these reforms on the litigation of one recent FTC
suit, see Crock, Here's One Case The TrustbustersMay Finish Soon, Wall St. J., May 17, 1979 at
26, col. 3 (analyzing the progress of the Commission's DuPont monopolization suit).
390. See FTC, ANN. REP. 13 (1979); FICProposesEasingMergerReporting Rules, Wall St. J.
Aug. 22, 1979 at 2, col 2.
391. Senate 1981.4ppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at 376, 383.
392. See In re Exxon: Complaint Counsel's First Statement ofIssues, FactualContentionsand
Proof(Oct. 31, 1981) (on file with author). See also FTC Narrows Case Against 8 OilFirms But
Alleges Possible Price 'Conspiracy, Wall St. J. Nov. 3, 1980, at 19, col. 2. Two months later the
FTC's staff also filed a statement in the Exxon proceeding outlining its views on relief. See FTC.
StaffEases flew In Oil Case, N.Y. Times Feb. 3, 1981, at D-l, col. 6.
393. On the auto investigation, see supra notes 335-36. On the Exxon case, see supra note 351.
394. House 1981 4ppropriationsHearings, supra note 263, at 12; House 1980 4ppropriations
Hearings,supra note 347, at 572, 583; House 1979 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at 813,
972; House 1978 AppropriationsHearings, supra note 382, at 3, 11.
395. See supra note 394; see also House 1979 AppropriationsHearings, supra note 347, at
818,936.
396. Note 394 supra;see also House 1979 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at 819,937.
397. Note 394 supra;see also House 1979 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at 820, 969
& 972.
398. Note 394 supra;see also House 1979,4ppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at 819.
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used a variety of approaches to raise competition concerns about these
and other industries.
Among the most salient initiatives begun from 1977 to 1980 were
Commission lawsuits. The FTC brought significant antitrust cases
dealing with monopolization and attempted monopolization,399 mergers,4 00 horizontal restraints, 40 1 and vertical restraints.402 The Commission issued complaints or decisions in several important cases involving
complex legal and economic issues such as strategic entry deterrence,
predation, and the acceptable range of dominant firm behavior generally;40 3 market signalling among firms in concentrated markets; 404 the
Colgate doctrine; 4° and the lawfulness of various vertical, horizontal,
and conglomerate mergers. 4 6 Other important facets of the Commission's litigation work included increased cooperation with state governments seeking to apply the results of FTC investigations in their own
lawsuits; 4°7 greater use of injunctions to halt potentially anticompetitive mergers; 408 and the development of new remedial devices such as
restitution.40 9
399. See, e.g., In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980); In re Sunkist
Growers, Inc., [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 121,315 (No. 9100, May 31,
1977), consent orderissued, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,793 (May 5, 1981).
400. See, ag., In re Exxon Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,599 (No. 9130, Aug. 1,
1979); In re Beatrice Foods Corp., [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 121,437
(No. 9112, June 29, 1978), order to cease anddesist issued, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,775
(Nov. 21, 1980).
401. See, eg., In re Ethyl Corp., [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REo. REP. (CCH)
21,579 (No. 9128, May 30, 1979), orderto cease and desist issued, 3 TRADE REO. REP. (CCH)
21,856 (Aug. 12, 1981); In re Indiana Dental Ass'n, 93 F.T.C. 392 (1979) (consent order).
402. See, ag., In re Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 3 TRADE REo. REP. (CCH) 1 21,719 (No.
9140, July 1, 1980).
403. See, ag., In re Borden Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978), 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,558 (6th
Cir. 1982); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980); In re Reuben H. Donnelly Corp.,
95 F.T.C. 1 (1980), enforcement denied sub nom. Official Airline Guides, Inc., v. FTC, 630 F.2d
920 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1362 (1981).
404. In re Ethyl Corp., [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REo. REP. (CCH) 1 21,579 (No.
9128, May 30, 1979).
405. Inre Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 121,719 (No. 9140, July 1,
1980), comrplaintdismissed, 3 TRADE REG. RaP. (CCH) 21,801 (Mar. 16, 1981).
406. See e.g., In re Exxon Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,599 (No. 9130, Aug. 1,
1979); In re Heublein, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 385 (1980).
407. See House 1978 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 382, at 16.
408. See, ag., FTC v. Exxon Corp., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 162,972 (D.D.C. 1979); FTC v.
Southland Corp., 471 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1979); see also House 1979 AppropriationsHearings,
supra note 347, at 1034; ABA MONOGRAPH No. 5, VOL. 11, supra 272, at 72-81. E. ROCKEFELLER,
DESK BOOK OF FTC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 115 (3d ed. 1979) ("The Commission has been
successful in using the threat of a preliminary injunction to force concessions.").
409. See In re Binney & Smith, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 625(1980); Milton Bradley Co., 96 F.T.C. 638
(1980); see also CompaniesAnte Up $1.2 MillionforAntitrust Restitution, Legal Times of Wash.,
Mar. 26, 1980, at 9, col. 1.
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These litigation projects, however, constituted only one of several
Commission approaches for developing competition policy. Programs
to stimulate research, analysis, and discussion of important antitrust
issues were also an important strategy. From 1977 to 1980, for example, the Commission sponsored conferences on solar energy industry
competition;41° health care competition; 411 media concentration; 412 social consequences of firm size and market structure;413 predation and
modern antitrust analysis; 4 14 and commercialization of new
technologies.415
The study of significant competition issues took other forms as
well. In this period the FTC's attorneys and economists published
working papers, protocols, and articles dealing with numerous matters
including business strategy, 416 predatory practices, 4 17 trademarks, 418 innDvation,41 9 the limits and purposes of the FTC's enabling acts, 420 and
the measurement of market power. 421 In addition the Commission
422
funded outside research by distinguished academicians on mergers,
dynamic economic analysis, 423 and the competitive effect of govern410. See FTC, THE SOLAR MARKET. PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON COMPETITION IN
THE SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRY (June 1978).
411. See FTC, COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
(June, 1977).
412. See BUREAU OF COMPETITION FTC, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON MEDIA CONCENTRATION (Dec. 1978).
413. See FTC, THE ECONOMICS OF FIPRM SIZE, MARKET STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL PERFORMANCE (July 1980).
414. See BUREAUS OF ECONOMICS AND COMPETITION, FTC, STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS (Sept. 1981) [hereinafter cited as STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS].
415. See OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS-BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC, THE COMPETITIVE
IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT-ASSISTED

COMMERCIALIZATION

PROGRAMS:

CONFERENCE

SUMMARY (Oct. 3, 1980).
416. See ag., Salop, StrategicEntry Deterrence,69 AM. ECON. REV. 335 (1979); E. MORRISON
& R. CRASWELL, PAPERS ON BUSINESS STRATEGY (Sept. 1980).
417. See, eg., Hilke, Advertising PredationandtheAreeda-Turner and Williamson Rules, 1980
J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 367; J. HURWITZ, W. KOVACiC, T. SHEEHAN, & R. LANDE,
Current Legal Standards of Predation, in STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS,
supra note 414, at 101.
418. See, ag., R. CRASWELL, TRADEMARKS, CONSUMER INFORMATION AND BARRIERS To
COMPETITION, (Jan. 1979).
419. See, ag., J. HILKE & C. GOLDFARB, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FTC ACTIVITIES AND
PRIVATE SECTOR TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH (Oct. 16, 1978).
420. See supra note 347.
421. See, ag., Kwoka, The Effect of Market Share Distributionon Industry Peformances, 61
REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 101 (1979).
422. See W. BOUCHER, THE PROCESS OF CONGLOMERATE MERGERS (1980); W. CARLETON,
R. HARRIS & J. STEWART, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MERGER MOTIVES (1980). These studies
were funded jointly by the FTC and the Small Business Administration.
423. See STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 414.
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ment procurement practices.4 2 4 These research projects supplemented
reports by the Bureaus of Competition and Economics. 425
Another important field was competition advocacy. The Commission expanded the intervention role it began earlier in the decade, and
participated in many proceedings before other government agencies.426
In addition, the Commission considered the use of rulemaking as a
competition enforcement approach.427 The FTC considered, but declined to issue rules governing certain conglomerate mergers; barring
physician organizations from controlling Blue Shield; and other openpanel medical prepayment plans and prohibiting the ownership of
crude oil and petroleum products pipelines by major integrated oil
companies. 428
3. Proposed Limitations
In 1979 and 1980, congressional dissatisfaction with some elements
of the FTC's competition and consumer protection work swelled into a
forceful movement to curtail certain specific projects and to redefine
424. See W. BALDWIN, THE IMPACT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ON COMPETITION IN COMMERCIAL MARKETS: CASE STUDIES OF THE ELECTRONICS AND HELICOPTER INDUSTRIES (1980).

425. From 1977 to 1980 the Commission published many staff studies, including reports on
selected concentrated industry sectors and issues earmarked by Congress for examination earlier
in the decade. See, e.g., FTC, MARKET SHARES, CONCENTRATION AND COMPETITION IN MANU-

FACTURING INDUSTRIES (1978); BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, SALES, PROMOTION, AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN Two PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKETS (Feb. 1977); see also FTC ANN.
REP. 77-80 (1980).
426. See, e.g., House 1981 AppropriationsHearings,supra note 263, at 142; Senate 1981.Appro.
priationsHearings,supra note 347, at 389; House 1979AppropriationsHearings,supra note 347, at
969; see also FTC, ANN. REP. 81-85 (1980). A brief summary of the types of FTC intervention
and commenting activities in the energy and transportation fields since 1976 indicates the program's scope and its importance to the agency's competition policy role. For the Department of
Energy, the FTC prepared comments on a variety of regulations affecting petroleum prices and
supplies. For the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Commission supplied comments in several proceedings dealing with pricing and entry for various categories of motor carriers. Fgr the
Civil Aercnautics Board, the Commission provided comments on several matters affecting fares
charged by domestic air carriers. For the Department of Interior, the Commission supplied comments on policies governing bids for leases to develop offshore oil and gas properties. For the
Department of Transportation, the Commission in 1979 assessed the competitive implications of
the application of the Texas Deepwater Port Authority to build a deepwater terminal facility in
the Gulf of Mexico.
427. See Address by A. Dougherty, Council on Antitrust and Trade Regulation of the Federal
Bar Association (Mar. 29, 1978) (New Directionsin Antitrust Enforcement: Competition Rulemak.
ing); Schorr, FTC Plansto Promote Competition by Use ofRules Now Limited to ConsumerArea,
Wall St. J. Jan. 26, 1977, at 38, col. 1.
428. FTC consideration of a possible pipeline rule began with the filing by Senator Kennedy
of a petition calling upon the Commission to commence such a proceeding. See 44 Fed. Reg.
35,237 (1979).
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the agency's underlying authority.4 29 The intensity and breadth of this
drive have been equalled only twice before in the agency's history-in
the meatpacking report4 30 and Cement Institute4 3 1 confrontations discussed earlier. Divisions within both chambers over the extent of re-

strictions to be imposed were so severe that the Commission's funding
lapsed on two occasions, forcing the agency to close its doors for the
first time ever.4 32 The Commission had gone without an authorization
bill for fiscal years 1978, 1979, and 1980-a portent of the discontent

of the Federal
that surfaced graphically in congressional consideration
3
Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980.1 1
Most of its provisions dealt with the consumer protection programs, but the Act also affected several FTC competition matters. It
prohibited the FTC from petitioning the Commissioner of Patents for

cancellation of a registered trademark on the ground that the trademark had become the common, descriptive name for an article or substance. 03 4 The Act barred the Commission from conducting any study
or investigation of agricultural marketing orders or prosecuting agricul-

tural cooperatives for conduct exempt from the antitrust laws by the
429. For three contemporaneous assessments of the reasons behind congressional moves to

limit the Commission's authority in 1979 and 1980, see Debate: The FederalTrade Commission
Under 4ttaclk"Should the Commission's Role be Changed? 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1481 (1982) (remarks by William Baxter, Philip Elman, Miles Kirkpatrick, and Robert Pitofsky); Gellhorn, The
Wages of Zealotry: The FTC under Siege, Jan./Feb. 1980 AEI J. ON Gov'T AND SOC'y 33;
Katzmann, Capitol iMll's CurrentAttack Against the FJ7C, Wall St. J., May 7, 1980, at 26, col. 3; M.
Pertschuk, supranote 9. Among the more perplexing tasks in attempting to explain this display of
legislative feeling is to determine the extent to which congressional displeasure with the FTC's
competition and consumer protection work contributed to the final result, or, alternatively,
whether the opposition aroused by either the FTC's competition or consumer protection programs
separately would have precipitated such a searching and, at times, impassioned review of the
agency's activities. Equally troublesome is to appraise the degree, if any, of additional scrutiny
and rebuke the agency received by serving as an outlet for deep-seated, popular frustrations with
government behavior that are only partly attributable to the FTC's work. The answers to these
and other questions are important to determining what lasting significance congressional actions
will have for the Commission's competition role.
430. See supra text accompanying notes 186-97.
431. See supra text accompanying notes 198-08.
432. The Commission formally ceased operations for two days in 1980 (May 1 and June 2).
Brown, FTC Temporarily Closed in Budget Dispute, Wash. Post, May 1, 1980, at B-1, col. 1;
Sulzberger, Jr.,After BriefShutdown, FTC Gets More Funds, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1980, at D-1, col.
1. Some congressmen regarded the funding lapse approvingly. Rep. Quillen said, "[Tlhe way to
kill a rattlesnake is to cut its head off. That is what we ought to do today." 126 CONG. RFc.
H2196 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1980).
433. Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
434. This provision effectively terminated the Commission's Lanham Act proceeding to cancel
the Formica trademark, marking the first time in the agency's history that Congress had intervened to eliminate an ongoing FTC adjudicatory proceeding. The Formica case was in discovery
when the 1980 authorization Act was passed. The Trademark Trial and Appeal board dismissed
the FTC's cancellation petition on June 13, 1980, and the FTC staff then moved for the Commission to formally close the matter.
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Capper-Volstead Act.43 The other limitation directly affecting the
Commission's choice of possible competition initiatives was a ban on
investigations relating to the business of insurance unless such studies
were authorized by a vote of either the House or Senate Commerce
Committee.436
The only other specific antitrust restriction to gain Congress' approval in this period was the Softdrink Interbrand Competition Act of
1980, 41 7 which exempts soft drink bottlers' exclusive territorial
franchises from antitrust challenge so long as there is competition in
the area from other soft-drink brands.43 The Act culminated long efforts by the bottlers to gain relief from the FTC's suit challenging the
439
industry's exclusive geographic territories.
In addition to the restrictions it did enact, Congress considered
other measures to limit the agency's competition work. The House Appropriations Subcommittee. nearly banned further funding for the
Commission's automobile industry investigation and Exxon monopolization suit;" 0 Senator Hatch introduced a bill to require the FTC to
bring all of its antitrust cases in the federal district courts, thus eliminating the agency's adjudicatory function in the competition field;441
and during consideration of the Senate version of the FTC's authorization bill, Senator McClure offered an amendment prohibiting FTC
scrutiny of state-regulated professions." 2 Finally, Senator Heflin proposed eliminating the Commission's power to order divestiture or other
forms of structural relief in non-merger cases. 443
435. The statute allowed the agency to complete its ongoing monopolization suit against the
Sunkist Growers. See supra note 399.
436. In a measure that affects the agency's competition investigations, the Act required all
compulsory process to be signed by a Commissioner acting pursuant to a Commission resolution.
Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 6, 94 Stat. 374, 384
(1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 46 (Supp. IV 1980).
437. Pub. L. No. 96-308, 94 Stat. 939 (1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3501-03 (Supp. IV 1980)).
438. See id.
439. Since 1972, Congress had given extensive consideration to bills similar to the 1980 Act.
See, e g., House CommitteeAppro ves Bottlers BillAllowing TerritorialRestrictions, [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE RaG. REP. (BNA) No. 973, at A-14 (June 1, 1976). The 1980 Act swept through
Congress with overwhelming support, as 310 congressmen co-sponsored the House bill alone.
440. See Sinclair, HousePaneiActs to Curb FTC Probes,Wash. Post, Sept. 14, 1979, at A-1 i,
coL 5-6.
441. See [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REp. (BNA) No. 938, at G-1 (Nov. 8, 1979).

442. See Senator ProposesLimitationson FTC's Jurisdiction Over ProfessionalGroups, [JulyDec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REo. REP. (BNA) No. 938, at A-22 (Nov. 8, 1979). If approved such a

measure would have ended the agency's competition proceedings dealing with the legal, medical,
and dental professions. Sims & Smith, FTCAssault: A Modem-day Roman Circus, Legal Times
of Wash., Dec. 10, 1979, at 18, col. 1. The McClure proposal failed by two votes to gain Senate
approval. 126 CONG. REc. S 1116 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1980).
443. See FederalTrade Commission-Divestiture HearingBefore the Subcommfor Consumers
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The policy views behind these measures were present in Congress
in the early 1970's but were held by only a minority of the congressional membership. Thus, though not a complete break from the past,
these actual and proposed restrictions signified a basic change in the
attitudes and preferences regarding the role of the FTC that Congress
had expressed for most of the decade. Significantly, recent experience
indicates that this congressional sentiment to pursue reversal of earlier
legislative policies has scarcely abated, even though FTC actions since
1980 have effectively mooted, in whole or in part, some of the antitrust
restrictions that failed to win approval from the 96th Congress. 444 Despite passage of the 1980 Improvements Act and the Commission's selfrestraint, congressional advocates of further limits on the agency's competition authority are now poised to accomplish major, unfinished elements of the legislative agenda from 1980.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Congress in 1914 gave the Federal Trade Commission expansive
competition authority in large measure because the legislature expected
to play an active role in ensuring that the agency faithfully pursued the
enabling statute's goals. Rigorous congressional review of the FTC's
competition programs fits squarely within the system of careful legislative oversight that Senator Cummins envisioned 68 years ago. 44 5 Indeed, it should startle no one that the 97th Congress would closely
appraise the Commission's antitrust initiatives or evaluate its competition policy role. From this Article's examination of the FTC's experience since 1969, and the forces that have shaped its evolution since
1914 emerge several considerations that are relevant to current congressional debate over the Commission's future.
The first consideration concerns the proper basis for altering the
of the Senate Comm on Commerce, Science, andTransportation,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1979).

If enacted the Heflin measure would have effectively barred the Commission from ordering divestiture in its ongoing monopolization suits, notably the Kellogg and Exxon cases. Id. at 9-16
(remarks of Commissioner Pitofsky). Perhaps more than any other proposed antitrust limitation
to receive attention in 1979 and 1980, the Heflin bill represented an abrupt departure from the
tone and substance of congressional guidance in the 1970's concerning the Commission's powers.
See Id at 97-110.
444. For example, since passage of the 1980 Act, the Commission has closed its investigation
of the automobile industry and discontinued its cereal and petroleum monopolization suits. See

supra notes 289-90; FTCDropsCerealsCase, [Jan.-June] ANTIRUST & TRADE REr. REP. (BNA)
No. 1048, at 154 (Jan. 21, 1982); FTC Drops Complaint in Exxon Proceeding, [July-Dec.] AtITRUST & TRADE Ro. REP. (BNA) No. 1031, at A-28 (Sept. 17, 1981). These initiatives were
subjects of one or more of the restrictions discussed above.
445. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
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FTC's statutory charter. Although the desirability of scrupulous congressional oversight is beyond dispute, 446 the grounds on which some

members of Congress now propose to restrict the FTC's antitrust powers are questionable. Congress can legitimately probe many aspects of
the agency's competition performance and ask searching questions
about both the substantive merits of the Commission's antitrust programs and the skill with which the FTC has carried them out; but there

is no principled basis for curtailing the agency's antitrust authority on
the premise that the Commission has contradicted congressional guidance. 447 The FTC's choice of competition programs and enforcement
strategies during the 1970's was consistent with the legislature's articulated preferences. And new limiting legislation that grounds itself on
the Commission's supposed past infidelity to Congress' will builds on
an illusion." 8
An issue closely related to the consistency of FTC programs with
congressional guidance is whether Congress in fact exerts meaningful
influence over the Commission's choice of enforcement programs. 4 9
446. As Joseph Harris states the principle, "It is not enough for a legislature to enact policies
.. . into law; it must check to see how those policies are being executed, whether they are accomplishing the desired results, and, if not, what corrective action the legislature may appropriately
prescribe." J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 1 (1964).
447. As Robert Katzmann commented in May of 1980, "it is clear that the [Commission's]
activities in the last decade have not not defied congressional policy expressions." Katzmann,
Capitol Hill's Current Attack Against the FTC, Wall St. J., May 7, 1980, at 26, col. 3.
This Article has focused upon congressional guidance concerning the FTC's antitrust activities, but its conclusions are largely applicable to congressional oversight of Commission consumer
protection programs, as well. Many such initiatives, which have been the subject of intense congressional criticism in recent years, received strong legislative support in the early and mid-1970's.
The Commission's efforts to regulate television advertising directed toward children is an outstanding example. Several oversight and appropriations committees directed the Commission to
give this program a high priority and to emphasize binding enforcement strategies, rather than
voluntary, cooperative programs with industry. See, e.g., Senate Commerce Comm. 1974 Opersight
Hearings,supranote 216, at2, 309,317,344,347 (remarks of Sens. Moss and Pastore); Senate 1975
AppropriationsHearings,supra note 330, at 1190-95 (remarks of Sen. McGee); see also S. REP. No.
285, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 53 (1977)
The [Senate Appropriations] Committee shares the Commission's growing concern
about the effects of advertising on children. The Committee therefore encourages the
Commission to revievW its current expenditures to determine if sufficient funds can be
made available from fiscal year 1977 resources to implement a viable program in this
critical area.
Id.
448. Weingast and Moran argue that congressional complaints that the FTC failed to abide by
legislative guidance should mnStead be acknowledged as dissatisfaction with the prevailing policy
views of Congress in the early to mid-1970's. They write: "Despite the political rhetoric about a
runaway, uncontrollable bureaucracy being responsible for the 1979-81 sanctions ... these sanctions were instead tied to the committee changeover that brought to bear congressional control
due to legislators with markedly different preferences." Weingast & Moran, supra note 9, at 46.
449. There is an active debate among commentators over the extent to which Congress controls the activities of the FTC and other regulatory agencies. One view contends that independent
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Many of the proposed reforms now under congressional review stem
from the assumption that Congress at present exercises only minimal
control over the FTC's activities.4 5 0 A major implication of the analysis in this Article is that the substantial congruency of congressional
antitrust preferences and FTC antitrust programs in the 1970's was not
mere coincidence. Rather, the 1970's were a period of powerful legislative influence in the Commission's competition activities. From 1969 to
1976 in particular, Congress used virtually every tool at its disposal to
move the FTC toward far-reaching applications of its antitrust powers.
With great force and effect, Congress stressed that the Commission's
well-being depended upon its development of ambitious, aggressive enforcement programs.4 5 1 Moreover, the history of congressional oversight since 1914 indicates that the FTC would not have pursued such a
course had Congress not urged it to do so. To depict the 1970's as a
time in which Congress functioned as an inattentive, ineffective over-

seer, leaving the FTC to account only to itself, stands the situation on
its head.4 52

Beyond questioning some proposed bases for limiting the Coinregulatory bodies generally operate independently of the legislature. In this model, congressional
oversight of regulatory agencies is largely ineffective in influencing agency behavior. See, e.g., K.
Clarkson & T. Muris, supranote 9 at 18-34; J. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 391 (1980);
L. DODD & R. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 2 (1979). The opposing
view holds that regulatory agency actions are the products of congressional guidance. Under this
model, Congress has a decisive impact on agency behavior through its use of a variety of incentive
systems. See, e.g., W. CARY, POLITICS AND REGULATORY AGENCIES 57-59 (1967); D. MAYHEW,
supra note 215, at 134-35; Weingast & Moran, supra note 9, at 45-47.
450. See Weingast & Moran, supra note 9, at 46-47.
451. This was the message, for example, in Senator McGee's advice in 1971 to Miles Kirkpatrick that the Commission should err on the side of trying too much, rather than attempting too
little. See supra text accompanying note 221. It was also the spirit in which Senator Stevens told
Lewis Engman in 1973 to become a "real zealot" in executing his duties as FTC Chairman. See
supra text accompanying note 224.
452. The argument that the Commission operated in the 1970's without effective external constraints assumes that institutions other than Congress which might have restrained the agency
declined to do so. In assessing the role of the federal judiciary in this period, for example, some
commentators have concluded that the federal courts gave uncritical review to FTC cases that
rested upon disputed or expansive applications of the agency's authority. See, e.g., K. Clarkson &
T. Muris, supra note 9, at 35-49. Some decisions of this period, such as the Supreme Court's
opinion in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 223 (1972), unquestionably gave a broad
reading to the agency's substantive powers. But an arguably truer measure of the closeness of
judicial scrutiny in the 1970's and its influence upon the Commission is the manner in which
courts, in the latter part of the decade, reviewed the products of specific, concrete attempts by the
FTC to apply what nominally was a generous definition of its authority. A review of decisions on
the merits by the federal courts and the Commission itself in antitrust cases decided from 1977 to
1980, however, reveals no apparent inclination to give the FTC a free rein in its choice and prosecution of antitrust theories. See, e.g., Official Airlines Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1362 (1981); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir.
1980); In re E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980).
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mission's authority, this Article also suggests several factors that deserve serious consideration during the current congressional debate.
One important factor in weighing the merits of the agency's antitrust
performance would be to review what Congress expected of the agency
throughout the 1970's. From the FTC's creation in 1914 to the present,
Congress and the nation generally have expected things of the Commission at different times. Any contemporary evaluation of the FTC's
record that does not take into account the rules to which the Commission was expected to conform in the 1970's cannot serve as a reliable
guide for prescribing the agency's future activities or rewriting its statute. A complete and accurate assessment must necessarily acknowledge changes in the views of congressmen and commentators about
what constitutes good performance.453
Historical retrospection would shed light upon the Commission's
record in at least one other important respect. By almost any yardstick,
the past decade has differed markedly from any in the FTC's past. The
tremendous expansion (by way of judicial interpretation and statute) of
the agency's substantive, remedial, and investigatory powers; major,
sustained budget increases; and the sudden, substantive reorientation
of its competition and consumer protection agendas placed immense
strains on the Commission. These developments required it to simultaneously develop new planning and management systems and to initiate
programs that fulfilled the more ambitious role Congress expected it to
perform. Recent years seem to have produced a gradual consolidation
453. The assumptions by which commentators have criticized regulatory agency performance
have depended greatly on the age in which the criticism is delivered and the enforcement preferences of the commentators. For example, in his lectures on The Administrative Process in 1938,
James Landis described the main failing of administrative agencies in these terms:
The pressing problem today. . . is to get the administrative to assume the responsibilities that it properly should assume. Political and official life to too great an extent tends
to favor routinization. The assumption of responsibility by an agency is always a gamble
that may well make more enemies than friends. The easiest course is frequently that of
inaction. A legalistic approach that reads a governing statute with the hope of finding
limitations upon authority rather than grants of power with which to act decisively is
thus common.
J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 75 (1938). His lectures were given at a time when, as
he put it, "the drive against monopoly on the part of the Federal Trade Commission [had] dwin" Id. at 113.
dled into a mere campaign against false advertising... ...
As this Article has suggested, congressional expectations can vary considerably over time, as
well. For example, one cannot fully understand the origins or approach of the recently concluded
generation of government monopolization cases concerning the computer, telephone, breakfast
cereal, and petroleum industries without reference to the congressional and academic ferment that
supported such initiatives in the late 1960's and early 1970's. See supra note 444; Justice Settes
AT&T Case, [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1047, at 82 (Jan. 14, 1982);
Antitrust Division DismissesIBM Case, [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REO. REP. (BNA) No.

1047, at 88 (Jan. 14, 1982).
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of the agency's expanded resources, authority, and management and
planning reforms. Outward signs of this trend include stronger emphasis on planning, research, and preliminary screening in choosing and
shaping competition programs; closer attention to program management and the refinement of information systems on which such management greatly depends; and greater sensitivity to theoretical and
practical concerns affecting the economically sensible application of
competition policy. The legislative activity of the past few years often
has tended to obscure these significant developments.
Finally, a broad historical review would offer a useful perspective
on what substantive functions the FTC should serve in the antitrust
field. Congress in 1914 perceived a serious need for an administrative
body that could incrementally adjust the boundaries of antitrust law to
conform with modern learning in law and economics. As it prescribes
the FTC's antitrust role for the 1980's, Congress might profitably consider whether its predecessors' conception of the agency in 1914 suits its
needs today. This issue, not an imagined refusal of the Commission to
heed legislative guidance, arguably lies at the heart of the matter.
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